The importance of preaching to the converted : The strategic use of campaign rallies, campaign promises, clientelism, and violence in African elections by Rauschenbach, Mascha
The Importance of Preaching to the Converted:
The Strategic Use of Campaign Rallies, Campaign Promises,
Clientelism,
and Violence in African Elections
Mascha Rauschenbach
February 2015
The Importance of Preaching to the Converted:
The Strategic Use of Campaign Rallies, Campaign
Promises, Clientelism,
and Violence in African Elections
Mascha Rauschenbach
Inaugural dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the Doctor of Social Sciences
in the Graduate School of Economic and Social Sciences
at the University of Mannheim
Dean of the School of Social Sciences at the University of Mannheim: Prof. Dr. Michael Diehl
Date of the defense: 23 April, 2015
First Examiner: Prof. Sabine C. Carey (Phd), University of Mannheim
Second Examiner: Prof. Dr. Le´onard Wantchekon, Princeton University
Third Examiner: Prof. Dr. Marc Debus, University of Mannheim
iv
vUNIVERSITY OF MANNHEIM
SUMMARY OF THE DISSERTATION
This dissertation addresses one of the main puzzles concerning elections in young democracies:
Why do undecided voters receive so little attention in parties’ election campaigns? While most theoret-
ical models would expect parties to focus their campaign efforts on voters who do not have strong pref-
erences for any party, this is not what the empirical evidence from young democracies shows. Rather,
parties spend much time and money on campaigning among their own supporters, which is what the
standard models would simply regard as a waste of valuable resources. I provide three key answers for
this puzzle. First, parties do not waste resources on courting their supporters who are certain to turn
out, at the expense of campaigning among swing voters. They rather mobilize those supporters who
would otherwise not go and vote. Second, in contexts where campaign promises have little credibility,
the organizers concentrate their energy on voters who are likely to trust them the most, namely their
core supporters. Third, in situations in which parties use electoral violence to affect election outcomes,
they concentrate their intimidation strategies on citizens who would be difficult to win over, so as to
disenfranchise them. This frees up resources to offer benefits to their supporters to mobilize them to
turn out on Election Day.
The arguments are subjected to various empirical tests analyzing a range of campaign strategies used by
presidential candidates in young democracies, and potentially in more established democracies as well.
These strategies include: visits by presidential candidates to electoral constituencies to hold campaign
rallies; promises of local club goods to constituencies as opposed to national programmatic promises;
and attempts at winning votes using voter bribery as opposed to exercising violence. I test predictions
of my argument applying a range of methodological approaches and using various original data sources.
During fieldwork in Ghana, I collected event data on the journeys of presidential candidates across the
country on the basis of content-analysis of two daily newspapers during the campaigning period. In
addition, I compiled audio recordings from these campaign rallies and conduct content-analysis of the
campaign speeches these candidates held. Furthermore, I conducted qualitative interviews with cam-
paign managers at the national, regional and constituency level as well as focus group interviews with
voters. In addition to these observational data, I carried out a survey experiment on the credibility of
campaign promises. To establish external validity for the findings from campaigns in Ghana, I compile
individual and regional-level data on the use of clientelism and violence in a total of 10 African coun-
tries, combining Afrobarometer survey data with regional-level election data.
The overall results show that candidates use campaign rallies, campaign promises and clientelistic be-
nefits largely to mobilize turnout among their potential supporters. The findings further show that can-
didates concentrate promises of local club goods in contexts in which they enjoy a comparatively high
level of credibility. In line with my expectation, the incumbent makes many of such local promises in
constituencies where his partisans are concentrated. Furthermore, it is nearly exclusively the incumbent
who promises local club goods in the first place. As incumbents already exercise discretion over the use
of public resources at the time of the campaign and can thus make costly investments, their promises are
more credible than those of opposition candidates. The results from the survey experiment conducted in
Ghana’s capital Accra confirm that the incumbent is regarded as more credible with his promises than
the challenger. They further support my argument that partisans evaluate campaign promises made by
vi
the candidate they support as much more credible than if the same promises are attributed to a different
candidate. Finally, in line with the hypothesis that parties concentrate bribes or promises of redistri-
bution on their partisans, because they can disenfranchise voters that do not support them, I find that
independent voters and those living in contested regions are most at risk of being subjected to violent
intimidation.
This dissertation thus provides key answers for the puzzle of why parties in young democracies court
their own supporters so intensely. The findings also have important implications for the study of election
campaigning in young democracies, beyond this puzzle. The evidence presented shows that the preval-
ence of mobilization as a campaigning strategy has been seriously under-estimated by past research.
This informs an important debate in the literature and speaks in favor of turnout-buying rather than
vote-buying, and mobilization rather than persuasion. The dissertation also advances recent efforts to
integrate the use of clientelism and violence as repertoires of campaign strategies. The findings suggest
that these two strategies are used among different types of voters and with different goals.
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1Chapter 1
Introduction
“There is a saying that, that’s like in the Bible. The man who had [...] a hundred sheep
and one got lost. He left the ninety-nine and went to look for the one. We will keep the
ninety-nine and then if there’s time, you go and look for the one. What I’m trying to say is
that we make sure that we protect our strongholds, before we go and look for ..., let’s say
where you know are not our strongholds.”
In this quote a member of a regional campaign team of the main opposition party in Ghana explains the
rationale behind choosing the electoral constituencies where the presidential campaign focused time and
money during Ghana’s 2012 election campaigns. In the interview, the politician of the New Patriotic
Party (NPP) goes on to emphasize how his party needed to spend considerable effort on mobilizing
voters in its strongholds, because it could not be taken for granted that these constituencies would remain
strongholds.1 This short narrative paints an unusual image; the more common impression gained from
observing presidential campaigns in the United States (US) is that parties focus their time and money
on trying to convince undecided voters to vote for them, rather than wasting resources on voters who
have already decided to vote for them, and thus campaign heavily in swing states (Althaus, Nardulli and
Shaw, 2002, p. 53, Hill and McKee, 2005, Shaw, 1999). The expectation that it should make more sense
for a party to spend money on convincing voters who are indifferent between the party and a competing
1MR: “Ok. So that means you go to strongholds, although you’ve already won them? Is that not a waste of energy?”
NPP: “No, it changes. Greater Accra is a swing place, it can swing to the NDC. For that matter, you need to concentrate much
more [energy here] and then make sure you don’t lose what you have.”
MR: “So in Greater Accra, you don’t have these very [...] safe havens that favor you likey you have in Ashanti Region or in
Eastern Region where you don’t even need to go?”
NPP: “Yes. There are four constituencies, which we have never lost before. We have never lost these constituencies before.
The other ones, we have lost [them] before. We have never lost these constituencies before.”
MR: “So for the ones you have never lost before, do you do rallies there or do you not have to go there?”
NPP: “Yeah, we go there. We go there. Because the dynamics changes (sic!) in Greater Accra. People go in and out and for
that matter, you cannot be sure where people don’t have strong preferences. Because people come in here, because most of our
businesses are concentrated and they come in here when they are old they go, retired people leave [from] here with their whole
families” (Interview with a member of a regional campaign team of the NPP, 28 November, 2014).
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party in the election, rather than motivating its own supporters to turn out on Election Day is based
on a simple calculus: If a party offers some kind of benefit to a supporter – for example, money or a
campaign promise, and if this campaigning effort has the intended effect, the voter will turn out and vote
for the party she was likely to vote for anyway.2 Had the supporter not been “mobilized”, she would
have stayed at home. This buys the party an advantage of one additional vote. If, however, the party
succeeded in gaining a vote from a new voter, this does not only win the party one additional vote, but
it also might take away one vote from the rival party for whom the voter would potentially have voted,
had she not been offered a benefit. Thus persuading an undecided voter buys the party net two votes,
while motivating one of their supporters to turn out to vote only buys the party one vote (Gans-Morse,
Mazzuca and Nichter, 2014, pp. 418-419). Indeed a member of the national campaign team of the NPP
confirms a picture in line with these theoretical expectations:
“The core support: For those groups, nothing you say is going to make a difference. For they
vote according to the acquisitions. And the acquisitions are developed either by historical
circumstances or very deep emotional circumstances. So it is not the economy, for example,
that makes them change their mind. If NPP is in power, half their voters will always vote
NPP. If NDC is in power, no matter how bad the economy is, supporters vote NDC. That
leaves a middle ground of about five to 10% maximum. Those are the people we search for.”
1.1 Motivation and research question
Despite the fact that parties would be better off convincing new voters than focusing on mobilizing core
voters, empirical studies on the types of voters which campaigns actually address, paint a mixed picture.
Some find that parties focus on mobilizing their supporters in settings as diverse as Argentina (Nichter,
2008, Stokes, Nazareno and Brusco, 2013, p.67-72), India (Dunning and Nilekani, 2013), Mexico and
Venezueala (Stokes, Nazareno and Brusco, 2013, p.67-72) and Taiwan (Liu, 1999), while other studies
on campaigns in Argentina (Stokes, 2005) and the United States, for example (Althaus, Nardulli and
Shaw, 2002; Hill and McKee, 2005; Shaw, 1999) show that parties undertake great efforts to attract
unaligned voters. Yet other investigations of campaigning activities in elections in Lebanon (Corstange,
2012) or Spain (Albright, 2008, p. 720), for example, contend that parties pursue a mix of strategies.
These contrasting views raise an important question: why do parties often concentrate their campaign
efforts on their own supporters if there would be more to be gained from attracting new voters?
Past research suggests that parties are more likely to campaign among their supporters if party alignment
is strong (Rohrschneider, 2002, p. 377) and when parties are mass parties (Duverger, 1954, p.23, Katz
2I use the terms indifferent, undecided and independent voters interchangeably throughout this dissertation. They all refer
to voters who do not prefer any of the main candidates in an election, over another candidate or party.
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and Mair, 1995, p.7). Furthermore, spatial models of party competition have assumed that consensus-
based systems with larger numbers of parties than two-party systems set incentives for parties to mo-
bilize core voters, in order to avoid defection to other parties (Bowler and Farrel, 1992). In contrast,
majoritarian systems are expected to provide parties with incentives to compete for independent voters,
because party supporters can be relatively safely ignored, since they have few alternatives to voting for
the party which they have supported in the past (Bowler and Farrel, 1992). It is not clear, however, what
expectations we can draw from this literature for campaign strategies in Sub-Saharan Africa (hereafter
often referred to as Africa). On the one hand, party systems are generally volatile and partisan alignment
is considered to be weak (Mozaffar and Scarrit, 2005), which might push parties toward a mobilization
strategy. On the other hand, oftentimes voters seem to be casting their votes along ethnic lines (e.g.
Bratton, Bhavnani and Chen, 2013). Given this, parties might not worry too much about their supporters
defecting to rival parties with different ethnic profiles and hence concentrate on persuading independent
voters who do not have a co-ethnic candidate in the race.
It is important to understand the logic of campaigning in Sub-Saharan Africa not only to inform a schol-
arly debate about whether it is more rational for parties to motivate their supporters to go and vote or to
make voters change their vote intentions. The relevance of the question of which type of voters African
parties focus their campaign appeals on, and why, goes well beyond this scholarly debate. Parties in
African elections often use illicit campaign strategies in addition to modern campaigning tools. The
(re-)introduction of multi-party competition in Africa in the beginning of the 1990s starkly raised the
stakes for winning elections. This has resulted, particularly in contexts in which “restraints upon the be-
havior of candidates [...] [is low],” in election campaigns marred by the wide-spread use of manipulative
campaign strategies such as voter bribery, fraud and violence (Collier and Vicente, 2012, p. 117).
In such contexts it is important to understand which voters parties are trying to manipulate by buying
their support with small benefits and potentially to divert their attention from evaluating these parties
based on their broad national policies. Furthermore, this study helps us to identify the groups of voters
who are most at risk to be intimidated with violence.
1.2 Main theoretical argument
The central argument developed in this dissertation is that although concentrating campaign efforts on
undecided voters would win parties more votes than motivating their supporters to turn out, in many
contexts it makes sense to concentrate campaigning on one’s own partisans, as the benefits of doing
so often outweigh the costs necessary to win over new voters. There are essentially three reasons that
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might lead parties to focus their campaigning efforts on their supporters. First, parties might be mobiliz-
ing turnout among potential supporters, rather than wasting benefits on those supporters who are likely
to vote. Second, their supporters might be more responsive to parties’ campaign appeals, than other
voters. Third, parties often have other strategies at hand with which they address independent voters.
While they might be using campaign rallies, campaign promises and clientelistic benefits to mobilize
turnout among likely supporters, parties might be demobilizing independent voters by using intimidation
and violence, because they then avoid the costs of trying to convince these voters.
1.3 Empirical approach
I put the central argument to empirical test by analyzing the use of a range of campaign tools, using
different methodological approaches. These tools are different forms of campaigning which are likely to
be of particular relevance in elections in Sub-Saharan Africa, where a substantial part of the electorate
does not have access to modern media, and where campaigners need to invest time and money to reach
voters directly.3 The tools used are the hosting of campaign rallies, promises of local public goods and
electoral clientelism as well as voter intimidation.
I investigate the strategic allocation of campaign rallies, campaign promises, and the credibility of these
promises in the context of Ghana’s 2012 presidential elections. I compile a novel event dataset on cam-
paign rally events by the two main candidates in these elections during three months of campaigning
prior to the election, using content-analysis of two daily newspapers. To investigate the strategic use of
campaign promises, I collect original recordings of speeches by the two main candidates at these rally
events during the same campaigning period. I use these two datasets to conduct quantitative analyses of
the allocation of campaign rallies and campaign promises across electoral constituencies, characterized
by their voting and turnout histories. To test the plausibility of various theoretical mechanisms, which I
assume to be at work, I conduct interviews with campaign managers of the two main parties in Ghana,
who organized the campaigns at the national, regional and constituency level.
To test one central assumption of my argument, I conduct a survey experiment among a sample of 447
respondents in the capital Accra two weeks prior to the election. In this experiment, I test whether par-
tisans and independent voters differ in how credible they find various campaign promises. I also test
whether promises of local public goods are more credible than promises about national public goods
and whether the incumbent is more credible in promising future benefits than the challenger.
3See for example Bleck and van de Walle (2013) on the importance for parties of reaching voters in African elections
through campaign rallies.
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In the analysis of the allocation of campaign promises across electoral constituencies and of the cred-
ibility of campaign promises, I introduce a distinction between local and national promises, which is
based on a number of theoretical considerations laid out in Chapter 2. To test the plausibility of this
conceptualization, I conduct focus group interviews with groups of voters in the same areas in Accra,
where I conducted the survey experiment.
The test of the predictions regarding the use of clientelism and violence as campaign strategies are per-
formed on a sample of elections in 10 African countries. I compile a cross-sectional dataset on the
use of clientelism and voter intimidation in elections which took place between 2007 and 2011, based
on Afrobarometer data from the round 5 of the survey. I match these survey data with regional-level
election data, which I compile from various sources. I use the resulting dataset to conduct a multi-level
analysis, in which I model the likelihood of a voter to be targeted with clientelism and to suffer from
violent intimidation to depend on her affiliation with the parties campaigning and her likelihood to turn
out, as well as the level of competitiveness and past turnout of the region she lives in.
1.4 Case selection
Ghana was selected as the main case study for this dissertation for three core reasons. The most import-
ant one; in analyzing the question of whether parties predominantly use campaign rallies and campaign
promises to mobilize their own supporters or to attract new voters, Ghana is a country which put my
argument to a particularly tough test. Party alignment in Ghana is relatively strong when compared to
other African countries (e.g. Osei 2012), and the number of swing voters is comparatively low (Lindberg
and Morrison, 2005). In view of these characteristics, existing models in the literature on modern cam-
paigning would lead us to expect presidential candidates in Ghana to focus on attracting independent
voters and to campaigning in swing constituencies (e.g. Rohrschneider, 2002, p. 377). If my predictions
hold, and parties spend considerable time and money on mobilizing their supporters, rather than pre-
dominantly campaigning among independent voters, then this is likely to also be true for other African
countries, where party systems are generally more fragmented and volatile compared to Ghana (see
Mozaffar and Scarrit, 2005; van de Walle, 2003).
The second reason for choosing Ghana: it lends itself to analyzing the strategic allocation of campaign
resources across groups of voters, because elections in Ghana are particularly close-run races. This can
be illustrated for example by the fact that the NDC won the presidential run-off election in 2008 by a
mere .5% (Weghorst and Lindberg, 2013, p. 722) and by under 3% in the 2012 election.4 The contests
4My own calculation, based on official election results.
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between the NDC and the NPP have been extremely competitive since the re-introduction of multiparty
politics in 1992 and have led to shifts in power in both 2000 and 2008 (Weghorst and Lindberg, 2013,
p.722). In such a context, campaigning can be expected to be highly strategic. In addition to elections
generally being competitive, the circumstance that the ruling party’s candidate was only endorsed three
months prior to the election, made it imperative for the NDC to be particularly strategic in allocating the
candidate’s limited time across the country. The original candidate who had won the primaries in 2011,
the late president John Evans Atta Mills, had unexpectedly passed away on July 25, 2012. His vice pres-
ident John Dramani Mahama, was only endorsed as the new flagbearer for the NDC in the presidential
elections in September, 2012.
The third and final reason for choosing Ghana: parties in Ghana exhibit a considerably high level of
organization (Osei, 2012), compared to parties in other African countries. Therefore, it is plausible to
assume that the variation in campaigning activity across the country I observe, is a function of central
decisions made by the campaign management, and not simply a result of variation at the local party
level.
1.5 Outline of the dissertation
The remainder of Chapter 1 provides a brief discussion of the main theoretical and empirical contribu-
tions made by this dissertation. Chapter 2 defines key concepts of different campaign strategies which
the dissertation investigates, and reviews existing approaches to studying the logic of campaigning in
young democracies, and elsewhere.
Chapter 3 develops the dissertation’s central theoretical argument. It relaxes three assumptions under-
lying earlier models in the study of campaigning concerning the distribution of benefits to voters, which
are problematic when examining campaigning in African elections: First, that voters vary in their ideo-
logical distance to parties; second, that parties always deliver on their promises; and third, that they do
not intentionally demobilize voters.
Chapter 4 presents the approaches in measuring campaigning strategies which are used in this disserta-
tion. It describes the data collection during field work in Ghana and the nature of the different datasets
that the empirical analyses in Chapters 5 to 8 are based on.
Chapter 5 analyzes how past levels of turnout and the distribution of supporters impact the candidates’
choices of where to go on their campaign trail. Using original data, I investigate the allocation of cam-
paign rallies across the 275 electoral constituencies in Ghana. In line with my argument that parties
should be campaigning among potential supporters, I find that the incumbent focuses his visits on con-
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stituencies where his partisans are concentrated, and in which past levels of turnout have been low.
Based on content-analysis of campaign speeches held at these rallies, Chapter 6 investigates to which
constituencies the candidates make promises of local public goods. The results suggest that candidates
indeed concentrate local promises in contexts in which they enjoy a comparatively high level of cred-
ibility. In line with my expectation, the incumbent makes more promises of local public goods to his
party’s strongholds than in swing constituencies, and much more frequently than the challenger. This
supports the argument that candidates concentrate the use of local promises in contexts where they are
most credible.
Chapter 7 reports the findings from a unique survey experiment conducted in Ghana’s capital immedi-
ately prior to the elections. I test whether voters do indeed regard promises of local public goods as more
credible when they are made by candidates whose party they feel close to. Additionally, I test whether
the incumbent is generally more credible in making such promises compared to the challenger. The
findings, which are corroborated with results from qualitative focus group interviews, largely support
these expectations.
In Chapter 8, the argument that parties should be concentrating their campaign efforts on potential sup-
porters, is put to yet another test. In line with the findings from Ghana’s 2012 campaigns and further
corroborating my argument, I find that partisans and voters living in the main parties’ strongholds are
more likely to receive bribes than others. Moreover, voters living in regions that have a low turnout
history are more likely to be targeted than those living in other regions. Finally, in line with the argu-
ment that parties concentrate bribes or promises of benefits on partisans, because they can disenfranchise
voters that do not support them, I find that independent voters and those living in contested regions are
most at risk of being subjected to violent intimidation.
1.6 Central contributions
1.6.1 Theoretical contributions
Extending turnout-buying and vote-buying models
I build on existing models of distributive campaigning (Cox and McCubbins, 1986; Lindbeck and
Weibull, 1987; Nichter, 2008; Stokes, 2005) by relaxing three central assumptions which are unfounded
in the context of African elections. These are (a) that voters vary in their ideological distance to parties;
(b) that parties always deliver on their promises; and (c) that they do not intentionally demobilize voters.
My argument builds on the assumption that voters vary in the trust they put in campaign promises made
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by different candidates more than in their preferences regarding promises made by these candidates.
Voters who are affiliated with a party tend to find promises by their party’s candidate more credible than
other voters, and are hence more receptive to this person’s campaign appeals. As parties do not always
deliver benefits to voters prior to the election, but oftentimes only after voting has taken place, they
could in principle renege on their promises. This, in turn, can incentivize voters to vote as they please.
In order to prevent voters from doing this, parties focus their campaign effort on situations in which they
enjoy most credibility. This can account for why parties focus so much time and money on courting
their own supporters on the campaign trail. Lastly, I relate models of campaigning to recent studies on
the use of electoral violence as a strategy to impact elections (e.g. Daxecker, 2014; Hafner-Burton and
Hyde, 2014; Wilkinson and Haid, 2009), and extend the repertoire of parties’ campaigning strategies
to include the use of violence to demobilize voters (e.g. Bratton, 2008; Gonzalez Ocantos et al., 2013;
Gutie´rrez-Romero, 2014).
A wholistic model of campaigning
This dissertation makes efforts to integrate the literature on modern campaigning, clientelism, dis-
tributive politics and electoral violence. Combining the various elements is important, as the choice
of a particular strategy to address a selected group of voters is likely to be conditioned by how effect-
ive parties consider another strategy might be. The fact that a group of voters who seem neglected
by one strategy, might actually be targeted with a different strategy, can provide important answers to
the puzzle why parties should focus campaign efforts on their own supporters. I develop an argument
whereby parties can mobilize voters via campaign rallies, campaign promises and clientelistic targeting,
and demobilize other voters through the use of violence.
1.6.2 Empirical and methodological contributions
Conceptualizing distributive appeals as campaign promises
To date, research investigating the logic of clientelistic targeting has mainly relied on voter surveys
(Brusco, Nazareno and Stokes, 2004; Lindberg and Morrisson, 2008; Stokes, 2005; Young, 2009). Typ-
ically, these studies are interested in understanding the strategic calculations made by parties as to which
types of voters they will target. However, it is far from obvious that patterns in targeting which emerge
from the surveys are a direct function of electoral strategies employed by candidates. It is highly likely
that a considerable amount of variation in the allocation of goods is a function of interests of those
agents carrying out the distribution of benefits in the geographical units under study. Stokes, Nazareno
and Brusco (2013) argue that in the case of clientelistic benefits, the patterns by which voters are tar-
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geted is a function of the interests of local intermediaries directly addressing these voters, rather than the
outcome of strategic decisions by the party leaders. I contribute to this literature by measuring electoral
strategies directly, through studying the strategic use of promises of local public goods by presidential
candidates.
An experimental test of the credibility of campaign promises
In order to investigate whether parties mobilize their supporters, or attempt to convince undecided voters,
it is important to test whether partisans and independent voters vary in their receptiveness to campaign
appeals. As shown in more detail in Chapter 2, this question has not been sufficiently addressed for
campaigning strategies used in African elections. I address this question by carrying out an experimental
test of voters’ receptiveness to campaign promises among both partisans and independent voters.
Taking voters’ likelihood to turn out into account
Research which has provided insight into whether parties mobilize their supporters or try to convince
independent voters has so far classified voters by their political inclinations (e.g. Berry, Burden and
Howell, 2010; Calvo and Murillo, 2004; Dahlberg and Johansson, 2002; Dunning and Nilekani, 2013;
Lindberg and Morrisson, 2008; Stokes, 2005). Swing or independent voters have been characterized
by their political affiliation with the parties contesting the elections, but their likelihood to turn out
has not much been studied.5 One reason why the question of whether parties buy votes or turnout
remains unresolved, is that past research has not systematically studied whether campaigners target
voters who are likely or unlikely to vote. In Chapters 5 to 8, I address this shortcoming by systematically
investigating the effect of both past turnout and levels of support for candidates, on how they allocate
campaign rallies, campaign promises, as well as clientelistic benefits.
5For an exception see Stokes, Nazareno and Brusco (2013, pp. 67–72).
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Chapter 2
Existing research on the use and the
effectiveness of campaigning strategies in
new democracies
This dissertation investigates different forms of campaigning which are likely to be of particular relev-
ance in elections in young democracies. In such contexts, a substantial part of the electorate does not
have access to modern media, and candidates and intermediaries acting on their behalf need to invest
time and money to reach voters directly.1 The strategies I investigate are the hosting of campaign rallies,
the promising of local public goods, and the use of electoral clientelism and voter intimidation. In the
present chapter, I introduce my conceptualization of these campaign strategies and review past research
on how and why parties apply them. The chapter concludes with a summary of how the dissertation
contributes to this research.
2.1 Defining key concepts
2.1.1 Campaign rallies
Personal appearances of presidential candidates are regarded by campaigners as one of the most import-
ant tools of a presidential campaign (Althaus, Nardulli and Shaw, 2002, p. 50, see also Chen and Reeves,
2011, p. 539). This should be ever more true in Sub-Saharan Africa, where still considerable proportions
of the electorate have only limited access to media outlets such as TV, newspapers, and the internet, and
1See for example Bleck and van de Walle (2013) on the importance for parties of reaching voters in African elections
through campaign rallies.
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where campaign rallies “offer candidates an opportunity to communicate salient issues to the masses.
This information sharing is particularly important in African nations characterized with high rates of
illiteracy and lower access to information” (Bleck and van de Walle, 2013, p. 1413). I analyze the stra-
tegic allocation of campaign rallies, hosted by presidential candidates in various electoral constituencies
across Ghana in Chapter 5. I consider each event as a presidential campaign rally where the two main
presidential candidates, John Dramanai Mahama of the ruling NDC and Nana Dankwa Akufo-Addo of
the opposition NPP, spoke in public, during the three months prior to the election.2 The event dataset,
which the analysis in Chapter 5 is based on, consists of 173 campaign rallies by the incumbent and 103
rallies hosted by the challenger.3
2.1.2 Campaign promises of local and national public goods
In addition to the strategic allocation of campaign rallies, I investigate the use and effectiveness of cam-
paign promises in Chapters 6 and 7, and the use of clientelism in Chapter 8. The campaign promises
I study are promises candidates make concerning the provision of local public goods as opposed to
national public goods. There are two features that characterize public goods. They are non-rivalrous,
which means that “a unit of the good can be consumed by one individual without detracting [...] from
the consumption opportunities still available to others from that same unit” (Cornes and Sandler, 1999,
p. 8). Take the example of a government which has passed a law to make secondary education free.4
One additional high school student benefiting from paying no school fees will not decrease the oppor-
tunity of another student to also enjoy free education. Besides the non-rivalry criterion, public goods
are non-excludable. This means that no individual or group of voters can be denied access to the good
if they are eligible to benefit from the particular policy (ibid., pp. 8-9). In the case of the free education
policy, this would mean that for every student in the country being enrolled in a public institution of
secondary education tuition will be free.
Local club goods, are “geographically targeted local public goods” (Kramon, 2013a, p.15), “like a com-
munity well or a school building” (Weghorst and Lindberg, 2013, p. 721).5 These local club goods can
be enjoyed by all inhabitants of a local community (Kramon, 2013a, p.167). These are typically voters
living in the same electoral constituency, as these constituencies are often geographically segregated
in rural regions of African countries (ibid., p.51). Club goods are hence non-excludable on the local
2In the remainder of this dissertation, I also refer to these candidates as John Mahama and Nana Akufo-Addo.
3See Horowitz (2012, p.75) for a similar operational definition of campaign rallies.
4This was the most debated campaign promise made by the principal opposition candidate in Ghana’s 2012 presidential
election campaigns.
5I use the terms local public goods and local club goods interchangeably.
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level, but people living outside an electoral constituency typically do not benefit from them (Cornes and
Sandler, 1999). As these local public goods significantly impact the wellbeing of both rural and urban
dwellers, voters tend to evaluate candidates’ past performance and competence in providing these be-
nefits in elections in many African countries (Barkan, 1995; Baldwin, 2013; Ichino and Nathan, 2013;
Kramon, 2013a; Lindberg and Morrisson, 2008). The importance of these goods to voters, coupled with
the possibility to target these club goods to distinct groups of voters, make them an important tool for
candidates when vying for votes. What distinguishes local club goods from national public goods is that
governments can use these goods to reward or punish geographically concentrated groups of voters for
their support at the polls. I analyze the use and the perception of campaign promises referring to national
public goods and club goods in Chapters 5, 6, and 7. I consider any statement by the two main presid-
ential candidates as a campaign promise that is made in public during the official campaigning period
and that “contains unequivocal support for a specific action or outcome that is testable” (Costello and
Throup, 2008, p. 241).6 If such statements refer to national public goods, they are regarded as national
promises. If they refer to local public goods, they are defined as local promises.7
Clientelism and pork-barrel politics
One campaign activity candidates in African elections engage in is offering voters individual benefits
for their support at the polls. This is referred to as clientelism (e.g Stokes, Nazareno and Brusco, 2013,
p.13). The benefits involved are private goods, such as cash, or food, access to healthcare, or any other
good valued by voters that candidates can provide to them. It is not the type of good that character-
izes clientelism, but that the criterion of distribution that candidates use is “did you (will you) support
me?” (Stokes, 2007b, p. 605). This distinguishes clientelism from a programmatic mode of distribution,
where goods are distributed according to objective criteria of eligibility, which are made public (Stokes,
Nazareno and Brusco, 2013, p.7-10). This distinction is illustrated in Figure 2.1.
The party using clientelism can deliver benefits to the voter before the election, which has been termed
“electoral clientelism”, or it can provide at least a part of the benefit only after the election, which has
been termed “relational clientelism” (Nichter, 2010, p. 1). In contrast to that, patronage refers to bene-
fits parties channel to their own members (Stokes, Nazareno and Brusco, 2013, p.13-14). Parties usually
rely on intermediaries who may be low-level party members, but also individuals who are not connected
6Costello and Throup (2008, p. 241) use this conceptualization to define what they call a “pledge” and they base this
definition on criteria for statements to be regarded as campaign pledges or promises laid out by Royed (1996). Other authors
apply less strict definitions of campaign promises, including also statements in which parties make only vague assertions of
support for a cause, rather than strong assertions of commitments to future actions (Thomson, 1999; Mansergh and Thomson,
2007, p. 313), which parties in coalition systems tend to make.
7See Chapter 4 for more details on the coding procedure of local and national campaign promises.
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to the party and who are paid for their service (Wang and Kurzman, 2007) to arrange deals with voters.
These are referred to as brokers (Stokes, Nazareno and Brusco, 2013).
If benefits are targeted at groups of voters, and parties try to reward or punish voters with the delivery of
club goods, this is referred to as pork-barrel politics (Aldrich, 1995, Stokes, Nazareno and Brusco, 2013,
p.10-12, Veiga and Veiga, 2013). As Figure 2.1 illustrates, both clientelism and pork-barrel politics are
strategies of parties to distribute benefits to voters in order to win their support and where parties try to
grant voters access to these benefits only if they actually vote for the party. The difference between cli-
entelism and pork-barrel politics is that parties using clientelism provide private benefits to individuals
or small groups such as families. Parties might, for example, offer a family head to pay her children’s
school fees. Parties engaging in pork-barrel politics will, for example, channel spending for constituency
projects, such as the building of a health clinic to constituencies which have overwhelmingly supported
the party at the polls.
Figure 2.1: Programmatic and non-programmatic distributive strategies
Both forms of distributive politics are non-programmatic. These different distributive strategies are
operationalized as offering individuals benefits for their vote in the case of clientelism, making promises
to provide local club goods, to reflect pork-barrel politics, and making national promises, to reflect the
use of programmatic policies to win voters.8
8Details on the operationalizations of these concepts are provided in the empirical chapters, where I analyze the use of these
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2.1.3 Violent campaigning
Observers of African elections have contended that intimidation of voters and candidates, including
“harassment, imprisonment and assassination; violent riots and clashes between supporters or security
elements of the competing political parties; and attacks on local party headquarters and party symbols”
(Adolfo et al., 2012, p. 1) can also be part of parties’ campaigning repertoire. Such low level electoral
violence has occurred in recent elections in “Cameroon, [the] Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia,
Equatorial Guinea, Gambia, Guinea, Madagascar, Sierra Leone and Uganda” (ibid.). Higher levels of
escalation of electoral violence have been seen in Kenya’s 2002 and 2007 elections, Coˆte d’Ivoire’s 2010
elections, Nigeria’s 2007 elections, and Zimbabwe’s 2008 elections (Adolfo et al., 2012; Bratton, 2008;
Collier and Vicente, 2014; LeBas, 2006). Violent campaign appeals are “random or organized act[s]
or threat[s] to intimidate, physically harm, blackmail, or abuse a political stakeholder in seeking to
determine, delay, or to otherwise influence an electoral process” (Fischer, 2002, p. 3). The perpetrators
of violence might range from “government forces (i.e. the police and army) and supporters of the
government to opposition groups, spontaneous demonstrators and even rebel organizations that cannot
or do not want to take part in the formal political life at all,” or hired thugs and youth wings, instructed
by political parties (Laakso, 2007, p. 228).9 The form of pre-electoral violence that I am interested to
explain in this dissertation is any violence or threat thereof committed against voters by the two main
contenders in a presidential election or any actor connected to one of the two, with the aim to impact
how or if people vote.
2.2 The use of campaign strategies: mobilization and turnout-buying
versus persuasion and vote-buying
The main puzzle this dissertation seeks to address is why parties do not focus all of their time and re-
sources on convincing new voters, and spend so much effort on courting their supporters. This question
has been addressed in the campaigning literature and the literature on distributive politics, and particu-
larly that on clientelism. There are two main opposed strategies that parties use to influence elections to
their favor which have been advanced in the campaigning literature and in studies on distributive politics.
At one end of the spectrum is a persuasion strategy in
“which [...] [a party] aims at maximizing its vote share, [...] predominately aims at attract-
strategies.
9See Carey, Mitchell and Lowe (2012) on how political parties maintain links to militias to carry out violence against
civilans or opponents.
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ing unaligned voters, [...] mainly emphasizes modern technology, not ideology, in design-
ing an election message, [...] tends to emphasize leaders and [...] views organizational
innovation as part of the campaign theme to increase a party’s electoral attractiveness”
(Rohrschneider, 2002, p. 377).
In the literature on distributive politics, more precisely in the subfield of clientelistic campaign appeals
this corresponds to the model of vote-buying where a party targets supporters of the rival candidate or
voters who are unaffiliated with both parties in the race, and which “requires monitoring of specific
voting decisions” (Nichter, 2008, p. 21).
At the other end of the spectrum is a mobilization strategy which
“is motivated primarily by policies, [...] focuses on reaching core voters, [...] primarily
relies on its ideological heritage, [...] predominately emphasizes a party’s core constituen-
cies, and [...] mainly views organizations as instruments to contact voters, not to attract new
voters on the basis of attractive participatory opportunities within parties” (Rohrschneider,
2002, pp. 376-377).
In the literature on distributive politics, mobilization finds its equivalent in the model of turnout-buying
in which a party “targets nonvoting supporters and [which] requires monitoring turnout” (Nichter, 2008,
p. 21). The vote-buying model expects candidates to concentrate on voters who are indifferent between
the two parties campaigning for their votes, or who slighty lean toward the rival candidate in their prefer-
ence, but who are likely to turn out (Stokes, 2005, p. 323). The turnout-buying model predicts candidates
to focus their targeting appeals on potential supporters – those who are ideologically closer to them than
to the rival candidate – but who are not certain to turn out (Nichter 2008). In both models, parties try to
condition the handing out of benefits to voters on whether or not voters support them. In order to avoid
moral hazard on the part of the voters, parties need to observe whether voters actually fulfill their part of
the “benefits-for-votes-deal” (Lehoucq, 2007, pp. 37-42, Nichter, 2008, Stokes, 2005, Stokes and Dun-
ning, 2007). While the vote-buying model requires parties to observe how people vote, parties buying
turnout only need to observe whether people vote (Nichter, 2008).
In both models candidates have no incentives to cater to their certain supporters or to supporters of the
rival candidate (Nichter 2008, Stokes 2005). Neither model thus expects parties to focus their campaign-
ing effort on their supporters who are certain to go and vote, because this would be a waste of resources
(Stokes and Dunning, 2007, p. 14). At the same time, parties are not expected to try to win votes from
supporters of their rival candidate who are determined to turn out, because the costs of doing so would
be over-proportional (Nichter, 2008; Stokes, 2005; Stokes and Dunning, 2007). This is in line with an
argument put forward in the literature on candidate appearances that says that campaigning in hostile
areas carries the risk of polarizing these opposed voters against the candidate and hence pushing them
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even further away from him (Althaus, Nardulli and Shaw, 2002; Fenno, 1978).10
In many cases, it seems plausible that candidates pursue a mix of vote-buying (or persuasion) and
turnout-buying (or mobilization). However, there are certain conditions under which one or the other
strategy is assumed to be used predominantly. In principle, the vote-buying strategy is more powerful,
because attracting a new voter potentially also takes away a voter from the rival candidate. Persuad-
ing a new voter hence buys the party net two additional votes. Motivating one’s supporter to turn out
only buys the party one net vote (Gans-Morse, Mazzuca and Nichter, 2014). Most theoretical models
in the literature on distributive politics hence assume that parties would prefer a vote-buying or persua-
sion over a turnout-buying or mobilization strategy (Cox and McCubbins, 1986; Lindbeck and Weibull,
1987; Stokes, Nazareno and Brusco, 2013), but it has been recognized that it might be easier for parties
to mobilize their core voters under certain conditions (Cox and McCubbins, 1986; Dixit and Londregan,
1996).
The literature on distributive politics argues that candidates will use a persuasion strategy if they are
equally efficient in distributing goods to undecided or swing voters as they are in targeting their core
supporters (Cox and McCubbins, 1986; Dixit and Londregan, 1996; Lindbeck and Weibull, 1987). If
however, they are better at delivering benefits to their partisans, with “less leakage,” parties will also
provide benefits to their own supporters (Dixit and Londregan, 1996, pp. 1153-1154). Stokes regards
the monitoring capabilities of parties as central and argues that vote-buying or persuasion is particularly
attractive when candidates have a comparatively high ability to monitor how voters voted or at least
signal credibly to voters that they can (Stokes 2005). She develops a model in which clientelistic party
machines and voters interact in a repeated game and in which parties condition rewards on the voting
behavior of their clients (Stokes 2005). Although the ballot is formally secret, and therefore parties
cannot monitor voting perfectly, they can credibly signal to voters that they can make informed infer-
ences through brokers who forge deals with voters. These brokers have private information on voters
and make an effort to signal that they have the ability to monitor votes. This repeated game, according
to Stokes, leads to a form of perverse accountability in which parties hold voters accountable for how
they voted and reward or punish them with providing or withholding private material incentives to them
(ibid., p. 316).
The campaigning literature expects candidates to predominantly apply a persuasion strategy when party
alignment is strong (Althaus, Nardulli and Shaw, 2002). This is because core voters in these contexts
can relatively safely be ignored. As due to their strong party attachment, they are unlikely to defect
10For reasons of the legibility the male form was chosen in the text, as the candidates in the empirical analysis of this study
are male. However, the information in the theoretical model refers nevertheless to members of both genders.
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to another party. This is even more the case in two-party systems where supporters of one party have
hardly anywhere else to go, because there are no attractive third parties which resemble “their” party in
its policy positions who voters could deviate to (Althaus, Nardulli and Shaw, 2002). To the contrary,
the campaigning literature expects candidates to have incentives to pursue a mobilization strategy when
party alignment is weak and turnout is “uneven” (Althaus, Nardulli and Shaw, 2002, p. 53).
There have been a few attempts to integrate the vote- and the turnout-buying models (Stokes and Dun-
ning, 2007; Stokes, Nazareno and Brusco, 2013). Stokes and Dunning (2007) devise conditions under
which parties should be likely to follow a vote-buying or a turnout-buying logic in allocating benefits.
They argue that vote-buying should be used to address weakly opposed voters who are certain to turn out
and turnout-buying attempts should be concentrated on strong supporters with low turnout propensities.
Stokes, Nazareno and Brusco (2013) provide an explanation for why the empirical evidence deviates
from the swing voter model. They argue that while parties do have an incentive to focus benefits on
undecided marginal voters, the intermediaries they rely on to distribute the benefits have different in-
centives and therefore over-proportionally target loyal voters which requires less effort for the brokers.
Demobilization, abstention-buying, and rewarding of loyalists
Besides using benefits to buy turnout or to induce voters to switch their vote, there are three alternat-
ive strategies known in the clientelism literature, which have received far less attention than vote and
turnout-buying: double persuasion, the rewarding of loyalists, and abstention-buying. Double persua-
sion refers to a party paying voters a benefit to make them turn out in the first place, and secondly, to vote
for the party. This is a strategy directed at independent voters, who are unlikely to vote (Gans-Morse,
Mazzuca and Nichter, 2014). Parties can also reward their loyalists for past support and turnout (Nichter,
2008, p.20). Abstention-buying – also referred to as “negative vote-buying” (Schaffer, 2002, p. 78) –
is the targeting of voters with a benefit with the intention to making them stay at home on polling day,
and is typically directed toward indifferent or opposed voters (Gans-Morse, Mazzuca and Nichter, 2014,
pp. 417-418). Parties might pay voters cash to stay at home, which used to be common in New York
State in the 19th and early 20th century (Cox, Kousser and Morgan, 1981, p. 656), or pay registered
voters for disqualifying themselves, by dipping their index finger in indelible ink so that they will not
be allowed to vote anymore, something that has been observed during elections in the Philippines, for
example (Schaffer, 2002, p. 78). Another example of how to induce voters to stay away from the polls
also comes from elections in the Philippines, where parties have been observed to take voters on excur-
sions out-of-town, away from the polling station, on Election Day (Schaffer, 2002, p. 78).
The campaiging literature also considers the possibility that campaign exposure might demobilize voters.
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Gerstle, Sanders and Kaid (1991) argue, for example, that modern campaigning style – and particularly
the increase in negative campaigning – might account for decreasing turnout rates in US elections, al-
though findings on the effect of negative campaigning are mixed.11 However, this literature on modern
campaigning does not consider strategies to intentionally turn off voters.
2.2.1 Empirical evidence: targeting core or independent voters?
This section presents findings from the literature on modern campaigning tactics in established demo-
cracies as well as on the use of pork-barrel politics and clientelism which are relevant to the question of
who gets targeted by campaigns and why.
Campaigning in established democracies
The campaigning literature has yielded important insights on the use of a number of campaign tactics
in established democracies. With regard to where parties host campaign rallies, it has been found that
candidates in the United States tend to focus campaign appearances on highly and densely populated
areas (Althaus, Nardulli and Shaw, 2002, Bartels, 1985, p.928, Chen and Reeves, 2011, Doherty, 2007),
where turnout fluctuates (Althaus, Nardulli and Shaw, 2002, p. 53), in large media markets (Herr, 2002,
906), in swing states (Althaus, Nardulli and Shaw, 2002, p. 53, Shaw, 1999), and in states that yield the
greatest rewards in the electoral college (Bartels, 1985; Brams and Davis, 1974). The question of the
conditions under which parties predominantly mobilize core voters or persuade independent voters has
also been studied in other contexts outside of American politics. Past research suggests that mobiliza-
tion is more likely when party alignment is strong (Rohrschneider, 2002, p. 377) and when parties are
mass parties (Duverger, 1954, p.23, Katz and Mair, 1995, p.7). Furthermore, spatial models of party
competition have assumed that consensus-based systems with larger number of parties than two-party
systems set incentives for candidates to mobilize core voters in order to avoid defection to other parties
(Bowler and Farrel, 1992). In contrast to that, majoritarian systems are expected to provide parties with
incentives to compete over independent voters because core voters can be relatively savely ignored since
they have few alternatives but supporting “their” party (Bowler and Farrel, 1992).
The allocation of resources in campaigns in African elections
It is not clear, however, what expectations we can draw from this literature that focuses on established
democracies for campaigning strategies in Africa. On the one hand, party systems are generally volatile
11See Ansolabehere (1994); Ansolabehere, Iyengar and Simon (1999) for turnout decreasing effects of negative campaign-
ing, but also Lau and Pomper (2001); Lau et al. (1999) for findings that do not corroborate this hypothesis.
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and partisan alignment is argued to be weak (Mozaffar and Scarrit, 2005).12 The number of voters in
Sub-Saharan Africa who are affiliated with a party is expectedly lower than in the United States, for
example (Keefer, 2010, p. 8). A study on 10 African countries reports that only 55.9% of respondents
feel close to a political party (Kuenzi and Lambright, 2011, p. 779). The high volatility of African party
systems and the low number of partisans might push parties toward a mobilization strategy. On the other
hand, this volatility of many African party systems is not so much a product of voters switching between
parties from one election to another, because they are unstable in their party preferences. It is rather a
function of many small parties entering and exiting the party system as well as parties forging alliances
and splitting up (Mozaffar and Scarrit, 2005; van de Walle, 2003). Furthermore, voters often seem to
be casting their votes along ethnic lines.13 Given this, parties might not worry too much about their
supporters defecting to rival parties with different ethnic profiles and thus concentrate on persuading
independent voters who do not have a co-ethnic candidate in the race.
The current state of research on the allocation of general campaign resources in Africa mainly consists
of qualitative case studies of single elections (Cheeseman and Hinfelaar, 2010; LeBas, 2006; Nugent,
1999), or comparative studies that do not address the variation in campaign efforts across different
groups of voters (Bleck and van de Walle, 2011). This current state of the art does not allow us to detect
general patterns of campaign strategies with regard to mobilization or persuasion. Exceptions are two
studies on ethnic campaign appeals across states in Nigeria, and a study on the geography of ethnic
campaign messages and campaign rallies in Kenya’s 2007 elections (Horowitz, 2012).
The use of clientelism
The question about whether the use of clientelism during elections follows a mobilization or a persua-
sion logic remains also largely unanswered. Some find that parties focus on mobilizing their supporters
in settings as diverse as Argentina (Nichter, 2008, Stokes, Nazareno and Brusco, 2013, p. 67-72), India
(Dunning and Nilekani, 2013), Mexico, Venezuela (Stokes, Nazareno and Brusco, 2013, p. 67-72), and
Taiwan (Liu, 1999), while other studies on campaigns in Argentina (Stokes, 2005), Ghana (Lindberg
and Morrisson, 2008) or Kenya (Kramon, 2013b) suggest that parties buy votes rather than turnout.
While clientelism is probably the campaign strategy which has been most explored for African elec-
tions (e.g. Bratton, 2008; Guardado and Wantchekon, 2014; Kramon, 2013b; Lindberg and Morrisson,
2008; Kramon, 2013a; Weghorst and Lindberg, 2011; Young, 2009), I am not aware of any study which
explicitly tests the predictions of the vote and turnout-buying models with regard to the use of clientel-
12More recent studies argue that the volatility of African party systems has been exaggerated, but nonetheless consider
African democracies to be comparatively volatile, as compared to democracies in Latin America, for example (Boogards,
2008; Kuenzi and Lambright, 2005).
13See Bratton, Bhavnani and Chen (2013) on determinants of vote choice and Posner (2005) on the salience of ethnicity.
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ism. Some studies, nonetheless, report findings on the political make-up of the targets of clientelism.
A study of clientelism in Kenya finds that swing voters are most targeted with clientelism (Kramon,
2013b, p. 110), suggesting a vote-buying logic. Similarly, in a study of clientelism in Ghana, Lindberg
and Morrisson (2008, pp. 118-119) find that more people reported receiving clientelic offers in swing
constituencies than in the safe havens of the two main parties. In contrast to that, in an analysis of
clientelism in Benin and Kenya, Guardado and Wantchekon (2014) find that respondents who are more
involved with political parties are more likely to be targeted than those with no partisan attachments,
which might suggest that a mobilization or turnout-buying logic is at work. The findings from these few
existing studies on the targets of clientelism in Africa are far from conclusive with regard to the question
of why and when parties should cater to their core supporters during campaigns.
Pork-barrel politics
Research on the allocation of local public goods across geographic regions has emphasized political
motivations in the allocation of local club goods, both in established (Grossman, 1994; Pereira, 1996;
Veiga and Veiga, 2013; Worthington and Dollery, 1998) and in new democracies (Banful, 2011; Barkan
and Chege, 1989; Case, 2001; Cole, 2009; Jablonski, 2014; Khemani, 2007).14 The empirical evidence
with regard to the vote-buying or the turnout-buying model is mixed also for the targeting of region-
ally concentrated groups of voters with benefits. Some studies conducted in Ghana (Banful, 2011),
Peru (Schady, 2000), Spain (Castells and Sole´-Olle´, 2005), Sweden (Dahlberg and Johansson, 2002),
or in the United States find that parties target competitive or swing constituencies (Berry, Burden and
Howell, 2010; Wright, 1974). Other research is more in line with the turnout-buying or the mobiliza-
tion logic. Barkan and Chege (1989) find, for example, that under Kenya’s President Daniel Arap Moi
budget allocations for the constructions of new roads in his political strongholds of the Rift Valley were
disproportionately high. Similarly, Miguel and Zaidi (2003) showed that in Ghana annual government
expenditures per student were considerably higher in districts that had voted overwhelmingly for the
ruling party in parliamentary elections than in other districts. Other studies on pork-barrel spending in
Argentina (Calvo and Murillo, 2004), Brazil (Ames, 2001; Rodden and Arretche, 2004), Mexico (Bruhn,
1996; Hiskey, 1999) and the United States (Ansolabehere and Snyder, 2006; Levitt and Snyder, James
M. Jr., 1995) also provide support for a mobilization logic in the allocation of targetable goods across
regions.
14Golden and Min (2013) argue, however, that due to a publication bias against null findings, the notion that the allocation
of such targetable goods follows political motivations might have been over-estimated.
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2.2.2 Effectiveness of campaigning strategies
The strategy parties use in the run-up to elections is intimately linked to which voters can be influenced
with campaigns. While parties might want to focus all their campaigning effort on attracting new voters,
they might be constrained to do so by the fact that voters tend to vary in their receptiveness to campaign
messages. In fact, studies on the political psychology of voters suggest that partisanship is one of the
most important mediators of how and if campaigns influence voters’ behavior (Lazarsfeld, Berelson and
Gaudet, 1968, pp. 137-149, Berelson, Lazarsfeld and McPhee, 1954, pp. 118-132, Finkel and Schrott,
1995) and that voters evaluate campaign information in light of their predisposed political inclinations
(Hagner and Rieselbach, 1978; Kraus, Kennedy and Nixon, 1962; LeDuc and Price, 1979; Lang and
Lang, 1962; Sigelman and Sigelman, 1984). This also leads voters to evaluate campaign messages made
by candidates whose party they are affiliated with much more positively (Iyengar and Kinder, 1987;
Popkin, 1991; Zaller, 1992).
In addition, past research has found more robust effects for campaigns strengthening the vote intentions
voters had at the beginning of the campaign season, than making them think in new ways (Lazarsfeld,
Berelson and Gaudet, 1968; Key and Cummings, 1966; Campbell, 1960). These findings might make
it more compelling for parties to appeal to their own supporters and mobilize them. At the same time,
existing research also suggests that people who are uninformed about politics or exhibit little interest
in politics can be most influenced by campaigns (Berelson, Lazarsfeld and McPhee, 1954; Converse,
1962; Lazarsfeld, Berelson and Gaudet, 1968; Zaller, 1992). This would suggest that it is very difficult
for parties to change voters minds, and much easier to mobilize those who are inclined to support them.
Those who do not exhibit any political inclination of which party to vote for, however, can also be re-
sponsive to campaigns.
Effectiveness of Clientelism
There are various arguments in the literature about the types of voters we should expect to most be in-
fluenced when addressed with an offer to buy their vote or turnout. One argument is that poorer voters
value private benefits more than wealthier voters, due to the diminishing marginal utility of these benefits
for wealthier voters (Dixit and Londregan, 1996). Indeed, many studies find that poor voters lie at the
heart of clientelistic targeting (Bratton, 2008; Kramon, 2013a; Stokes, 2005; Scott, 1969; Weitz-Shapiro,
2014, 2012). In line with this, several studies testing the effect of clientelism find that poorer voters are
more likely to be influenced by it. In a survey conducted in Argentina, Stokes finds that poorer and
less educated voters lie in the focus of targeting and that they are most likely to report that vote-buying
22
has influenced their vote (Stokes, 2005, p. 322). Nichter’s findings on the effectiveness of clientelistic
targeting in Brazil (Nichter, 2010, p. 52) and Kramon’s analysis of Kenyan elections point in the same
direction (Kramon, 2013a, pp. 114-121).15
Another argument suggests that the more people feel that candidates can find out how or if they voted,
the more likely they are to comply with a benefits-for-votes-deal, which Stokes (2005, p. 321) finds sup-
port for. Finally, another line of argument posits that voters who highly value reciprocity are more likely
to comply with offers to buy their vote. Combining a survey of brokers and voters with experimental
evidence from Paraguay, Finan and Schechter (2012, p. 874) find that individuals who value reciprocity
highly are more likely to be targeted with vote-buying attempts (ibid., 874). This study does not directly
test, however, whether these voters are indeed more likely to comply.
The findings with regard to gender are mixed. While Kramon’s analysis of vote-buying in Kenya sug-
gests that women were more likely to have their vote bought than men (Kramon, 2013a), Wantchekon
finds the contrary in his seminal field experiment conducted in Benin (Wantchekon, 2003, pp. 418-419).
He argues that men are more likely to profit from clientelistic targeting than women, which is why they
are responsive to clientelistic campaigns.
Few studies report whether clientelistic targetings serves to buy votes or turnout and whether partisans
and independent voters vary in their receptiveness to this strategy (Auyero, 2000; Calvo and Murillo,
2004; Finan and Schechter, 2012; Hale, 2007; Keefer and Vlaicu, 2008; Lindberg and Morrisson, 2008;
Young, 2009). Exceptions are Liu (1999) who finds that clientelistic benefits are used to mobilize voters
in Taiwan, or Corstange (2012) and Brusco, Nazareno and Stokes (2004) who argue that clientelistic
campaigning served both to buy votes and turnout in elections in Lebanon and Argentina. Several recent
studies on clientelistic campaigning in African elections suggest that it has very little effect at all on
voting behavior (Guardado and Wantchekon, 2014; Lindberg and Morrisson, 2008; Young, 2009).
The evaluation of campaign messages in African elections
There is a recent, but growing experimental literature on the effectiveness of different types of campaign
messages on vote choice in Sub-Saharan Africa (e.g. Conroy-Krutz, 2012; Kramon, 2013a; Wantchekon,
2003). This literature does not directly test whether independent voters differ from partisans in their re-
sponsiveness to campaign appeals, however. In an experiment conducted in Uganda, Conroy-Krutz
(2012) investigates the importance of information about candidates’ ethnic identity on vote intentions.
In this experiment, subjects were presented with a vignette of different types of information on hypo-
15While Kramon finds that Kenyans at average income levels are most likely to be targeted, not necessarily those below
average, this nonetheless speaks to poor voters being at the heart of this form of distribuion, as the average income of Kenyans
is just around the poverty line (Kramon, 2013a, pp. 114-121).
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thetical candidates varying, among other characteristics, their competence and their ethnic backgrounds.
Conroy-Krutz (2012) finds that the importance of ethnic cues on vote intention diminishes, the more
information respondents are provided with on the candidates that is non-related to their ethnic identity.
In an experiment conducted in Kenya, Kramon (2013a) asked participants to evaluate audio campaign
messages, where he varied whether the message entailed information that a candidate had made attempts
to buy votes. The findings reveal the hypothetical candidate who is said to have distributed cash in pub-
lic, is perceived to be more electorally viable than the candidate who is not presented as having engaged
in vote-buying. Concerning the respondents among whom the positive effect of vote-buying on vote
intention is strongest, Kramon finds that this is among Kenyans at average income levels, those who are
just around the poverty line (Kramon, 2013a, pp. 114-121). In a field experiment conducted in Sa˜o Tome
e Principe´, Vicente (2014) finds that an anti vote-buying campaign drove down turnout for the challenger
and increased turnout for the incumbent. The author interprets this as evidence in favor of the fact that
the challenger more frequently relies on vote-buying than the incumbent. He assumes that because the
incumbent has an advantage in using what has elsewhere been termed “relational clientelism” (Nichter,
2010, p. 1) i.e. the delivery of benefits after the election, the challenger who cannot apply this strategy
relies more on “electoral clientelism” (Nichter, 2010, p. 1, Vicente, 2014, p. 358).
In a series of experiments conducted in several national elections in Benin, Wantchekon studies the ef-
fectiveness of clientelistic and programmatic campaign messages, measured as local and national prom-
ises (Wantchekon, 2003; Fujiwara and Wantchekon, 2013). In the seminal field experiment conducted
during the campaign of Benin’s 2001 national elections, Wantchekon (2003) assigns actual candidates
a local or a national message and finds that the local campaign message worked for all candidates in
increasing their vote share. The national message was only effective for those candidates who had a
national support base and for opposition candidates. The interpretation that Wantchekon offers is that
candidates with a national support base are more credible in promising public goods than regional can-
didates, and that the opposition is more credible in making programmatic promises than the incumbent.
This, he argues, is because the incumbent has an advantage in using clientelistic campaign messages and
hence probably more widely makes use of this strategy than the opposition (ibid., p. 401). Furthermore,
he finds that voters in general are receptive to the local message, but that women, more informed voters,
and co-ethnics of the candidates are also responsive to the national message. One of the mechanisms
the author assumes links messages and voting behavior, besides varying preferences among voters over
clientelistic and national goods, is the credibility of the promises. He argues that the opposition is more
credible in making local promises than the incumbent, and that candidates with a national following are
more credible than regional candidates in promising the provision of national public goods (Wantchekon,
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2003).
This brief review of the effectiveness of clientelism illustrates that the state of the research does not allow
conclusions on whether partisans or independent voters are more receptive to campaign appeals. This is
one reason why the turnout-buying versus the vote-buying debate remains unresolved. We neither know
much about what makes some voters more and others less receptive to clientelistic campaigns. One
mechanisms that has been suggested to play a role is the credibility of different campaign promises, but
this has not yet been tested.
2.2.3 Violent campaign strategies
Whereas early scholarly work on election-related violence has treated it as a side effect of instability and
democratic transition processes (Huntington, 1993; Snyder, 2000), more recent work has recognized the
strategic use of electoral violence (e.g. Carey, Colaresi and Mitchell, Forthcoming; Cederman, Gleditsch
and Hug, 2013; Daxecker, 2014). Accordingly, scholars have studied the effect of timing and the com-
petitiveness of elections (Cederman, Gleditsch and Hug, 2013) or the effect of fraud (Daxecker, 2014;
Tucker, 2007) and the presence of election observers on post-election protest and violence (Daxecker,
2014; Hyde and Marinov, 2014). Most of this research, however, has studied causes and triggers of
electoral violence in general or has focused on post-electoral violence. Only few pieces of research have
focused on pre-electoral violence as a campaign strategy (Bratton, 2008; Chaturvedi, 2005; Collier and
Vicente, 2012; LeBas, 2006; Wilkinson and Haid, 2009). Chaturvedi (2005) argues, based on Skaperdas
and Grofman’s (Skaperdas and Grofman, 1995) model of negative campaigning, that a party uses viol-
ence to demobilize the supporters of the rival party. Collier and Vicente (2012) argue, to the contrary,
that strong supporters of a party cannot be impacted in their vote choice or turnout propensity and will
hence be ignored by campaigners. They expect parties to focus their effort on demobilizing weakly
opposed voters.
Robinson and Torvik (2009) endogenize the question of who gets targeted with intimidation. Depend-
ent on the strength of party alignment (or ethnic polarization of the electorate), either independent or
weak supporters of the rival party are most at risk to suffer intimidation. Depending on how many of
these weakly opposed or independent voters are in the electorate, the incumbent chooses the group of
voters to target with violence. If the proportion of weak supporters of the opposition is large, buying
their support with benefits would be expensive and the incumbent will choose to disenfranchise these
voters. If however, party alignment is relatively strong, so that opposition supporters are all strongly
determined to vote for the opposition, the incumbent ignores these voters altogether and targets efforts
of demobilization on independent voters (ibid.).
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The empirical evidence about which types of voters are most at risk to suffer from pre-electoral vi-
olence is mixed. There is evidence of parties using violence both to demobilize and to persuade op-
posed voters (Kasara, 2014; Wilkinson, 2004; Wilkinson and Haid, 2009), and even to mobilize turnout
among core supporters (LeBas, 2006). The most rigorous test of the assumptions and predictions of
these three main theoretical models on voter intimidation is provided by Kuhn’s study on patterns of
intimidation in 20 African countries (Kuhn, 2013). He finds that partisans of the incumbent party are
substantially less likely to suffer from voter intimidation than other voters. However, whether violence
concentrates on swing voters (Robinson and Torvik, 2009), or whether opposition voters experience the
most pre-electoral violence, as Chaturvedi (2005) and Collier and Vicente (2012) predict, varies across
the countries he studies.
2.2.4 Distributive and violent strategies
While the study of electoral clientelism and that of electoral violence have emerged as two separate
research agendas, scholars have recently begun to integrate these strategies. Both theoretical and em-
pirical research emphasizes that redistributive and violent campaign strategies are used for different
purposes. With regard to the political make-up of voters who are in the focus of either manipulation
strategy, however, the evidence is mixed. Bratton (2008) finds that intimidation is spread quite evenly
across all groups of voters in 2003 and 2007 Nigerian elections, but that what he terms vote-buying
had clearer demographic correlates. Poorer voters, living in the countryside were more likely to be
targeted with vote-buying attempts than their wealthier, better educated, urban counterparts. In con-
trast, studying Mexico’s 2000 presidential elections, Cornelius (2004) finds that parties concentrated
distributive appeals on urban voters and particularly in states in which they controlled governorship.16
Gutie´rrez-Romero (2014) finds that while vote-buying clustered in less competitive areas, violence was
concentrated in contested areas. According to the author, these findings suggest that parties mainly use
distributive appeals to signal to would-be supporters that they would channel patronage to them if they
won the election. However, the groups that parties target with vote-buying within these strongholds
were groups that did not have a co-ethnic candidate in the race, which Gutierrez-Romero argues corres-
ponds to the concept of swing voters. Parties concentrate intimidation attempts in those contested areas
where they are in the lead and mainly target voters that were not part of the ethnic group that was their
support base (ibid., p. 10). Evidence from a list experiment conducted in Guatemala also points in the
direction that distributive appeals might be used to mobilize most responsive voters and that violence is
16Cornelius’ findings with regard to coercion are difficult to relate to the present study because his definition of coercion
includes both aspects of distributive and coercive appeals as I conceptualize them (Cornelius, 2004).
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used to demobilize those voters who would be difficult to persuade with vote-buying. Gonzalez Ocantos
et al. (2013) find that while vote-buying attempts are concentrated on urban, middle-income voters who
highly value reciprocity and often on those who had abstained in the previous election, intimidation is
concentrated on mostly rural, opposed voters with a high turnout propensity, those who do not value
reciprocity and who do not believe that their vote choices can be monitored.
This new research on clientelism and violence as campaign strategies suggest that they are used to ad-
dress different groups of voters. The findings remain, however, inconclusive as to who the targets of
both campaign appeals are.
2.3 Summary
Existing approaches to understanding the logic of campaigning in young democracies has failed to ad-
equately address the question of which groups of voters parties target during elections and why. In
particular the question whether it is more rational for parties to focus their campaign resources on at-
tracting indifferent voters, or to mobilize their own supporters remains unresolved. Not only do we
lack systematic investigations of who parties target with different campaigning appeals. We also do not
know what types of voters can be influenced with the various campaign appeals that parties in young
democracies use, ranging from modern campaigning strategies, promises of local club goods and from
political clientelism to voter intimidation.
This chapter introduced key definitions of campaigning strategies that parties use in African elections. I
reviewed the literature on the main explanations for what types of voters parties target in elections and
why. The main theoretical models in the literature on campaigning and in the literature of distributive
politics were discussed. I then presented an overview over what types of voters are receptive to cam-
paign exposure in general, and to clientelistic targeting, in particular. In addition, I provided a summary
of a new research agenda studying violence and clientelism as campaigning strategies, used to address
different groups of voters.
The next chapter introduces the main theoretical framework of the dissertation, which investigates three
conditions under which it is rational for parties to focus on mobilizing their supporters to turn out. It
concludes with a discussion of the implications for the strategic use of campaign rallies, promises of
local club goods, clientelism, and violence in African elections.
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Chapter 3
A theory of mobilization and
demobilization in African elections
In this chapter, I develop a theory of campaigning strategies in African elections. I argue that there are
three reasons why parties court their own supporters, rather than exclusively trying to win new voters.
First, rather than wasting benefits on those voters who will vote for them, regardless of how much (or
how little) effort is spent on them, parties might be mobilizing turnout among potential supporters.
These are supporters who are unlikely to turn out on Election Day, although they would rather support
them, than any other party. Second, I argue that another reason why parties focus their attention on
their supporters, is that their campaign promises are much more credible to their own supporters, than
to those who are independent or oppose them. Finally, parties often have devised other strategies with
which to address independent voters. While they might be using campaign rallies, campaign promises,
and clientelistic benefits to mobilize turnout among likely supporters, parties might also try to demobilize
independent voters via intimidation and violence, thereby avoiding the costs of trying to persuade them.
This chapter is structured as follows. First, I discuss the points of departure for the argument. I explain
ways in which existing models of distributive campaigning need to be extended and modified to account
for why parties in African elections might decide to court their core supporters. Second, I develop a
holistic theory of the allocation of campaign effort. It allows me to derive predictions for the use of
different campaigning strategies, not just for electoral clientelism like the vote-buying and the turnout-
buying model. Third, I outline a number of my theory’s empirical implications, contrasting them with
the predictions made by other models, which I then test in the empirical chapters of the dissertation.
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3.1 Points of departure: an evaluation of existing theoretical models
The main questions this dissertation seeks to answer are (1) which groups of voters do parties in African
elections focus their campaigning efforts on and, (2) what is their aim in doing this? Is it to persuade,
mobilize or demobilize these voters? Past research has often focused on investigating the strategic use
of one particular campaigning tool, such as candidate appearances (Althaus, Nardulli and Shaw, 2002;
Brams and Davis, 1974; Chen and Reeves, 2011; Colantoni and Levsque, 1975; Doherty, 2007), cam-
paign expenditures across regions or states (Nagler and Leighley, 1992), or the allocation of money to
media markets (Fletcher and Slutsky, 2011). The type of campaigning tool that has, by far, received the
most attention when studying African elections is the use of political clientelism (e.g. Kramon, 2013a;
Lindberg and Morrisson, 2008; Vicente, 2014; Wantchekon, 2003; Weghorst and Lindberg, 2011; Young,
2009). Focusing on one particular strategy can, however, be problematic, because it may lead to false
inferences about which voters lie at the heart of a party’s campaign. A group of voters who seem to be
neglected by one strategy, might be offset by a different type of campaign. For example, parties might
cater to their supporters by hosting most of the campaign rallies in their strongholds. At the same time,
they might offset disadvantages for independent voters concentrated in competitive constituencies, by
using more clientelistic targeting there.1 Thus to understand which voters parties are actually trying to
mobilize, persuade or demobilize, we need to take their broad repertoire of campaigning strategies into
account. This is why I develop an argument which covers different strategies and can be used to derive
predictions on a range of campaigning tools.
The argument presented in the next section is drawn from different strands of literature. These are (a)
research on the allocation of campaigning efforts in general, (b) spatial models of party competition, (c)
models of the logic of distributive campaigning, and particularly (d) that of electoral clientelism. While
this past research has greatly advanced our understanding of the logic of campaigning in established
democracies and the logic of clientelistic targeting in newer democracies, there are several assumptions
– often made implicitly or explicitly – which need to be qualified in order to explain patterns of cam-
paigning in African elections. One such assumption is that parties have different ideological profiles
and that the further away a voter’s ideal point is from theirs, the more the parties will need to invest
in order to win this particular voter’s support (e.g. Nichter, 2008; Stokes, 2005). Another assumption
which often implicitly underlies models of distributive targeting, is that parties always deliver the bene-
1See Kramon and Posner (2013) on a similar argument about beneficiaries of distributive politics. They argue that if our
goal is to investigate which groups of voters a government is particularly responsive to with its policies, it is necessary to take
into account the allocation of a range of targeted goods which are important to voters in a given country. It is not sufficient to
study the spending for one type of good, because, as the authors show, a group which seems to be neglected in one field, e.g.,
education, often has needs offset by the government in a different area, such as the provision of a good road infrastructure.
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fits that they promise to voters (Cox and McCubbins, 1986; Dixit and Londregan, 1996; Nichter, 2008;
Stokes, 2005). Lastly, past research has acknowledged that campaign exposure may not only lead voters
to switch their vote intention or mobilize them to turn out, but that it can also keep voters away from the
polls. What has been largely overlooked, however, is that parties can also intentionally demobilize voters
(Ansolabehere, 1994; Ansolabehere, Iyengar and Simon, 1999; Berelson, Lazarsfeld and McPhee, 1954;
Gerstle, Sanders and Kaid, 1991; Lazarsfeld, Berelson and Gaudet, 1968); an important point which will
be addressed in more detail later in this chapter.
Assumption of different ideological profiles of parties
A general idea underlying our understanding of rational choice models of voting, party competition and
campaigning is that voters and parties have distinct ideal points and that voters support the party which is
closest to them. In order to win as many supporters as possible, parties move close to the median voter,
given certain constraints (Downs, 1957; Enelow and Hinich, 1982), or they try to manipulate voters’
perceptions of the location of different candidates in the ideological space (Harrington and Hess, 1996).
Distributive models of campaigning assume that voters’ ideal points are fixed and that candidates offer
voters rewards to compensate for the ideological distance between them and the voters (Stokes, 2005,
pp. 319–321, Nichter, 2008, p. 23). To make sense of why campaigns would go after their core voters,
which is the main goal guiding this dissertation, the turnout-buying model would attribute this to the
ideological closeness between a party and its partisans. The intuition of this model is that the closer a
party’s ideal position is to that of a particular voter, the cheaper it is for a party to buy off this voter’s
support. Hence buying off a core voter is cheaper than buying off an independent or opposing voter.2
Thus, one of the responses the turnout-buying model would offer to the question of why parties spend
so much time and money on courting their core supporters is the argument that it is relatively cheap for
parties to mobilize their supporters, as the ideological distance they need to compensate those voters
for, is small. To the contrary, it is argued that compensating voters whose preferences are less aligned
with those of the party is more expensive, which is why parties ignore independent and opposed voters
(ibid.).
I argue that this logic is not very helpful in explaining why parties in African elections would have an
incentive to mobilize their supporters. Parties in Africa rarely adopt distinct policy positions (van de
2Both the turnout-buying and the vote-buying model share this basic intuition. The difference between them is that in the
vote-buying model voting is assumed to be costless so that the only source of negative utility, which a voter faces when voting,
is the distance to the party she votes for. Hence, the party compensates the voter only for the ideological distance between
them (Stokes, 2005, pp. 319–321). In the turnout-buying model the act of voting itself also imposes costs on the voter. In order
to mobilize a voter, a party needs to compensate the voter not only for the degree to which the party’s policies diverge from
her preferences, but also for voting costs such as transportation to the polling station or the opportunity costs which are caused
for the voter by requiring her to leave her work for the time of voting (Nichter, 2008, p. 23).
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Walle, 2003, p. 304, Bleck and van de Walle, 2011, Bleck and van de Walle, 2013). That is why
the ideological distance between parties and voters alone cannot account for why parties target their
supporters. Most parties in Sub-Saharan Africa do not differ much on ideological grounds (Bleck and
van de Walle, 2011, Bleck and van de Walle, 2013, Carey, 2002, p. 64, van de Walle, 2003, p. 304), and
parties that have attempted to forge clearer ideological profiles have generally not been very successful
in attracting support. The National Lima Party in Zambia is a case in point. It positioned itself as
representing rural interests in the 1996 elections, and was indeed supported by the Zambian Farmers’
Association; yet it did not receive a single seat in the parliament (van de Walle, 2003, pp. 304–305).
Similarly, several parties in Francophone Africa that have positoned themselves as Marxist, have not
been electorally viable (van de Walle, 2003, pp. 304–305). Even the NDC and the NPP in Ghana, which
are among the parties with the most clear-cut ideological profiles (Osei, 2012, p. 147), have not been
consistent in their programmatic orientations. While the NDC presents itself as a social democratic
party (National Democratic Congress, 2008, p. 31) and the NPP holds a neo-liberal ideology (Obeng-
Odoom, 2013, p. 79), they converge on economic policies. For example, both parties emphasize the
importance of the private sector in boosting Ghana’s economy (Obeng-Odoom, 2013, p. 79). Moreover,
the NPP – who claims to promote market liberalism – promotes interventionist, social policies such as
the introduction of free Senior High School education (Obeng-Odoom, 2013, p. 79). Instead of adopting
distinct policy positions, parties in African elections seem to overwhelmingly focus on valence appeals
(see Bleck and van de Walle, 2013).3
Given these general characteristics of African parties, I argue that the ideological distance between
parties and voters is unlikely to be the most important explanation of why parties might decide to target
core voters.
Assumption of credible campaigns
Another problematic assumption concerns the idea that parties are credible in delivering the benefit
they promise to voters. Distributive models of party competition and campaigning tend to assume that
3There are various reasons which have been brought forward for why African parties have unclear programmatic and
ideological profiles. A potential reason for the ideological vagueness of parties would be that issues do not mobilize African
voters, but this argument has been refuted by recent research (Bleck and van de Walle, 2011). Rather, one part of the explanation
of why parties do not distinguish themselves clearly on programmatic grounds might be that the different constituencies they
represent – often based on ethno-regional groups – do not differ much in their preferences (van de Walle, 2003, p. 315). Even
if they did, however, as parties are relatively young, they might be uncertain about their supporters’ preferences and hence
eschew taking distinct positions (Bleck and van de Walle, 2013, p. 1396). The low salience of ideology in party politics has
also been argued to be the product of strategic considerations. Kitschelt (2007) argues, for example, that the recurrence to
valence issues is more likely in party systems that are characterized by clientelistic parties which compete over their ability to
deliver targeted goods and constituency-services. Bleck and van de Walle (2013) argue that parties purposively remain unclear
in their campaign promises, in order to remain flexible to forge alliances with other parties in the future, given the instability
of the party landscape in many African countries (Mozaffar and Scarrit, 2005, Bleck and van de Walle, 2013, p. 1398).
31
parties always deliver the benefit which compensates the voter for her costs of voting or for her ideo-
logical distance to the party (e.g. Dixit and Londregan, 1996; Nichter, 2008; Stokes, 2005). While
much thought has gone into what prevents voters from defecting from this “benefit-for-votes-deal” (e.g.
Gallego, Forthcoming; Lawson and Greene, 2014; Stokes, 2005), existing models of vote and turnout-
buying have largely ignored the fact that parties do not necessarily follow through with their campaign
promises (Cox and McCubbins, 1986; Dixit and Londregan, 1996; Nichter, 2008; Stokes, 2005) .
The paradox that parties are able to influence vote choice and turnout by offering individuals private
benefits, while the ballot is secret, has attracted much scholarly attention. Stokes (2005, p. 318) has
argued that well-organized party machines in Argentina are able to credibly signal to voters that they
can find out how they vote, which in turn prevents voters from taking the benefit but not voting for
the machine. Proponents of the turnout-buying model argue that parties mainly focus benefits on core
supporters, because here they know how these voters would vote if they voted, and hence only need to
observe turnout, not try to find out how individuals voted (Nichter, 2008, p. 21). Others have argued
that parties target intrinsically reciprocal individuals who are unlikely to defect from the deal and vote
as they please (Lawson and Greene, 2014, Finan and Schechter, 2012, p. 865). Another way in which
politicians try to assure that voters to whom they offer a benefit actually do vote for them, is to only
deliver benefits after the election (Nichter, 2010, p. 2). In such cases, it is argued that a voter desiring to
receive a benefit is likely to fulfill her part of the deal. This is particularly effective if the politician offers
a benefit whose delivery is directly tied to his electoral success (Robinson and Verdier, 2013, p. 261).
Thus if candidates promise voters benefits such as jobs in the public sector, it is clear that only in case
of a win will the candidate have access to the necessary state resources to provide voters with these jobs
(Robinson and Verdier, 2013, pp. 261–263).
The fact, however, that it is not only voters who have an incentive to defect from the benefits-for-votes-
deal, but that candidates may also have one, has received much less attention.4 I argue that candidates
enjoy different levels of trust with their partisans than among independent and opposed voters and that
promises to deliver benefits in the future are more credible to one’s own supporters than to other voters.
This variation in the candidates’ credibility among different types of voters, I argue, is part of the story
why candidates target core voters.5 To be fair, there would be no credibility problem on the part of
candidates if they delivered all benefits ahead of the election.6 However, it is implausible to expect that
4Exceptions are Gallego (Forthcoming); Robinson and Verdier (2013); Finan and Schechter (2012).
5While past models of distributive campaigning have acknowledged the possibility that parties’ ability to cater to partisans
is different to that of distributing benefits to other voters, to the best of my knowledge, this has not been linked to the variation
in the credibility of campaign promises. Dixit and Londregan (1996, pp. 1153–1154) argue for example, that if parties can
deliver goods to their core voters with less leakage than to swing voters or opposed voters, they will have an incentive to focus
benefits on their partisans (Gallego, Forthcoming, p. 5).
6This is an assumption that Nichter (2008, p. 20), for example explicitly makes.
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parties would exclusively do this, as voters would then have an incentive to defect i.e., take the benefit
and vote as they please, as Bratton’s analysis of Nigeria’s 2003 and 2007 presidential elections, for ex-
ample, suggests (Bratton, 2008).7 We lack systematic data on the type of clientelistic targeting which
takes place, in order to assess how frequent the use of upfront payments is, compared to the delivery
of benefits after the election. There is anecdotal evidence of clientelistic targeting, however, where the
delivery of benefits also takes place – sometimes exclusively so – after the election. In such cases, can-
didates could potentially defect from an agreement they strike with voters. One example of relational
clientelism is given in a study of clientelism in Argentina. In this study, Auyero (2000, p. 56) reports
how party brokers of the Peronist Party distribute powdered milk to mothers as part of a nutritional pro-
gram funded by the Argentinian welfare ministry. In order to assure continued access to these benefits,
beneficiaries of this program appear at rallies of the Peronist Party and vote for candidates of this party
in elections. Another example is provided in an analysis of clientelism in Northern Brazil (Nichter,
2011, p. 12). It illustrates how voters signal their support during election campaigns by campaigning
for a candidate or putting up party banners at their houses, in order to receive health benefits from local
politicians, ranging from priority access to a municipality’s only ambulance (ibid., p. 12) to medicine
that local politicians buy for their supporters at private pharmacies (ibid., p. 8). Finally, my fieldwork
in Ghana also provided examples of relational clientelism. A regional campaign manager of the NPP
in Ghana gave me a detailed account of how he arranges benefits-for-vote-deals in the region he was
responsible for during the 2012 election campaigns. He explained that he and his team organized door-
to-door campaigns, in which they asked people to vote for the NPP and listened to what potential voters
would expect to receive in return for doing so.
“NPP: They demand from you. But how sure are you that they are coming to vote for you?
That is the big question.
MR: So what do you do? Do you give it or you don’t?
NPP: No, no, no, some of the demands are so heavy and it’s our difficult zone, too, so the
only thing we normally do is to promise that, ’let’s strike a deal, vote for me if I come, I will
speak to your need’. You see?”
He went on to explain that he takes stock of their demands – such as new fishing nets, or that the local
politicians pay their children’s school fees for a given time – and contacts the voters after the election to
reward them with the corresponding benefits. He said that he does so if the vote share his party gains
7Data to investigate to which extend voters comply with the arrangement with the party trying to win their vote is naturally
sparse, as vote-buying is not only illegal, but also reporting on it might put voters at risk. In an analysis of Nigeria’s 2003 and
2007 elections, using exceptionally fine-grained data on vote-buying, Bratton (2008, p. 626) finds that voters who are targeted
with vote-buying are actually less likely to vote than those who are not offered a reward for their vote. This, the author suggests,
might be because voters are torn between complying with the vote-buying agreement and voting for the respective candidate
or defecting and voting as they please. They might choose the middle-ground and abstain from voting, which Bratton regards
also as a form of defection (Bratton, 2008, p. 626).
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in the respective constituency indicates that these voters have indeed been mobilized through these ar-
rangements.8
These insights from election campaigns in new democracies provide anecdotal evidence that even when
using clientelistic campaigning strategies – as opposed to the intended implementation of national
policies – candidates promise future benefits to be delivered after the election. This creates a situation
in which not only voters, but also candidates could defect from such vote- or turnout-buying deals.
As I have described in this section so far, past models of distributive targeting have made the assumption
that parties are always credible in promising benefits. I have argued that this is unfounded as parties
often only deliver these benefits to the voters after the election. In the next paragraphs, I present my
reasons for why it is particularly difficult for African parties to make credible promises to voters.
Parties in Africa generally enjoy low levels of credibility among voters (Logan, 2008, p. 9). There are
various factors that help account for this. One is that party labels convey little information about what
type of policies parties are likely to implement once in power, due to parties’ weak ideological and
programmatic profiles (Bleck and van de Walle, 2011, 2013; Carey, 2002; Mozaffar and Scarrit, 2005;
van de Walle, 2003). African party systems are also unstable, with new parties entering and exiting the
political arena from election to election and parties splintering or forging alliances with each other on a
regular basis (van de Walle, 2003; Mozaffar and Scarrit, 2005). These characteristics of African parties
make it difficult for voters to anticipate how likely a party or a candidate is to follow through with a
proposed policy. Finally, it has been suggested that parties in Africa probably also have difficulty in
making credible and specific campaign promises, because they are exceptionally budget-constrained, as
many of these countries are highly dependent on foreign aid (Bleck and van de Walle, 2013, p. 1400).
This dependency gives them little leverage in pursuing policies which their domestic constituents prefer,
and which they might have promised to them, and makes them more accountable to international donors
(Bleck and van de Walle, 2013).
In light of these characteristics, I argue that the credibility of campaign promises cannot be taken for
granted. I further argue that the credibility with which candidates can make promises to deliver benefits
is going to influence the effectiveness of such a campaigning strategy. Some candidates are likely to
be more credible than others, and more so among their partisans than among other voters. Candidates
not only have an advantage in targeting core voters because they do not need to pay them as much for
their vote as other voters as the ideological distance they need to compensate them for is lower. I argue
that parties target core voters, because these voters are more likely to believe that the party will keep its
8Interview with a regional campaign manager of the NPP, November 15, 2012.
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promises.9
Assumption of campaigns exclusively intended to increase parties’ vote shares
The study of electoral clientelism and that of electoral violence have emerged as two separate research
agendas which have tended to talk past each other. In order to develop a holistic understanding of which
groups of voters parties are trying to address during the campaign season, and of their reasons for doing
so, we need to take into account that parties might intentionally demobilize voters. As mentioned above,
this possibility has long been ignored in the literature. While it has been recognized that campaign
exposure might demobilize voters (Berelson, Lazarsfeld and McPhee, 1954; Lazarsfeld, Berelson and
Gaudet, 1968), mostly through an extensive use of negative campaigning (Ansolabehere, 1994; Ansol-
abehere, Iyengar and Simon, 1999; Gerstle, Sanders and Kaid, 1991), this has generally been regarded
as simply an unintended side effect. Similarly, early scholarly work on election-related violence has
treated violence as a side effect of instability and democratic transition processes (Huntington, 1993;
Snyder, 2000). More recent work, however, has recognized the strategic use of electoral violence, to
impact election outcomes, both by established parties and opposition groups (Daxecker, 2014; Ellman
and Wantchekon, 2000; Hyde and Marinov, 2014; Tucker, 2007).
I argue that it is important to include plans intended to demobilize voters into the analysis of campaign-
ing strategies in African elections. In those African countries where violence erupts around elections,
evidence increasingly corroborates the interpretation that it is a product of parties’ campaigning efforts
(Basedau, Erdmann and Mehler, 2007; Bekoe, 2010; Goldsmith, Forthcoming). Consideration of the
possibility that parties demobilize voters, can also help to account for why the organizers might choose
to concentrate benefits on core, rather than on independent voters. One possibility is that parties might
be mobilizing voters with benefits, while demobilizing independent voters with violence. Studying dif-
ferent strategies in a party’s campaigning repertoire is vital because a party’s calculus of which groups to
target with particular strategies aimed at either increasing turnout among voters, or making them switch
their vote intention, is going to be influenced by the cost-benefit calculation of the counter-factual. This
counter-factual may not necessarily be the decision not to address a certain group of voters at all during
a campaign. Potentially, it could be the implementation of a different strategy meant to achieve some
contrasting effect on the group. In my theory, I therefore extend the campaigning repertoire of parties
to allow them to use violence. I contribute to recent research studying both strategies using benefits and
violence together (Bratton, 2008; Collier and Vicente, 2012; Cornelius, 2004; Gutie´rrez-Romero, 2014;
9See also Kramon (2013a, p. 18) who argues that in Sub-Saharan Africa “[...][p]olitics is about credibility, rather than
ideological or programmatic proximity as the spatial models prescribe” (Kramon, 2013a, p. 18).
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Gonzalez Ocantos et al., 2013).
3.2 The argument
I propose an analytical framework based on the standard model of electoral competition with two parties
– the incumbent party and the main opposition party – competing to win presidential elections. The
incumbent and the challenger have a repertoire of different campaigning strategies, ranging from organ-
izing campaign rallies to making promises of public goods or local club goods, or offering voters private
material incentives, and even using violence against them. They can use these strategies to increase or
decrease voters’ likelihood to turn out.10 My main interest lies in identifying the groups of voters who
are at the center of campaigning strategies for the incumbent and the challenger. I formulate and test
predictions about which groups of voters parties target with different strategies, in order to increase or
decrease their turnout. I suggest a probabilistic voting model based on Lindbeck and Weibull (1987),
extended to enable parties to disenfranchise parts of the electorate, as in Robinson and Torvik (2009).
Different from Robinson and Torvik, however, I do not constrain the ability to use force to the incumbent
party.
The electorate consists of different types of voters who can be distinguished along two dimensions: their
partisan status and their likelihood to turn out. Core voters have a positive bias towards the incumbent
or the challenger. I apply a broad concept of the closeness of a voter to a party or a candidate. This
affiliation can be based on ideological proximity to the party (Nichter, 2008; Stokes, 2005) or ethnic
affiliation with the party or the candidate running on the ticket of the party (Wantchekon, 2003). It can
also be based on any past interaction of the voter with a particular party or candidate. An example would
be that she has received private benefits from the party (Harding, 2013b, p. 18, Kuenzi and Lambright,
2011, p. 781-782).11 What is important is that these are voters who are likely to positively evaluate
campaign promises made by the candidates of the party to which they feel close. This argument is based
on theories developed in political psychology which assume that voters use shortcuts such as cognitive
dissonance, priming, or acceptability bias which makes them hear what they knew before the campaign
(Iyengar and Kinder, 1987; Popkin, 1991; Zaller, 1992). A third group of voters is indifferent between
10In principle, besides mobilizing or demobilizing voters, parties can also attempt to persuade voters or engage in double
persuasion (Gans-Morse, Mazzuca and Nichter, 2014, pp. 418–419) or abstention-buying (Gans-Morse, Mazzuca and Nichter,
2014, pp. 418–419) (also referred to as “negative vote-buying” (Schaffer, 2002, p. 78). I explain in the following paragraphs
why it is most rational for parties to use the strategies with the intention to mobilize or demobilize voters.
11Research indicates that in African countries with lower ethnic diversity (Harding, 2013b, p. 21) and lower party system
volatility (Harding, 2013b, p. 22) more people express an affiliation with a party. Individual-level factors are also important,
with rural residents (Harding, 2013b, p. 18), educated voters in volatile party systems, and supporters of the incumbent party
more likely to form partisan attachments.
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the incumbent and the largest opposition party (Robinson and Torvik, 2009).
Furthermore, voters can be distinguished with regard to their likelihood to turn out and vote. While the
vote-buying model has assumed that voting is costless and hence that voters always vote (Stokes, 2005),
in most elections these conditions are not met. Some voters need to spend a day on the road to vote,
others live only a stone’s throw away from their polling station. These different costs of voting are likely
to influence whether or not voters will take part in the ballot, independently of whether they feel close to
a particular political party or not.12 In addition, individual voter characteristics are also likely to make
some voters more and others less likely to vote. I distinguish between certain voters who are likely to
turn out, even if they are not addressed by any campaigning strategy, and potential voters who might or
might not turn out on Election Day (Stokes and Dunning, 2007). We might think of certain voters as
being older, more educated, as belonging to low income-level groups, living in the countryside, or being
members of voluntary associations. These are individual characteristics of voters in Sub-Saharan Africa
who have been shown to have the habit of turning out to vote (Bratton, 1999; Bratton, Gyimah-Boadi and
Mattes, 2005; Kuenzi and Lambright, 2011). To the contrary, potential voters are likely to be younger
and less educated, wealthier and urban dwellers (Kuenzi and Lambright, 2011). Institutional factors
and other macro-level factors have also shown to increase people’s likelihood of turning out in African
elections. Turnout in legislative elections, for example, increases with media exposure per capita and the
number of elections a country has held. It is also higher if legislative elections take place in concurrence
with presidential elections and in electoral systems which use a proportional formula (Kuenzi and Lam-
bright, 2007). As these factors do not vary across groups of voters within one country, however, they are
not of primary interest to this project.
Figure 3.1 locates voters on the dimension of affiliation with the incumbent and the challenger and on
the dimension of the likelihood to turn out from the perspective of the incumbent. Voters who are located
at the top left corner feel close to the incumbent and those located at the bottom left corner feel close
to the challenger. The voters who are located between these two poles, are indifferent between both
candidates, either because they do not feel close to any party or because they support a third party. The
other dimension, depicted on the x-axis of the graph, is continuous. Voters at the left corner are unlikely
to go and vote and their probability increases as they move to the right.
These voters can be addressed with different strategies with the goal of making them switch their in-
clination to vote for a party or to increase or decrease their likelihood to turn out. My central argument
12This holds even though partisanship is an important predictor of turnout in Sub-Saharan Africa (Kuenzi and Lambright,
2011, p. 779) and elsewhere (Norris, 2002). Even with a majority of respondents who report feeling close to a party, also
saying they have turned out and voted (83% in Kuenzi & Lambright’s analysis), a substantial number of these partisans remain
who are only potential voters.
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Figure 3.1: Types of voters
is that it is most rational for parties to focus on mobilizing potential supporters and demobilizing un-
decided voters. I further argue that candidate visits, campaign promises, and particularistic benefits are
best suited to mobilize turnout among potential supporters and that violence and intimidation is best
suited to demobilize undecided voters. In the following section I explain first, why candidates should
focus campaign rallies and promises and clientelistic targeting on their potential supporters and then I
present my argument about why they should focus appeals to intimidate voters on undecided voters.
3.2.1 Why parties try to mobilize potential supporters rather than persuade new voters
I expect parties to focus their time and money on the campaign trail on making sure their potential
supporters vote, rather than winning independent or opposed voters. This is known as mobilization
(Rohrschneider, 2002, pp. 376–377) in the campaigning studies and turnout-buying in the clientelism
literature (Nichter, 2008, p. 21). This is likely despite the fact that this strategy buys the party net only
one additional vote (Gans-Morse, Mazzuca and Nichter, 2014, p.418-419). Had the party succeeded
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in convincing an unaffiliated voter or an opposed voter which is known as persuasion (Popkin, 1991)
or vote-buying (Nichter, 2008, p. 21), the party would not only have gained an additional voter. It
would potentially have taken one vote away from the rival candidate as well (Gans-Morse, Mazzuca and
Nichter, 2014, p.418-419), as explained in Chapter 2. However, the benefit to be gained from persuasion
is outweighed, I argue, by the costs and risks associated with this goal which are potentially higher than
if a party simply tries to make its voters go and vote.
Mobilizing one’s supporters is less costly than buying the support of other voters
The reason why mobilizing one’s core voters is less costly than trying to convince undecided or op-
posed voters, is because the ideological distance the party needs to compensate the voter for, decreases
the more the voter’s and the party’s policy positions are aligned. In line with this central assumption
made in models of distributive politics (Lindbeck and Weibull, 1987, Nichter, 2008, p. 23, Stokes, 2005,
pp. 319–321), I argue that the costs of winning an additional vote through the allocation or the prom-
ising of particularistic benefits will be lowest when targeting one’s core voters, followed by independent
voters and will be highest for core voters of the opposing party. As I have argued above, however, this
is not the only reason why the benefits of mobilization may outweigh those of persuading independent
voters.
Why exposing supporters to the campaign is less risky than contacting independent or opposed
voters
Mobilizing one’s supporters is also less risky. First, parties are uncertain about how voters will react to
being addressed with campaign appeals (Cox and McCubbins, 1986, pp. 378–379). During the campaign
voters both receive information about the policy positions of the different parties in the race and get to
know the candidates better. There are different possible effects being exposed to the campaign of a
party can have on voters. Campaigns can stabilize a vote intention held by voters at the beginning of
the campaign season, known as “reinforcement” (Lazarsfeld, Berelson and Gaudet, 1968, 102). Voters
can also be motivated to change their vote intention throughout the course of the campaign, known
as “conversion,” or “reconversion” if the original intention was against their political predispositions
(Lazarsfeld, Berelson and Gaudet, 1968, 102). Finally, campaigns can help voters make up their minds
about which party to support in the election, although they had no preference at the beginning of the
campaign. This has been termed “activation” if the campaign activates the latent political inclination,
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or conversion if the voter’s final vote decision goes against her predisposition (Lazarsfeld, Berelson and
Gaudet, 1968, 102).
Past research has found that the most robust effect of exposing voters to campaigns is to strengthen their
pre-existing political inclinations (Lazarsfeld, Berelson and Gaudet, 1968; Key and Cummings, 1966;
Campbell, 1960). While parties would certainly like their potential supporters to be strengthened in
their political inclination, they would not want to make opposed voters feel even further away from them
and closer to the rival party (Althaus, Nardulli and Shaw, 2002; Fenno, 1978). I, therefore, argue that
candidates should concentrate their appeals on those groups of voters whose demographic or economic
background makes it likely that they are predisposed towards feeling close to the respective party. In
this way, they can be more certain that campaigns will have the intended effect among their core voters.
Or as Cox and McCubbins (1986, pp. 378–379) have put it:
“Core supporters...are well-known quantities. The candidate is in frequent and intense
contact with them and has relatively precise and accurate ideas about how they will react”
(Cox and McCubbins, 1986, pp. 378–379).
Based on these considerations, I expect parties to campaign most among their supporters, followed by
independent voters and, least among supporters of the rival candidate.
Why core voters will more positively react to campaign promises than independent or opposed
voters
Another reason why I maintain that mobilizing one’s core supporters is less risky than trying to win new
voters, is because core voters are more likely to believe promises made by candidates than independent
or opposed voters, as explained in the following section.
As outlined above, attending campaign rallies, watching campaign advertisements on television or listen-
ing to campaign spots on the radio might be more likely to increase voters’ awareness of their political
inclination than make them change their minds. In addition, voters tend to evaluate information provided
by parties and candidates in the light of their own political predispositions (Hagner and Rieselbach,
1978; Kraus, Kennedy and Nixon, 1962; LeDuc and Price, 1979; Lang and Lang, 1962; Sigelman and
Sigelman, 1984). Partisanship has been found to be one of the most important mediators of how and if
campaign information influences voters’ behavior (Lazarsfeld, Berelson and Gaudet, 1968, pp. 137-149,
Berelson, Lazarsfeld and McPhee, 1954, pp. 118-132, Finkel and Schrott, 1995). Political psychologists
like Weisberg and Greene (2003) have argued that identifying with a party is similar to forming a social
identity as a member of that party and that this causes individuals to adopt their party’s views and more
favorable attitudes toward the party’s leaders (see also Bartels, 2002; Gerber, Huber and Washinton,
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2010). Given these considerations, it is plausible that partisans regard campaign promises of candid-
ates of the party with which they identify as being more credible than independent or opposed voters
would do. Research on the relationship between partisanship and the credibility of candidates and their
campaign promises in Africa is virtually non-existent. Studies on the relationship between ethnicity –
which often functions as a proxy for partisanship – and trust in government suggest that co-ethnics of
the president tend to exhibit higher levels of trust in government than voters who are not affiliated with
the president’s ethnic group (Kuenzi, 2008).13
Given that candidates in African elections can be expected to generally enjoy low levels of credibility
(Logan, 2008), I expect them to focus campaign appeals in situations in which they can be expected
to be most credible. If parties are using a clientelistic campaign strategy, they can pay voters the be-
nefits upfront or after the election. If they wait with handing out the benefits until after the voter has
fulfilled her part of the deal, parties might have an incentive to defect from the agreement with the voter
and not deliver the reward (Finan and Schechter, 2012; Gallego, Forthcoming; Robinson and Verdier,
2013).Voters who anticipate that parties could shirk from the agreement, might be more likely to renege
on the deal themselves. In order to motivate voters to fulfill their part of the arrangement, parties would
henceforth have an incentive to signal their reliability by, for example, already delivering part of the
benefit before the election. Recall the demands made on the regional campaign manager of the NPP in
the interview quoted at the beginning of the chapter. In the region where his team campaigned, many
families live off fishing, thus some demanded new fishing nets in return for a favorable vote.14 In order
to show seriousness, the party pays the family a small amount of cash to repair their old fishing net and
promises to supply a new one after the election, in return for support at the polls. If, however, the voter
defects from the deal, parties do not lose much; at most a small amount of cash spent upfront on the
voter before the election.
I argue that if parties make promises not to individuals, but to groups of voters, we have a different
situation altogether. At public rallies, parties make promises about national policy programs, and often
also about delivering local projects to the particular constituency where the rally takes place. These local
public goods, such as clinics, schools, or clean water projects are essential for voters when making up
their minds regarding which party to support at the polls, as observers of elections in various African
countries have contended (Baldwin, 2013, Barkan, 1995, Ichino and Nathan, 2013, Kramon, 2013a,
p. 51, Lindberg, 2010).While the types of campaign promises parties make at rallies in African elections
remain under-researched, the salience of local club goods to voters makes it likely that parties address
13 Scholars explain this with more frequent interactions among homogeneous groups (Fearon and Laitin, 1996), better
sanctioning mechanisms towards co-ethnic leaders (Greif, 1994) or the better “findability” of co-ethnics (Miguel, 2004).
14Interview with a regional campaign manager of the NPP, December 15, 2012.
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this in their campaign speeches. Indeed, my content-analysis of campaign speeches in Ghana’s 2012
elections, presented in Chapter 6, confirms that the incumbent regularly made such local promises on
his campaign trail.
If a party promises to implement local club goods in a specific electoral constituency and the promise
does not have the intended effect of increasing the party’s vote share in the way it had hoped for, it faces
a dilemma. Provided that the party wins the national election, it can build the clinic in the constituency
despite the disappointing results gained there. If it does so, it signals to the people living in this con-
stituency that no matter how they vote, they can always cash in on the benefits. This is not a signal the
party wants to send, as this can encourage voters to continue to vote as they please and not feel obliged
to support a party, in order to benefit from it. If instead the party chooses to renege on its promise, it
risks losing the reputation of a party which honors its campaign pledges. Since parties are likely to care
about such damage to their reputation regarding promises (Aragones and Palfrey, 2007), this is clearly
also not an option they want to pursue.
For this reason, I argue that candidates should focus their promises on situations where they are most
credible for the voting public, and where these promises are most likely to increase their vote share.
One such situation could be an appearance before friendly crowds, which leads to the expectation that
parties should focus on making promises of future benefits to groups of voters who have a predisposi-
tion to vote for that party, rather than for the rival candidate. As such campaign promises are typically
made at rallies organized by the campaign in the respective localities, I also expect parties to focus these
rally events in areas where potential supporters are concentrated. The argument that candidates should
focus campaign promises in situations in which they anticipate to be most credible with these promises,
implies that other factors that positively impact candidate credibility can also increase the likelihood of
candidates to make such promises.
One important determinant is incumbency status, as incumbents are generally thought to be more cred-
ible in promising material benefits than their challengers (Medina and Stokes, 2007; Vicente, 2014;
Wantchekon, 2003). I discuss this extension of my argument in Chapters 6 and 7, in which I analyze the
use of local promises by the incumbent and the challenger in Ghana’s 2012 presidential elections and
the credibility of campaign promises made by these two candidates.
Why observing turnout is easier than observing vote choice
Finally, in order to prevent voters from taking benefits during campaigns and not turning out to vote, or
voting for a different party, parties try to make the delivery of the benefit contingent on an individual’s
or a group’s vote. While observing votes at the level of polling stations or at the level of electoral con-
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stituencies or regions is as easy as observing turnout, observing how individuals voted is much more
problematic under the secret ballot (Gallego, Forthcoming; Lawson and Greene, 2014; Stokes, 2005). If
a candidate knows that an individual is inclined to vote for him, rather than for any other party, based
on a factor like her ethnic background, the candidate or a broker working for him only needs to observe
whether this individual goes to vote or not. This is why, in line with the turnout-buying model (Nichter,
2008), I expect parties to choose to monitor turnout.
Furthermore, not only can parties more easily observe turnout than individual vote choice of any voter,
they also have more information on their core voters’ inclination or voting behavior than on that of in-
dependent or opposed voters. This is the case because parties relying on electoral clientelism typically
use intermediaries who forge the exchanges with the voters and monitor their voting behavior. The net-
works of the brokers, which not only serve as vehicles to target voters with benefits but also to collect
information on them, can be expected to be more dense in a party’s stronghold than in competitive con-
stituencies. These brokers are often party members, and parties have more members in their strongholds.
In addition, it is plausible that brokers and parties can more easily infer voting behavior in areas which
have consistently voted for one party in the past than in swing constituencies where party allegiance is
more volatile. Thus, parties not only deliver benefits to their core voters more easily (Cox and McCub-
bins, 1986), but it is also easier for them to monitor voting behavior among their supporters compared
to swing or opposed voters.
Why parties mobilize potential supporterts, rather than reward certain supporters
I have presented a number of arguments why parties should focus their campaign appeals on their sup-
porters so far. In line with previous models on distributive campaigning, I maintain that it would not
be rational to spend resources on those of their supporters, who would turn out, even if they were not
addressed during elections (Nichter, 2008, Stokes, 2005, Stokes and Dunning, 2007, p. 14). This is why
I expect parties to concentrate their campaign rallies, campaign promises, and clientelism on those of
their supporters who are unlikely to vote.
3.3 The strategic use of violence to disenfranchise unresponsive voters
So far, I have formulated expectations for the use of different campaigning strategies, such as candidates
hosting campaign rallies in various electoral constituencies, making promises of local projects in these
constituencies, and targeting individual voters with offers of materialistic benefits. While there is nothing
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undemocratic about visiting different communities and disseminating a party’s program and making
campaign promises, targeting voters with particularistic benefits can be more problematic. Trying to
make voters and groups of voters fear that they might be excluded from benefits if they do not support
a particular candidate or party has been argued to reverse the chain of accountability. In what Stokes
(2005) has termed “perverse accountability,” candidates are no longer accountable to voters, but voters
are accountable to candidates by delivering their vote in the hope of being granted access to vital goods
such as healthcare. Such attempts to invert the chain of accountability are only one strategy in the
repertoire of illicit campaigning strategies or on “the menu of manipulation” (Schedler, 2002, p. 39).
As I have mentioned in the review of existing research on campaigning in young democracies, observers
of African elections have contended that intimidating voters is also part of parties’ repertoire of strategies
to manipulate elections in many countries, ranging from Kenya, to Coˆte d’Ivoire, Nigeria and Zimbabwe,
to name but a few (Adolfo et al., 2012; Bratton, 2008; Collier and Vicente, 2014; LeBas, 2006). In the
following section, I present my argument why I expect parties to concentrate violence on independent
voters with the aim to disenfranchise them.
Parties will generally prefer to use distributive campaign appeals instead of voter intimidation, since
they are, after all, vying for votes (Bratton, 2008; Collier and Vicente, 2012; Gonzalez Ocantos et al.,
2013). The use of violence is sanctioned more heavily by both their electorate and outside observers
than are attempts to bribe voters with clientelism. However, there are several reasons why parties might
extend their campaigning repertoire to include voter intimidation. First, the exercise of violence requires
fewer resources than do strategies involving the distribution of benefits (Gonzalez Ocantos et al., 2013;
Wilkinson and Haid, 2009).
Second, parties can have an incentive to apply violent campaign strategies in an attempt to reach voters
who are relatively unresponsive to distributive appeals. Wilkinson and Haid (2009), for example, showed
that because the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party had little credibility in making distributive
promises to Hindu voters at lower income levels, it resorted to violence in order to increase the salience
of ethnic cleavages and stereotypes against the Muslim minority. They could thus mobilize Hindu voters
they would not have reached otherwise. In such situations parties can use violence to change the issue
ranking of voters, making issues, which they own, more salient (Chandra, 2004; Wilkinson and Haid,
2009).
Third, even though it seems plausible that voters do not usually develop genuine preferences for parties
threatening to use violence, Ellman and Wantchekon (2000) show that they might do so temporarily,
under certain circumstances. The authors argue that voters in Liberia’s 1997 elections, for example,
overwhelmingly voted for Charles Taylor, because he credibly signaled that he would re-instigate large-
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scale violence if he lost the election (Ellman and Wantchekon, 2000, pp. 518–519). Another example
cited by the same authors are the presidential elections which took place in El Salvador in 1994 in which
peasants, who were in favor of a land reform, voted for a party that was against this reform, in order to
prevent the latter from taking up arms if it lost the election (Ellman and Wantchekon, 2000, pp. 519).
Why violence is used to demobilize independent voters
While parties might in principle use violence to persuade new voters or mobilize their supporters to
turn out, I expect parties to predominantly apply violence to demobilize voters. While there is some
evidence suggesting that pre-electoral violence might be used to mobilize turnout from Zimbabwe’s
2008 elections (LeBas, 2006, p. 427) and from India (Wilkinson and Haid, 2009), the most robust finding
in this young literature is that violence demobilizes voters (Bratton, 2008; Hickman, 2009; Meredith,
2002; Kuhn, 2013; Sisk and Reynolds, 1998). I argue that this is because, even if parties were using
violence for a different purpose, the consequence of violence is likely to be a reduction in turnout,
rather than vote switching or mobilization. This is because a voter who is threatened into switching her
vote is faced with a dilemma. She can either give in to the threat or vote according to her preferences.
The most common reaction will be that she chooses the middle-ground and abstains.15 In fact, while
there is very little empirical evidence to date on which to base predictions regarding who are likely to
become individual targets of pre-electoral violence in Sub-Saharan Africa, and what the consequences
of violence are, analyses of Nigeria’s 2003 and 2007 elections lend support to my argument (Bratton,
2008). Bratton (2008, p. 626) finds a strong effect that voters who were threatened with campaign
violence are unlikely to vote and that this effect lasts until the subsequent election, in which these
respondents oftentimes also abstain. An analysis of patterns of pre-electoral violence in a range of Sub-
Saharan countries further corroborates the findings from the Nigerian elections (Kuhn, 2013).
Furthermore, a similar argument which speaks in favor of the turnout-buying versus the vote-buying
model also applies to the use of voter intimidation. Voters are less likely to shirk a benefits-for-votes
deal, the more they think that the party, that has targeted them with a benefit, will be able to find out
if and how they voted (Medina and Stokes, 2007; Stokes, 2005; Nichter, 2008). As turnout is easier to
observe than vote choice, proponents of the turnout-buying model argue that this is why parties focus
on mobilizing their supporters (e.g. Nichter, 2008). The effectiveness of threats is also likely to increase
with the parties’ ability to monitor voters’ behavior. As the monitoring of turnout is more feasible than
that of vote choice, compliance following a threat intended to make a voter stay away from the polls can
be expected to be higher than if the intention is to make the voter alter her vote choice. The following
15See Bratton (2008) for a similar argument.
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quote by a New Yorker campaign manager at the turn of the 20th century on how he paid voters to
abstain from voting illustrates this point:
“Under the new ballot law you cannot tell how a man votes when he goes into the booth,
but if he stays at home you know that you have the worth of your money.”16
I expect parties to concentrate their appeals aimed at demobilizing voters on independent voters. Again,
similar arguments apply for the use of intimidation as for strategies that try to win voters with benefits
and via campaign promises. Parties might indeed have the strongest incentives to demobilize ardent
supporters of the opponent, but the amount of coercion they would have to apply is likely to be much
higher than in trying to demobilize voters less determined to vote for the rival candidate. This is similar
to the logic of the benefit having to be increasingly higher, in order to compensate a voter for her
ideological distance to the party, the more she is inclined toward supporting the rival candidate (Stokes,
2005, pp. 319–321, Nichter, 2008, p. 23).
In addition, instigating violence in areas where strong supporters of the rival party are concentrated
might backfire as it may increase the determination among these voters to support the rival party and
alienate them further from the party who is inflicting violence. This mirrors my argument about why
parties should avoid campaigning too much in their rivals’ strongholds, in order to avoid a backlash
resulting in further polarization of these voters against themselves (Althaus, Nardulli and Shaw, 2002;
Fenno, 1978).
3.3.1 Empirical implications of the argument
In this chapter, I have argued that it is rational for parties to focus campaigning strategies, such as
visiting constituencies, making campaign promises, and offering voters individual benefits, in order to
mobilize their supporters. Since it would not be rational for parties to waste benefits on their faithful
or “certain supporters who are likely to go and vote for them, whether or not they are addressed by the
party’s campaign (Stokes and Dunning, 2007, p. 14), I expect parties to focus their campaign appeals on
potential supporters. These are voters who are located in the top left corner in Figure 3.2.
Expectations on the use of campaign rallies, campaign promises and clientelism
Figure 3.2 shows the degree of affiliation of voters with a party from the perspective of the incumbent. If
the expectation holds that a party mobilizes potential voters, then we should see a positive relationship
between an affiliation of a voter with the party and her likelihood to be addressed by campaign rallies,
16A campaign manager in New York, quoted in a New York Times article, published on September, 29, 1900, cited in Cox,
Kousser and Morgan (1981, p. 656).
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campaign promises and private benefits. Further, I expect to see a negative relationship between her
likelihood to turn out and the likelihood to be addressed with these campaign tools. I test this proposi-
tion in various analyses both modeling the political inclination and likelihood to turn out on the level of
individual voters (Chapter 8) and on the level of groups of voters in Chapters 5 and 6. For the group-level
analysis I study the targeting of electoral constituencies and regions with different strategies, in relation
to levels of support for the party targeting these voters, and histories of turnout in these localities.
Figure 3.2: Mobilization of potential supporters
The empirical analyses not only serve to test the importance of mobilization of potential voters
in election campaigns, but also to rule out alternative goals parties might be pursuing, illustrated in
Figure 3.2. If a party were rewarding loyalists (Nichter, 2008, p. 20), we would also see a positive
relationship between affiliation with this party and campaigning effort directed at these loyal voters,
but the likelihood to turn out would be positively linked to being targeted by the campaign. If instead
parties were following a persuasion (e.g. Cox, 2006, p. 2), rather than a mobilization logic, we would
see campaigning effort cluster around independent voters. If the relationship with turnout were negative,
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this would be termed “double persuasion” (Nichter, 2008, p. 20), and if it were positive then this would
simply be called persuasion.17 Finally, a party might be paying opposed voters to abstain (e.g. Schaffer,
2002, p. 78) from voting, in which case we would see a negative relationship between affiliation with
the party and the likelihood of a voter to be addressed by campaigns.
Another important implication of the model with regard to these strategies is that supporters should
be more responsive to campaign appeals than independent or opposed voters. I made this argument
specifically with regard to the credibility of campaign promises.18
Figure 3.3: Demobilization of independent voters with violence
Expectations on the use of clientelism and violence
When parties can buy voters’ support with clientelism and disenfranchise them with violence, I have ar-
gued that it is rational for them to predominantly use electoral clientelism to motivate potential support-
17 While parties, in principle, could also try to persuade opposed voters, this has been dismissed by most theoretical models
as being too costly to try and has not received much support from empirical analyses (e.g. Stokes and Dunning, 2007), which
is why I do not consider this strategy in this summary of alternative hypotheses.
18Chapter 7 tests whether candidates are more credible with campaign promises among their partisans than among other
voters.
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ers to turn out and to demobilize independent voters with violence. Thus I expect offers of clientelism to
concentrate on voters who are partisans of the party which is targeting them, but who are unlikely to turn
out and vote. I expect attempts of intimidation with violence to be concentrated on voters who are indif-
ferent between the two candidates in the race, independent of their likelihood to turn out, as is illustrated
in Figure 3.3, from the perspective of the incumbent. I test this expectation with individual-level and
regional-level analyses of voter intimidation during campaigns, in Chapter 8. The figure also illustrates
alternative hypotheses. If a party focused attempts of intimidation on potential supporters, this would
speak in favor of the party trying to increase cohesion among its supporters, and make them go and vote
(LeBas, 2006). Lastly if parties concentrated violence on supporters of the rival candidate, this would
indicate that their primary goal was to demobilize supporters of their opponent.
3.4 Summary
In this chapter I have proposed three theoretical answers to the question of why parties in new demo-
cracies seem to be spending more time campaigning among their own supporters than existing theories
would lead us to expect. First, parties do not waste resources on courting to their certain supporters, at
the expense of campaigning among swing voters. They rather mobilize those of their supporters who
would otherwise not go and vote. Second, in contexts where parties’ campaign promises have little
credibility, the organizers concentrate their energy on those voters who trust them the most, namely their
core supporters. Third, in situations in which parties use electoral violence to impact election outcomes,
they concentrate their attempts of intimidation on citizens who would be difficult to convince to vote
for them, and rather disenfranchise them. This frees up resources for making campaign promises and
offering benefits aimed at mobilizing their core voters to turn out on Election Day.
I have further, formulated expectations on the use of different campaigning strategies which follow from
the argument. The next chapter presents the data sources against which the empirical implications of the
argument are tested.
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Chapter 4
Data collection: measuring campaigning
strategies in African elections
The analyses of the allocation of campaign rallies and campaign promises across constituencies as well
as the credibility of campaign promises are based on original data I collected during field work in Ghana
from August to December, 2012, during the months leading up to the general elections on December
7, 2012.1 In addition to the data I collected in Ghana, I compiled a cross-sectional dataset on the use
of clientelism and voter intimidation in 10 African countries. This dataset is based on regional-level
election data, which I compiled from various sources, and Afrobarometer data from the round 5 of the
survey, conducted between 2010 and 2012. The remainder of the chapter describes the data collection
and the compilation of the various datasets which I test the theoretical argument with in Chapters 5, 6, 7
and 8.
4.1 Event data on campaign rallies
To analyze the strategic use of campaign rallies in Ghana’s 2012 elections, I conducted a content-analysis
of articles in two main daily newspapers. I reviewed all articles on campaign events by the two main
candidates published in the Ghana’s best selling newspaper Daily Graphic (Amponsah, 2012, p. 2) and
the main opposition newspaper Daily Guide. I chose these two newspapers because they exhibit the
most thorough coverage of the activities of the NDC and the NPP and because their coverage is biased
in two opposed directions. The state-owned Daily Graphic had in the past shown to be slightly biased in
1During this time, I was affiliated with the Center for Democratic Development Ghana (CDD-Ghana). The CDD-Ghana is
a non-partisan civil society organization promoting democracy as well as a research institute.
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its amount of coverage in favor of the ruling party (Amponsah, 2012, p.2, Ghana Center for Democratic
Development, 2004) and it was hence reasonable to assume that it would thoroughly cover activities of
the ruling NDC. The private daily newspaper the Daily Guide is a pro-NPP newspaper and was hence
likely to focus in its coverage on rally events by NPP’s flagbarer Nana Akufo-Addo. I reviewed these
two papers on a daily basis from mid-August to December 7, 2012, the day of the election and archived
every article reporting on an event in which these candidates spoke in public.
In order to be able to compare the campaigning activities by the two parties, I decided to choose a
three-months period in the run-up to the elections that marked the peak of both parties’ campaigning
activity. The analyses are performed for the period from August, 25 to December 5, 2012. The start
date is marked by the first of the two parties launching its party manifesto and with this act announcing
the official start of its campaign (Dapatem and Bonney, 2012). As the end date, December 5, 2012 was
chosen because this was the date after which parties were obliged by the Electoral Commission to stop
campaigning, two days prior to the election on December 7, 2012.
The start date for the analysis was chosen despite the fact that the NDC only launched its campaign on
October 4, 2012. The date was chosen to reflect the actual peak of campaigning, rather than the official
period. The offical launch of NDC’s campaign was delayed due to the sudden death of the late president
Atta Mills on July 25. However, the newly endorsed president and flagbarer of the NDC, John Mahama,
already campaigned throughout the country on a “thank you tour” in August and September, 2012. This
tour was declared by the campaign as a means to thank Ghanaians for their condolences, but the events
hosted by the presidential candidate took on the same nature as the rallies that took place after the official
launch of NDC’s campaign (see also Myjoyonline.com, 2012). That this three-months period was in-
deed the time of most intensive campaigning also for the NDC was confirmed by the national campaign
manager I interviewed.2
I coded the articles, counting as a rally any event where the candidates spoke in public, regardless of the
size of the audience, during the campaigning period (see also Althaus, Nardulli and Shaw, 2002, p. 55,
Horowitz, 2012, p. 75). I collected information on the location of campaign rallies held by John Ma-
hama and Nana Akufo-Addo, following approaches used in studies on US election campaigns (Althaus,
Nardulli and Shaw, 2002; Shaw, 2006) and recently in a study on campaigns in Kenya’s 2007 elections
(Horowitz, 2012).
In addition, I collected information on campaign events from a third, neutral source. I obtained audio
recordings from reporters from two of the largest national radio stations, Joy FM and Citi FM. These
2“The whole three months was [...] the climax” (Interview with a member of NDC’s national campaign team, November
28, 2012.)
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two radio stations have no known bias of devoting more attention to any of the two parties or their
candidates. The four journalists I obtained the audio recordings from worked as ‘presidential reporters’
during the campaigns. This means both Joy FM and Citi FM assigned one reporter each to follow each
of the two candidates. The reporters are non-partisan and were not involved in the conceptualization of
the research so that there is no reason to believe that they had any incentive to hold back information
on any particular rally. I collected a total of 147 articles on campaign activities referring to 252 distinct
campaign events by the two candidates. In addition, I collected 97 speeches of which 50 were held by
the incumbent and 47 were given by the challenger. Table 4.1 shows the number of events by the two
candidates reported in the different sources. The data suggest that the two newspapers reported indeed
in the way expected. While the Daily Graphic disproportionately covered events by the incumbent, the
Daily Guide reported relatively more events by the challenger. This makes the inclusion of both news-
paper sources and the radio recordings particularly valuable. As the different sources often reported on
Table 4.1: Rally events by the incumbent and the challenger
Candidate Daily Graphic Daily Guide Radio Recordings TOTAL
(incl. duplicates)
John Mahama 158 2 50 210
(Incumbent)
Nana Akufo-Addo 57 36 47 140
(Challenger)
the same event, which took place in the same constituency, on the same day, I deleted duplicates before
conducting the quantitative analysis of the allocation of campaign rallies. After excluding these duplic-
ates, I ended up with 173 campaign events hosted by the incumbent and 103 rallies by the challenger.
In order to analyze whether candidates indeed focused on campaigning in their strongholds, and in par-
ticular on those with histories of low turnout, I located these events in the 275 constituencies which
Ghana is divided into. I chose the constituency as the unit of measurement, because this is the level
where election results on vote shares and turnout are easily observable for candidates. This allows can-
didates to choose places for their campaign events, based on how many people have voted for them in
the past and on past turnout levels in these constituencies.3
Sometimes only the city, town, or village where the event took place was mentioned and not the name
of the electoral constituency. In such cases, I conducted research on the locality that was mentioned in
3“MR: When you say difficult area, easy area, is that on the constituency level? So do you choose on constituency level?
NDC: Yes, yes.
M: Or is it within the constituency?
NDC: No, no, it’s the constituency area. Let’s say, you have 34 constituencies in Greater Accra. We have 11 constituencies,
for them, whether we go there or not, they’ll vote for NDC. We have 16 constituencies. 11 are NDC strongholds. Nobody can
change it. We have 16 constituencies that are marginal. So these marginal places are like ..., you have NDC, 50% and NPP,
50%” (Interview with a regional campaign manager of the NDC, October 23, 2012.)
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the article. I followed a standardized procedure in which I first checked whether the name of the town
mentioned in the article was a constituency headquarter, based on a list of constituencies, constituency
headquarters, districts and regions, obtained from CDD-Ghana. If the town or city mentioned in the
article did not correspond to the constituency headquarter, I obtained longitude and latitude of the loca-
tion from the website http://itouchmap.com/latlong.html. Using the software QGis I located the village,
town or city mentioned in the article within the constituency, by matching the information on longitude
and latitude with that of the constituency list.
4.2 Compilation of campaign speeches
In addition to testing whether candidates allocated their campaign events with the aim to mobilize their
potential supporters, I also analyze the use of campaign promises. I test two central predictions of my
theory with data I collected on promises of local club goods which candidates made at their campaign
rallies. First, I perform an additional test of whether candidates predominantly focused campaign efforts
on mobilizing turnout among their supporters who are unlikely to vote, rather than wasting benefits on
certain supporters. Second, analyzing the use of campaign promises on local club goods by the incum-
bent and the challenger allows me to test whether they are making such promises in situations where
they are likely to be most credible with these promises.
The targeting of local club goods to geographically concentrated groups of voters, in order to reward
or punish them for their voting behavior, has been referred to as pork-barrel politics.4 Past research
has measured pork-barrel politics as spending on a particular good by governments (e.g. Berry, Burden
and Howell, 2010; Castells and Sole´-Olle´, 2005; Dahlberg and Johansson, 2002; Wright, 1974), such as
national infrastructure spending in regions (Castells and Sole´-Olle´, 2005), for example. My approach
differs from existing research, as I do not analyze a particular good, but promises of any type of local
club good.5 The advantage of this approach is twofold. I directly measure the strategy intended by
presidential candidates rather than actual spending. This closely reflects the use of targeted spending
as a campaign strategy. It also potentially more closely mirrors the intention of candidates of which
groups of voters to address in a campaign than if I analyzed actual spending, which can potentially be
influenced by many other factors that are not under the direct control of incumbent presidents.
In order to analyze the use of promises of local club goods by the incumbent and the challenger, I con-
4See Chapter 2 for a detailed definition.
5For an exception see Wantchekon (2003) who has measured clientelistic versus programmatic campaigning strategies as
local and national promises.
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ducted a content-analysis of their campaign speeches made at their campaign rallies. The campaign
speeches I coded were the same that were used for coding rally events. Coding these original recordings
of speeches was preferential to coding campaign promises reported by any media outlet such as news-
paper articles, for example. This is because these speeches were unfiltered by any media and thus do not
reflect any bias by journalists on what types of promises they regard as interesting to report on, or any
political bias (see also Horowitz, 2012, p. 103).
The audio files containing the speeches were translated into English from various Ghanaian languages,
mainly Twi, by a Ghanaian research assistant. Having all speeches translated and transcribed by the
same interpreter avoids bias in the data due to different styles of interpretation or punctuation. I coded
the transcriptions of the speeches by hand. A promise is considered local if its geographical scope does
not exceed the boundaries of the constituency in which the rally is held at which the promise is made.
For each promise that made reference to a certain locality, I researched whether or not the place was
located within the constituency where the campaign rally was held. For example the following is con-
sidered a local promise because the projects the incumbent mentions are to be implemented within the
boundaries of the Pusiga constituency.
“In this area there are many communities waiting for electricity. I want to assure you, we
have signed the Memorandum of Understanding with the Chinese government and some
poles have been delivered. I want to assure you as president of this country that in no time
your electricity is coming and the next time I come to Pusiga all your communities will be
shining as bright as the stars.”6
The following is considered a national promise:
“But before jobs are created [...], a country’s finances need to be strong so trading shall
be profitable and thereby creating more jobs. The NDC has weakened our currency and so
trading has become a big challenge for you. We shall work to restore the value of the Cedi
to aid you in your trade.”7
Besides local and national promises, candidates also make appeals which promise benefits to one of
Ghana’s 10 administrative regions. An example of a regional promise is the following:
“I have also heard that of the sixty scholarships being given to the youth to go study in
oil and gas management, only one person from the Western region has benefited. This
is not right. We are going to train the young people of this region to get involved in the
development of our oil and gas.”8
6John Mahama, Pusiga, November 10, 2012.
7Nana Akufo-Addo, Amasaman Constituency, August 28, 2012.
8Nana Akufo-Addo, Takoradi Constituency, November 24, 2012.
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I adopted a conservative coding rule and only considered promises as local where a project which is
promised by a candidate does not cross the borders of the constituency where the promise is made.
This is why the following promise, for example, although it makes reference to a location within the
constituency where the incumbent is holding a campaign rally, is not considered a local promise.
“I am promising you that your road from Kasoa to Swedru shall be rehabilitated.”9
This promise is not considered local because the road the incumbent is talking about is supposed to go
from Kasoa, which is in the Awutu Senya Constituency, to Swedru, which is in the Agona West Con-
stituency. I checked to what degree the measure of local versus national promises reflect the theoretical
concepts underlying this dichotomy in focus group interviews, which I discuss later in this chapter.
4.3 Semi-structured interviews with campaign managers
To test the plausibility of various theoretical mechanisms, which I assume to be at work, as discussed in
Chapter 3, I conducted interviews with campaign managers of the incumbent NDC and the opposition
NPP. Conducting qualitative interviews also helped me to draw my attention to possible alternative ex-
planations for the pattern of campaigning I observe, which need to be addressed in the statistical models,
in order to avoid omitted variable bias (Bennett, 2007). I followed a method of selection applied by Osei
in her analysis of party-voter linkages in Ghana and Senegal (Osei, 2012). I selected a member of each
of the national campaign teams of both parties, and a member each of the regional campaign teams of
the Ashanti Region, which is an NPP stronghold, the Volta Region, which is an NDC stronghold, and
the competitive region of Greater Accra. Furthermore, I conducted interviews with a few constituency-
level campaign organizers. I interviewed a local campaign manager of the NDC in one constituency of
its regional stronghold, the Volta Region, and one local campaign manager of the NPP in its regional
stronghold of the Ashanti Region. In addition, I interviewed one constituency organizer each in a com-
petitive constituency in the region of Greater Accra. Table 4.2 provides a list of the interviews that were
conducted. For reasons of confidentiality, I do not cite the name of the regions or constituencies when I
report findings from these interviews.
The procedure of selection of interview partners applied has two important advantages. First, it was
important to select campaign managers from both the parties’ strongholds and competitive areas, as the
strategies parties apply in their save havens are likely to differ from those they apply in competitive or
swing areas, or the rival party’s strongholds. This is why choosing interview partners from these differ-
9John Mahama, Awutu Senya West, November 1, 2012.
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ent areas increased the representativeness of the sample and hence the quality of the inferences drawn
from these interviews. Carefully selecting cases for qualitative small-N analyses like the present one
is particularly important, to assure the representativeness of the results (Seawright and Gerring, 2008).
Second, interviewing campaign managers at different levels of the party hierarchy had the advantage
that they were likely to report on different aspects of the campaign. National and regional campaigners
were more likely to explain the national strategy to me, as intended by the party executive, which was of
primary interest to me. At the same time, however, local constituency-organizers were likely to be more
open and frank about socially unaccepted or potentially even illegal strategies, such as how the parties
organize vote and turnout-buying. It turned out that these expectations were met in the interviews.10
Table 4.2: List of semi-structured interviews
Interview Date Place
NDC National campaign team December 18, 2014 Accra
NDC Ashanti regional campaign team October 23, 2012 Kumasi
NDC Greater Accra regional campaign team October 23, 2012 Accra
NDC Volta regional campaign team October 26, 2012 Dzodze
NDC Weija Gbawe constituency campaign team December 1, 2012 Anyaa Sowotuom
NDC South Tongu constituency campaign team October 23, 2012 South Tongu
NPP National campaign team November 28, 2012 Accra
NPP Ashanti regional campaign team October 22, 2012 Kumasi
NPP Greater Accra regional campaign team November 29, 2012 Accra
NPP Volta regional campaign team December 15, 2012 Hohoe
NPP Afigya Sekeyere West constituency campaign team October 24, 2012 Afigya Sekeyere West
NPP Anyaa Sowotuom constituency campaign team December 14, 2012 Weija
My principle interest in the interviews was to understand the logic of which groups of voters these
campaign teams targeted. I asked interview partners about where they organized most campaign rallies
and why. I posed the same questions about campaign promises candidates made at presidential campaign
rallies. I also asked the campaign managers where they distributed most cash, party paraphernalia and
other small benefits to voters. The questionnaire in Appendix A.1 provides details on the questions I
asked. Asking interview partners to describe how and in which areas they campaign not only helped
me understand the rationale of these campaign managers, but also served to validate the findings from
the quantitative analyses. I interviewed most campaign managers in their offices or on the road, in their
cars, on way to a meeting or a campaign rally. Conducting interviews in settings familiar to interview
partners, where they feel at ease is generally advised in qualitative research methodology, because it lets
interview partners behave most naturally (Girtler, 1992).
As it is common practice, I began the interviews with easy to answer and non-controversial questions
and posed more sensitive questions after the interview partners seemed at ease to talk to me about their
work (see Mishler, 1986). The interviews I conducted were semi-structured, which have the advantage
10See Osei (2012) for similar observations.
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to assure comparability of the interviews, as I asked the same, or nearly the same set of questions in each
interview. At the same time, these semi-structured interviews allow the researcher an important degree
of flexibility to ask additional questions, and leave out questions that seem less relevant, if the interview
is taking an interesting turn. This flexibility was also assured by recording interviews which allowed me
to “think through potential follow-up questions when the conversation takes an interesting turn without
worrying about taking down the exact text” (Rathbun, 2008, p. 697).
4.4 Survey experiment
The survey was conducted among a random sample of 447 respondents in 16 polling station areas and
four selected constituencies in Accra. The constituencies were purposively selected with the aim to
maximize ethnic diversity and variation in income-levels of respondents. The four constituencies in the
sample – Ayawaso Central, East, and West-Woguon and Anyaa Sowotuom – were selected to reflect av-
erage levels of competitiveness of constituencies in the Greater Accra Region.11 Therefore, we can rule
out possible biases in trust towards either of the candidates due to particular linkages of a constituency
to a particular party. A list of the places and times of the data collection is provided in Table 4.3.
Each constituency in Ghana is comprised of up to 100 polling stations. Using a random number gener-
ator, I sampled four polling stations in each constituency. The selection of the respondents followed a
methodology used in the Afrobarometer survey. In the absence of household lists or maps of the polling
station areas, my research assistants and I adopted the method of a random walk (Afrobarometer Net-
work, 2011b, p. 31-32). Arrived at the polling station, we walked into the direction of the constituency
border which was farthest away from the polling station, in order to avoid walking into another constitu-
ency. The date of the data collection determined the interval between households. On November 21,
for example, surveyors sampled every third household, adding the digits 2 and 1 of the 21st day of the
month. Further following Afrobarometer sampling methodology, the researchers then entered the house
and took down the names of all people in the household on a numbered list.12 They then asked the first
person they had met in the household to draw a number from a deck of cards the researchers handed to
them. The person who correspondent to the number chosen was then interviewed. If the person was not
at home, the researchers returned to the house once more later in the day and if the person was still not
home, they sampled another household. We altered between interviewing women and men, to assure
11The average difference in vote shares between the ruling NDC and the NPP in the Greater Accra Region is 9726.92 votes.
The difference in votes shares in Ayawaso Central is 8027.33, in Ayawaso East it is 11784, in Anyaa Sowutuom it is 9227.33.,
and the average difference in votes between the ruling NDC and the opposition NPP party in Ayawaso West-Woguon is 9637.14
(my own calculation, based on the average difference in vote shares between the NDC and the NPP per constituency across the
2000, 2004 and 2008 elections).
12See also Hillier et al. (2014) on the methodology of door-to-door sampling of interview respondents.
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that the sample would be balanced with regard to gender, by noting down only the names of female
residents of one household and only those of the male residents of the subsequent household.
The data collection took place between November 12 and November, 21, 2012. Prior to this, I conduc-
ted a pre-test on November 9, 2012, in one of the constituencies where the survey experiment was to be
conducted, in Ayawaso Central. This was done in a polling station area, which had not been sampled for
the actual survey experiment, in order to avoid sampling a respondent twice in the pre-test and the actual
data collection. The pre-test was performed on a small sample of 15 respondents with the aim to assure
the comprehensiveness of the items in the questionnaire. After the pre-test, some minor adjustments in
wording were made such as changing the term “ethnic group” to the more idiomatic “tribe.” In the ex-
periment, participants were asked to evaluate the credibility of experimental campaign promises. After
the pre-test the response options for the credibility ranking was reduced from a 5-point to a 4-point-
Likert-scale (see Likert, 1932). This was done to pre-empt the tendency of respondents to avoid voicing
an opinion and choosing the safe option that a promise was neither likely nor unlikely to be fulfilled,
which the pre-test was indicative of. This tendency is commonly known as the “central tendency”, which
results from the fact that respondents tend to shy away from choosing an opinion and taking a stand on
controversial issues (Brill and Jonathan, 2008). The scale was modified to a ‘forced-choice’ Likert-scale
(Wivagg, 2008), where respondents were read four options to rank the credibility of the experimental
promises. They also had the option to opt out by choosing “Don’t know” if they did not want to or felt
unable to make a choice, but this option was not read out by the interviewers so that its unnecessary use
was discouraged.
The interviews were conducted by a group of seven Ghanaian research assistants, who were well-
experienced in conducting household surveys. These research assistants had worked in numerous pro-
jects of data collection on behalf of the CDD. Among other projects, they had collected Afroboremeter
survey data. As the methodology of household sampling and the selection of respondents I used was es-
sentially the same as that used in the Afrobarometer, these assistants were hence well-skilled to conduct
these interviews. The research assistants worked in teams of two in one polling station area. Whenever
possible, I paired a male research assistant with a female one, as respondents in the survey tended to be
more willing to let women enter their compound or house and speak to them, than men. In the case that
respondents were afraid to talk to the male researcher he could call his female colleague to demonstrate
that he was indeed part of a research team, which typically reassured respondents so that they were
willing to be interviewed by the male researcher.
I also made sure that the team of researchers spoke the lingua franca of the respective polling station
area. In addition to the English version, I had the questionnaire translated into the Ghanaian languages
58
Ewe, Twi and Dagbani, which are the most commonly spoken languages besides English in Accra.13
Translating the questionnaires, rather than the research assistants translating the questions from the Eng-
lish version on the spot, was important to assure that interviewers did not introduce variation in the
questions through their different styles of translation. The reason why the interviews were conducted in
various languages was to assure that the sample did not exclude persons at low levels of education whose
command of English would not suffice to participate in the survey. The reason why I did not conduct
any interviews myself, but only supervised the research assistants, was not only that I did not speak any
Ghanaian languages. The main reason was that I did not want to introduce an interviewer bias, as I
would have certainly been perceived much different from the Ghanaian researchers by the participants
of the survey.
In this survey, respondents were asked about the likelihood of the two main presidential candidates
fulfilling different kinds of campaign promises, if elected. In addition, the questionnaire contained ques-
tions on demographic and political background information with survey items taken mainly from the
Afrobarometer round 5 questionnaire. The questionnaire I developed for the survey experiment is avail-
able in Appendix A.2.14 There were four experimental conditions. Each group of respondents that fell
in one experimental condition was confronted with a set of three either local or national experimental
promises assigned to either the incumbent or the main opposition candidate. The local and the na-
tional promises differed only in their framing, but not with regard to the content of the promise. Both
candidates were assigned the same kinds of promises. The promises all covered infrastructure issues
concerning the provision of electricity, clean water and streetlights. These topics were chosen, because
these were the issues where the two parties proposed to implement policies in their manifestos that re-
sembled each other most closely. I hence assured that these promises were compatible with both parties’
manifestos (New Democratic Congress, 2012; New Patriotic Party, 2012). The following is an example
of a promise framed as a national promise:
“Imagine President John Dramani Mahama, who is also the flagbarer of the NDC, had
made the following promise at a rally held in your constituency: ‘If I win this election, I
will improve the availability of clean water in all urban communities across the country by
connecting more households to pipe water and by building more treatment plants.’ Do you
think by the end of his term in 2016 he would have improved the availability of clean water
in all urban communities across the country?”
The local framing of the same promise is:
13The Afrobarometer survey is also conducted in these same languages in Ghana (Afrobarometer Network, 2012).
14The appendix contains one of the four versions of the questionnaire. It is the version where promises are assigned to the
incumbent and where they are framed as national promises.
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“‘If this constituency votes massively for me and my party in the presidential elections,
I will connect more households to pipe water in your constituency.’ Do you think by the
end of his term in 2016 he would have connected more households to pipe water in your
constituency?”
The answer options were “Yes definitely”; “Yes probably”; “No, probably not”; “No definitely not”.
The other two promises are referred to as the energy and the street lights promises. Exact wording of
these other two experimental promises is provided in Appendix A.2.
Table 4.3: List of places and dates of the data collection for the survey experiment
Constituency Polling station Date
Ayawaso East Nurudeen Islamic School Ruga (B) November 19, 2012
Roman Catholic School Nima November 20, 2012
Information Services 2 Kanda November 16, 2012
Pentecost Church Nima November 15, 2012
Ayawaso Central Alajo 3 & 4 Primary School (A) November 9, 2012
(Pre-test)
Wilberforce JHS Kotobabi (B) November 14, 2012
Sem Cinema Hall Alajo (A) November 16, 2014
New Town Experimental School JHS 1 November 17, 2014
Esther’s Day Care Centre Kokomlemle 2 November 15, 2012
Anyaaa Sowutuom Kubinson International School Kwashie (A) November 16, 2012
Optimist School, Kwashie Bu November 17, 2012
Santa Maria School Complex (A) November 18, 2012
Amy’s Blessed School, Awoshie November 19, 2012
Ayawaso West-Woguon Association International School 2 November 14, 2012
The Word of God Ministry International November 15, 2012
Mensah Sarbah Hall 2 (A) November 20, 2012
Akuaffo Annex B November 21, 2012
4.5 Focus group interviews
I conducted four focus group interviews in one of each of the constituencies in Accra where I also
conducted the survey experiment. The purpose of the focus groups was to test the “content validity”
(Miller, 2011, pp. 89–90) of my concept of local and national campaign promises, by asking ordinary
voters about their perception of these campaign promises (Morgan, 1988, p. 11).15 This helped me
validate the findings on the use and the credibility of campaign promises, gained in the analysis reported
in Chapter 6, and the survey experiment reported in Chapter 7. I randomly sampled one polling station
15I thank Eric Kramon for suggesting to me to check the validity of my concepts used in the quantitative analyses with a
qualitative investigation.
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(PS) per constituency and one compound in the street of this polling station. Compounds are houses in
which typically several families live. I then asked all residents at the age of 18 and older to participate in
the focus groups. There were five to eight participants in each group. The places and dates of the focus
groups are provided in Table 4.4.
Table 4.4: List of focus group interviews
Focus group interview Date Constituency
PS Akuaffo Annex B December 21, 2012 Ayawaso West-Woguon
PS Esther’s Day Care Centre Kokomlemle December 21, 2012 Ayawaso Central
PS Nurudeen Islamic School Ruga 1 December 22, 2012 Ayawaso East
PS Santa Maria School Complex December 22, 2012 Anyaa Sowotuom
In the focus groups, participants were presented with examples of promises the challenger and the
incumbent had made at public rallies across the country. These were promises that I had extracted from
the transcriptions of the campaign speeches held by the incumbent and the challenger. Participants were
handed cards that entailed a particular campaign promise. There were three local promises, five national
promises, and one regional promise which promised benefits to a particular region. The regional promise
was only presented to the participants to cross-validate that they would understand it as different from
local and national promises. I do not analyze the use of regional promises in the dissertation. In order to
engage all participants in the discussion of the promises, they were asked to read the promise on the card
they had received. In cases where respondents did not speak English or were not literate, my Ghanaian
research assistant read and translated the promises for them. We showed participants a map of where
the promises had been made and told them which candidate had made the promise. We then asked them
to give us their opinion about who would be the main beneficiaries if the promise were implemented
and whether the benefit promised could be withheld from a constituency if it did not support the candid-
ate making the promise. The questionnaire is provided in Appendix A.3. As is general practice when
conducting focus group interviews, we began the interviews with a warm-up phase in which we asked
participants to talk about the campaign promises they had come across during the campaigning period
(Flick, 2007), before they were asked to evaluate the campaign promises that I presented to them.
The focus group interviews thus investigated whether local, as compared to national campaign promises
were perceived to differ in two characteristics, as I had conceptualized them.16 These were first, that
local promises mainly benefit only the constituency where the rally was held at which the promise was
made and that national promises would benefit people beyond one constituency. Second, I was interested
in investigating whether voters would anticipate that the candidate would renege on the promise if it was
16See Chapter 2 for a detailed definition of local versus national campaign promises.
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a local promise, and was less likely to do so in case of a national promise, given that the candidate won
the election, but a constituency in which a certain promise was made did not support the candidate at the
polls.
Below I present the evidence from the focus group interviews, which largely validate my conceptualiz-
ation of local versus national campaign promises.
Beneficiaries of local versus national campaign promises
When I asked respondents who the beneficiaries of the (examples of) national promises were, in line with
my theoretical concept, they overwhelmingly said it would be all Ghanaians. None of them regarded
the beneficiaries of national promises as local. The picture was less clear regarding local promises. The
response that people beyond the constituency would profit from a local promise was almost as common
(approx. 54%) as the response that it would be the inhabitants living in the constituency, who would
benefit from a local promise (approx. 43%).17 Participants gave several reasons why, in some cases,
they considered a local promise’s scope to go beyond a particular constituency. One participant said that
the local promise of building a new Senior High School in the constituency of Awutu Senya East would
directly benefit the inhabitants of this constituency, but also indirectly other Ghanaians, because applic-
ants for Senior High Schools are placed in schools across the country, using a central allocation system,
which the individual student has little influence over (Dery, 2014). Due to this system, somebody living
in Accra might actually end up going to a high school in Kumasi and hence profit from the SHS being
built in Kumasi.18 Another participant, discussing the same promise said that he had relatives in Awutu
Senya East and would hence benefit from a school being built there.19 Yet other participants argued that
people travel and can use local infrastructure in constituencies they do not live in themselves.20
Despite these affirmations that local promises can benefit people living beyond a constituency, it should
17The numbers do not add to 100 percent, because one participant said that the beneficiaries of a local promise would be the
people living in a particular region.
18“It will be indirectly national but directly Kasoa. This is because, in Ghana, our educational policy like placement doesn’t
care where you come from. They just put everything into a raffle wherever the schools will be selected by the computer. So
that computer placement can send someone from Kumasi to Kasoa. So, automatically, it is national by itself. Because, at the
end of the day, somebody will come from Takoradi, Tamale etc. in the way they do the computer placement, you will not be
sure of where you will be sent especially when you don’t get the right grade for the schools you chose” (Focus group Ayawaso
Central, December 21, 2012). “This is for Ghana because someone may be attending that school from Tamale, so if he can do
it, it will benefit all Ghanaians” (Focus group Anyaa Sowotuom, December 22, 2012).
19”I think all of us will benefit. This is because the people of Kasoa are also our relatives and friends and getting access to
something like that [a new school] will make them better off and in the long run we can also benefit from their achievements”
(Focus group Anyaa Sowotuom, December 22, 2012).
20“Not only will the people in the area benefit but rather, all Ghanaians. If he wins [the challenger] and opens up the market,
it’s a good thing for all Ghanaians. Not only for the inhabitants of Amasaman, because anybody can go and buy or trade there.
So if he wins the election and he expands the market, all Ghanaians will benefit” (Focus group Ayawaso Central, December
21, 2012). “The market will be expanded. As you are saying, in Ga West Municipal. It’s not only the people of Amasaman that
are going to benefit more, there are lots of variety of goods and services. Most people will be coming in from various areas of
the country to the market” (Focus group Ayawaso West-Woguon, December 21, 2012).
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be considered that participants in the focus group interviews might have felt a need to show socially
desirable behavior (Callegaro, 2008), which would probably make them more likely to affirm that all
Ghanaians will profit and that they would not envy people living in a constituency far away from theirs
to receive some local infrastructure projects. Hence the interview situation might have biased parti-
cipants toward sometimes saying that a local promise’s beneficiaries are national.
These findings with regard to the beneficiaries show that my conceptualization of national and local
promises was largely in line with the understanding of the participants in the focus groups, with the
exception that they sometimes estimated the beneficiaries of local club goods to go beyond one constitu-
ency. As I have suggested, however, this might, at least in part, be due to social desirability bias.
Possbility of political punishment
The results with regard to the possibility that a candidate makes the fulfillment of a promise conditional
on how many votes he gained in a constituency, are similar. In line with my conceptualization of na-
tional promises, no participant considered it possible for a candidate to punish a constituency for not
supporting him in the election, by not fulfilling a national promise. Participants said that when a prom-
ise specifically referred to a nationwide program, politicians would not be able to single out a particular
constituency and exclude it from benefiting from this program.21 Others gave more concrete reasons.
One participant emphasized that national projects get published in the budget, which obliges the execut-
ive to follow through with these projects.22 Another participant referred to a promise where a candidate
announced to connect all communities with 500 inhabitants and more to the national electricity grid. The
participant argued that when there are such criteria specified, and the constituency meets them, then the
promise needs to be fulfilled.23 Finally, a reason which was also brought forward by several participants
for why it should not be rational for politicians to punish a constituency for not supporting him, was that
politicians care about future elections, and will hence avoid excluding it from a national policy.24 These
pieces of qualitative evidence largely support my conceptualization of national campaign promises.
In line with my expectation, participants considered such political punishment more likely in case of
local promises than in case of national promises (23%, compared to none in the case of national prom-
21“I think it was a nationwide thing so you can’t just single them out because they didn’t vote for you” (Focus group Ayawaso
West-Woguon, December 21, 2012).
22“They are still going to profit from it because there is a Zongo there. And since it’s a national policy, it’s going to be
initiated in the budget and the budget covers those people too”(Focus group Ayawaso West-Woguon, December 21, 2012).
23“There can’t be punishment because even if you don’t vote for him, it’s a promise to the whole nation. So the only thing
he can bring on is when the community is not more than 500” (Focus group Ayawaso West-Woguon, December 21, 2012).
24“If Wenchi had not voted for the NDC, I think they would still get the jobs because he [the president] needs more votes
the next time there is going to be an election” (Focus group Ayawaso East, December 22, 2012). “Yes I think he would still do
it because he needs votes for the next election so he will still fulfill his promise” (Focus group Ayawaso East, December 22,
2012).
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ises). A participant argued that a candidate and a constituency enter a contract when the candidate
promises to provide a club good to a constituency. According to him, if the inhabitants of the constitu-
ency do not fulfill their side of the contract, then the politician is also not obliged to fulfill his part of the
“deal”.25 Some participants argued that in case that voters in a constituency had not delivered the de-
sired votes for a candidate, he could, after the election, shift his attention to neighboring constituencies
instead of fulfilling the promise in the constituency which had not supported him.26 Another participant
said that even though the leverage of the president to withhold local club goods to a constituency after
the election is limited, as the allocation of some funds goes via the district assemblies common fund (see
Ichino and Nathan, 2013, p. 348), the president does have the discretion to withhold funding that goes
beyond what is channeled through the district fund.27
Overall these findings show that participants were more likely to consider political punishment possible
in the case of local than in the case of national promises, further lending support to the validity of the
conceptual difference between local and national promises.
4.6 A cross-sectional dataset on sub-national variation in the use of clien-
telism and violence
In addition to the data I collected in Ghana, I compiled a cross-sectional dataset on the use of clientelism
and voter intimidation in ten African countries. This dataset is based on regional-level election data
and Afrobarometer survey data.28 The fifth round of the Afrobarometer, conducted between 2010 and
2012, relates questions about presidential elections to those held in the respective country between 2007
and 2011. In this survey respondents were asked about their exposure to clientelism and their fear of
25“There can be a political punishment because they didn’t vote for him. I promised I will give you a senior high school and
you didn’t vote for me. There is a contract between Kasoa and John Mahama. If you vote for me, I will build the school and
you have breeched the contract”(Focus group Ayawaso West-Woguon, December 21, 2012).
26“Its not he excluding Kasoa, he [the president] can choose to build the thing at Buduburam. He didn’t do it in Kasoa but yet
still he has built the 250 Senior High Schools but it was not in Kasoa. So the people have to move from Kasoa to Buduburam
to school”(Focus group Ayawaso West-Woguon, December 21, 2012). “I think opposite. They are one out of 45 so supposing
they the people appointed him but didn’t vote for him as he expected it, then it means in four years, he will concentrate on
others more. It’s a fact that that place is his homeland. They are fond of Mahama so this is a constitutional promise. District
promise so then, he can decide to concentrate more on the others if they disappoint him so he will pretend as if he is not looking
at them so much”(Focus group Ayawaso West-Woguon, December 21, 2012).
27“I strongly disagree with you because every district is entitled to those infrastructures. And at the end of the year, it is being
given to them quarterly and at the end of every quarter, every district assembly has to be given the fund by the government so
even if I vote or did not vote for you, it is stated in the constituency that am entitled to a district common fund so you being
the sitting president cannot choose whether to give me my fund or not. The only thing he can do in this case is that, if I am
to provide you with the common fund and I am to give you your water project, I won’t. If there should be an extra ordinary
project I won’t bring it there. That’s where he can chose not to give you that development. But for your one million out of that
45 million, it is compulsory” (Focus group Ayawaso West-Woguon, 21.12.2012).
28See Afrobarometer Network (2014) for country-specific data sets.
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intimidation in the preceding election in their country.29
To test whether clientelism and intimidation are targeted at voters with different political makeup and
with different habits to turn out, I derive a number of variables at the regional and the individual level.
Voters’ likelihood to vote and their political inclinations are measured with the Afrobarometer survey. I
also measure past levels of turnout and the vote shares for the main parties in the elections under study
in the regions the respondents live in. The data on election results were compiled from various sources,
reported in Table 4.5.
Table 4.5: Sources of election results used to calculate regional-level competitiveness and
turnout levels
Country Year of Election Sources Election Results
Burkina Faso 2005 African Elections Database (2014)
Ghana 2004 Electoral Commission of Ghana (2014)
Kenya 2002 Throup (2003); Wanyande (2006)
Liberia 2005 National Elections Commission Republic of
Liberia (2014)
Malawi 2004 African Elections Database (2014)
Mozambique 2004 Carr (2014)
Namibia 2004 Carr (2014)
Tanzania 2005 African Elections Database (2014)
Zambia 2008 African Elections Database (2014)
Zimbabwe 2002 Kubatana (2014)
4.7 Summary
This chapter has described the data sources I compiled for this project, and the range of different
methodological approaches to test the predictions of the dissertation’s central argument. I compiled a
constituency-level event data set on campaign rallies, and a constituency-level dataset on the allocation
of campaign speeches. I further conducted semi-structured and focus group interviews. Moreover, an
original survey experiment was conducted. In addition to the data collected during fieldwork in Ghana,
I also compiled a novel cross-sectional dataset on subnational variation of campaigning strategies. This
multi-methods approach to analyzing the mobilization and demobilization of voters in African elections
allows for triangulation between the findings from the various studies in this project. First, I measure
similar concepts in different ways i.e. the use of distributive campaigning strategies as promises of local
club goods versus national promises and as the promising and distribution of individual benefits. If the
findings from both ways of operationalizing the concept of distributive campaign strategies point to a
similar logic of campaigning, which my findings suggest is the case, this increases the external validity
of my findings.
29Details on the measurement of these campaign strategies are provided in Chapter 8.
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Second, I use different methodologies: quantitative and qualitative data analysis and the analysis of
observational and experimental data. This allows for “between-method” triangulation (Denzin, 1970),
exploiting the advantages of the various methodological approaches (Bryman, 2003). While the quant-
itative, cross-sectional, subnational analyses are best suited to detect general patterns and establish ex-
ternal validity, the experiment is best suited to establish causal effects. Finally, the qualitative analyses
serve not only to investigate the plausibility of the causal mechanisms that I have assumed to be at work
(See Chapter 3). They also help to detect new and alternative hypotheses, which can then be accounted
for in the statistical analyses.
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Chapter 5
The strategic allocation of campaign visits
“We look where is our stronghold, where is our good areas. And, economically, it is better
to concentrate much more on areas where they seem to be a lot [NPP supporters]. And for
us as a party, the most cosmopolitan areas are areas where we win a lot of votes. [...] In
our case, we think it’s about numbers, we think it is about numbers and we need to canalize
our effort in getting the numbers at where the converted are. So that is what we are doing.”1
This quote from an interview with a regional campaign manager of Ghana’s main opposition party em-
phasizes the importance of hosting campaign rallies in the party’s strongholds. In this chapter I test
whether the presidential candidates of the NPP and the NDC allocated their rallies with the aim to reach
their core voters and to “preach” to these already “converted.” Further, I test whether these parties used
campaign rallies to mobilize turnout among their supporters. The chapter, thus, presents a first test of
the theoretical underpinnings of this dissertation established in Chapter 3: that parties focus campaign
rallies and benefits on their supporters who are unlikely to turn out, and that they attempt to disenfran-
chise voters who are difficult to win over with such strategies.
First, my findings show that the incumbent and his main challenger spent a bulk of their time on the
campaign trail in constituencies where their traditional support base was concentrated. This suggests,
as argued in Chapter 3, that they used campaign events to address their supporters. In the case of the
incumbent these were areas where his party’s ethnic partisans were concentrated and where past vote
shares for his party have been high. The challenger also concentrated his visits in constituencies where
his ethnic partisans were concentrated, but combined those visits with campaigning in swing constitu-
encies. Both candidates hence used campaigns to court their supporters. The challenger combined this
with a strategy of attracting indifferent voters.
Second, I find that while the incumbent mobilized turnout across both his potential supporters and in-
1Interview with a member of one of NPP’s regional campaign teams, November 28, 2012.
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different voters, the challenger mobilized turnout only among his ethnic partisans. These findings lend
partial support to the argument that parties use campaign rallies with the aim to mobilize those of their
supporters, who are unlikely to turn out if they are not addressed in a campaign.
The chapter is structured as follows: I, first, derive the theoretical expectations on the use of the cam-
paigning tool of rallies, based on the argument developed in Chapter 3. Second, I present the research
design and the nature of the sample of rally events. Third, descriptive and statistical results are presen-
ted and discussed in the light of the findings from the qualitative interviews with campaign managers.
Fourth, I summarize the findings and link them to the dissertation’s key research question.
5.1 Theoretical expectations on the allocation of campaign rallies
I expect candidates to focus their time on the campaign trail in constituencies where their potential
supporters are concentrated. This expectation rests on two main arguments. First, candidate appearances
are much better suited to activate predisposed identities than to change them. This idea is based upon
the finding that the most robust effect that the exposure to campaigns can have is to increase awareness
among voters about their existent predispositions (Berelson, Lazarsfeld and McPhee, 1954, Brams and
Davis, 1974, p. 115, Campbell, 1960, Key and Cummings, 1966, Lazarsfeld, Berelson and Gaudet,
1968, p. 102) and motivate them to turn out for the candidate they feel closest to (Finkel, 1993; Gelman,
1993; Iyengar and Petrocik, 2000). As parties have no interest in strengthening voter identities which
make these voters feel further away from them and closer to another candidate, I expect candidates to
visit mainly areas where the demographic or economic backgrounds of voters predispose them to feel
close to these parties. If a candidate visited a constituency populated by indifferent voters, or supporters
of the rival party, his chances of making these voters vote for him are lower than if he addressed likely
supporters. If he did not succeed in convincing these voters to support him by the campaign promises
he makes, he runs the risk of polarizing the electorate against himself and of increasing turnout for the
rival candidate (see also Althaus, Nardulli and Shaw, 2002; Fenno, 1978), which he would like to avoid.
Campaigning among his own supporters does not carry the same risk, as voters tend to evaluate campaign
messages made by candidates whose party they identify with much more favorably, than messages by
other candidates (Bartels, 2002; Gerber, Huber and Washinton, 2010).
Second, I have argued that in contexts in which candidates are expected to promise local investments to
constituencies in which these events are hosted,2 candidates need to be particularly strategic in choosing
2See Baldwin (2013); Barkan (1995); Ichino and Nathan (2013); Kramon (2013a); Lindberg (2010) on the importance
voters attach to the provision of such local club goods, as they directly impact their living conditions.
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the places they travel to. As I have laid out in Chapter 3, for campaign promises to be effective, they need
to be credible. I have argued that candidates are likely to be more credible with their campaign promises
among their supporters than among voters who are not affiliated with them. In addition, candidates
are likely to be more credible in constituencies that have supported his party in the past than in others,
assuming that past levels of support in a constituency are a function of how much a party has channeled
benefits to that constituency in the past. As candidates want to avoid making campaign promises in
situations in which they anticipate these promises to be little credible, they should hence avoid traveling
to areas where they have few supporters.
Base on these considerations, I derive the following expectation:
H1: The likelihood of a candidate visiting a constituency increases with levels of affinity of
voters with himself or his party.
I have further argued, however, that it would not be rational for candidates to concentrate mobilizing
efforts on core supporters who are certain voters – regardless of how much (or how little) effort they
spend on them. I rather expect candidates to target their potential supporters, which implies that parties
concentrate campaign rallies in those of their strongholds where past turnout has been low.
H2: Among the constituencies in which partisans are concentrated, a candidate should
allocate more visits to those with low levels of past turnout.
These expectations contrast with findings from studies on the patterns of presidential travel during US
election campaigns. Analyses of the allocation of candidate appearances across US states have found
that presidential campaigns focus on swing states (Althaus, Nardulli and Shaw, 2002; Colantoni and
Levsque, 1975; Kelley, 1961, p. 65). While there is not much research outside the US on the location
of campaign rallies,3 the nearly exclusive focus on swing states is likely not to be reproduced in other
presidential systems where the president is elected by popular vote. This is because the focus on swing
states in US election campaigns is due to the fact that campaign resources are allocated with the aim to
“yield the greatest reward in the electoral college,” (Chen and Reeves, 2011, p. 537 see also Althaus,
Nardulli and Shaw, 2002, Bartels, 1985, Brams and Davis, 1974). Since in US presidential elections a
presidential candidate needs to win a majority of the electors, this boils down to winning as many states
as possible, rather than winning a majority of the popular votes. This renders trying to win swing states
a vital strategy in US elections.4
3An exception is the analysis of campaign rallies in Kenya’s 2007 elections by Horowitz (2012).
4In addition to winning as many states as possible, a strategy designed to win the majority of electors in the electoral college
also implies trying to win over the most populous states, as the number of electors per state is proportional to its population
size (e.g. Brams and Davis, 1974).
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The mobilization of core voters will likely be more important in any presidential system using popular
vote, than in US presidential elections. However, I can only speculate on this, as presidential travel
outside US elections is completely under-researched. Besides the fact that presidential systems in Sub-
Saharan Africa elect presidents through popular vote, I have argued in Chapter 3 that candidates in
these young democracies are likely to place particular importance on the mobilization of core voters
due to a number of other factors: These are (a) weak party attachment, (b) a greater uncertainty about
the electorate than in established democracies, (c) their difficulty to appeal across ethnic groups, and,
finally, (d) the need to promise specific benefits to localities they visit on the campaign trail.
5.2 Testing the theory
The empirical tests of the hypotheses concerning the use of campaign rallies are based on data collected
during my field work in Ghana. In this chapter, I perform a quantitative analysis based on the event
dataset on campaign rallies I compiled. I interpret the results in light of findings from interviews with
campaign managers.5 The quantitative analysis is cross-sectional and exploits subnational variation of
campaign rallies by the two main candidates across the 275 constituencies in Ghana. The dependent
variable throughout the analysis is the number of constituency-level campaign appearances by the two
main presidential candidates, John Dramanai Mahama of the ruling NDC, and Nana Dankwa Akufo-
Addo of the main opposition NPP, during the three months prior to the election from August 25, to
December 7, 2012. I also refer to these candidates as the incumbent and the challenger respectively. I
gathered these data on campaign events from published accounts reported in two Ghanaian newspapers
Daily Graphic and Daily Guide and from a compilation of campaign speeches by these two candidates,
obtained from radio reporters. Chapter 4 presents a detailed account of this data collection. I define
the general election campaign as the period beginning with the launch of the NPP’s party manifesto
(August 25, 2012) and ending on December 5, 2012, the date after which parties were obliged to stop
campaigning for the election to be held on December 7, 2012.
5.2.1 The sample
I merged the events reported in the two newspapers and the compilation of campaign speeches, based on
candidate, constituency, and the date of the event and deleted repeated observations by different sources
on the same event.
5See sections 4.1 and 4.3 of Chapter 4 on the details of the collection of these data.
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Table 5.1: Speeches sample, support
(a) All rallies based on speeches, over support
Candidate Swing NDC stronghold NPP stronghold TOTAL
John Mahama 15 (50) 23 (50) 12 (50) 50
(Incumbent) 30% 46% 24%
Nana Akufo-Addo 20 (47) 7 (47) 20 (47) 47
(Challenger) 43% 15% 43%
(b) Rallies based on speeches with complete information, over support
Candidate Swing NDC stronghold NPP stronghold TOTAL
John Mahama 14 (42) 19 (42) 9 (42) 42
(Incumbent) 33% 45% 21%
Nana Akufo-Addo 15 (28) 4 (28) 9 (28) 28
(Challenger) 54% 14% 32%
I refer to this dataset as the deduplicated sample. There were 27 out of the 97 events in the sample
based on the speeches, where the date of the rally at which a speech was held was unknown. Due to the
missing information, I was unable to include these events into the deduplicated sample, so that only 70
events from the speeches were incorporated into this dataset. If the missings in the sample based on the
speeches were non-random, and particularly if they were correlated with the key explanatory variables
of partisanship and turnout, this could bias the deduplicated sample. To check for a possible bias, I com-
pare the distribution of the rallies by the two candidates held in swing constituencies, NDC, and NPP
strongholds between all rallies coded from the speeches, and a restricted sample. This restricted sample
is also based on the speeches, but only includes the 70 events with full information. The comparison,
illustrated in Table 5.1, shows that there is no concern of missings being systematic and hence biasing
the deduplicated sample. The incumbent held 30% of his ralllies in swing constituencies, 46% in his
strongholds and 24% in the opposition’s strongholds (Table 5.1a). This compares to a very similar distri-
bution in the sample without missings of 33% of the incumbent’s rallies located in swing constituencies,
45% in his strongholds, and 21% being held in NPP strongholds (Table 5.1b). The comparison of the
distribution of rallies by the challenger suggests that, according to the restricted sample, the challenger
held more events in swing constituencies and fewer rallies in his strongholds than in the full sample.
This biases the results slightly against finding support for the hypothesis that the challenger focuses his
rallies in his stronghold and is, hence, not a concern for the present analysis.
In addition to the distribution of events across constituencies with different political makeup, I also
compare the proportion of campaign rallies in constituencies with different levels of turnout in the two
samples.6 The results displayed in Table 5.2 alleviate any concern that including only events with com-
6In the tables, numbers of percentages do not always add up to 100 percent, due to rounding.
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plete information will bias the results of the analysis reported later in this chapter.7
Table 5.2: Speeches sample, turnout
(a) All rallies based on speeches, over turnout
Candidate Turnout low Turnout high TOTAL
John Mahama 32 (50) 15 (50) 50
(Incumbent) 64% 30%
Nana Akufo-Addo 30 (47) 15 (47) 47
(Challenger) 64% 32%
(b) Rallies based on speeches with full information, over
turnout
Candidate Turnout low Turnout high TOTAL
John Mahama 27 (42) 15 (42) 42
(Incumbent) 64% 36%
Nana Akufo-Addo 20 (28) 8 (28) 28
(Challenger) 71% 29%
Constituency characteristics
To estimate the effect of partisanship and past turnout on campaign strategies used by the two candidates,
I use data on the demographic makeup of constituencies from Ghana’s 2010 census and data on the
2000, the 2004, and the 2008 presidential elections. Census data are available on the district level,
not on the constituency level. Districts in Ghana comprise typically one or two constituencies. As the
census data are not available on the constituency level, following a method used in similar analyses,8
the district data were used in this analysis and all constituencies in one district are, hence, assumed
to share the same demographic characteristics. District data from the 2010 Household Census were
available for the 170 districts which existed in the year 2010.9 I match these data according to the name
of these districts with a list of districts and constituencies from the year 2012 obtained from the Electoral
Commission of Ghana (Electoral Commission of Ghana, 2012), which comprised 230 districts. In cases,
for which it was not evident which district in the year of 2012 corresponded to which district in the year
of 2010, I conducted research on each district’s history. The data on past election results and turnout
were obtained from the Electoral Commission of Ghana (Electoral Commission of Ghana, 2000, 2004,
2008). I repeated the same procedure to match constituencies from the years, 2004 and 2008 to those of
2012.10
7Turnout was coded as low if turnout in the 2008 presidential election was larger or equal to the median of 71.2%. It was
coded as high if it was above the median turnout level.
8See Horowitz (2012, p. 30).
9Data were obtained from the Minnesota Population Center (Minnesota Population Center, 2014). I also wish to acknow-
ledge the statistical office that provided the underlying data making this research possible: Ghana Statistical Services, Ghana.
10See Appendix B.1 for details on this procedure.
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I used these election data to construct several measures of past support. I calculate the victory margin of
the NDC (NPP) in past elections by subtracting the NPP’s (NDC’s) vote share from that of the NDC’s
(NPP)’s share. I code several dummies to obtain categorical measures of past support. If the NDC
(NPP) has won a plurality of votes in a constituency across the 2000, 2004, and the 2008 presidential
elections, I code it as an NDC’s stronghold (NPP’s stronghold). If a constituency has not been won
consistently by one of the two parties, I code it is a swing constituency. I also code a measure of past
turnout per constituency in the 2008 election, reflected in the percentage of voters who voted out of the
total electorate.
Besides the direct measures of partisanship, reflected in voting histories in the various constituencies, I
code several indirect indicators of partisanship. The most important determinant of voting behavior in
Ghana remains ethnicity (Lindberg and Morrison, 2005; Fridy, 2007). The Census reports over 50 ethnic
groups, which I grouped, based on past research, into politically relevant groups. While the Ewe, the
Ga, and the lose ethnic coalition of “Northerners” tend to support the ruling NDC, Akan-speakers and
particularly the subgroup of the Ashanti tend to support the NPP (Fridy, 2007; Lindberg and Morrison,
2005). While Fridy (2007) and Lindberg and Morrison (2005) only test the importance of ethnic identity
for support of the ruling party for the speakers of Northern languages and the Ewe, I also code members
of the ethnic group of the Ga as NDC’s ethnic partisans, as several campaign managers emphasized that
this group is part of the NDC’s traditional support base. This quote by a national campaign manager of
the NDC illustrates my reasoning:
“we have [...] the Ga-Adangbes who vote NDC; we have the Ewes; we have the Northern-
ers. And the Northerners, I talk of the three Northern Regions. They are more sympathetic
towards our course [...]. But the Ashantis and then the Akyems are more sympathetic toward
the NPP.”11
The classification of ethnic subgroups reported in the Census into Akan-speakers and into speakers of
Northern languages is based on La Verle (1994), Fridy (2007) and the Afrobarometer Network (2011b).
Apart from ethnicity, Fridy (2007) as well as Lindberg and Morrison (2005) suggest that support for the
NDC and the NPP might be structured along class and income cleavages in Ghana, similar to those that
traditionally structure partisanship in mature democracies in Europe (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967). The
authors suggest that the NDC tends to gain support in rural areas and among poorer voters and generally
those with a lower Socio-Economic Status (SES) and that the NPP tends to be supported by richer, more
educated voters with a higher SES, respectively (Fridy, 2007; Lindberg and Morrison, 2005). However,
these studies do not find robust effects of these cleavages on vote choice. I include these factors, non-
11Interview with a member of the national campaign team of the NDC, December 18, 2012.
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etheless, as robustness checks for the measures of partisanship that are based on past vote share and
ethnicity. Following Lindberg and Morrison (2005), I divide respondents into those who have no formal
or only primary education, those that have completed secondary education and those who have an edu-
cation higher than secondary education. With respect to respondents’ occupational status, the census
reports six categories of class of worker. I divide them into high status groups (“employer,” “working
on own account,” “wage/salary worker,” and low status groups (“domestic worker” and “unpaid family
worker”). In addition, I include various measures of poverty into the analysis. One measure is the per-
centage of households in a constituency without electricity in their homes. Another is the percentage of
households without pipe-borne water. Another proxy for poverty on the constituency level is the per-
centage of households without sanitary facility in their homes.
Research on US elections has found that candidates concentrate campaign rallies in urban areas and in
states with large population sizes (Althaus, Nardulli and Shaw, 2002). The possibility that population
size impacts the variation in candidate appearances in this study can, however, largely be excluded since,
as per the constitution, the boundaries of the constituencies in Ghana are drawn in a matter to assure that
every constituency has the same population size (Republic of Ghana, 1992). The degree of urbanization
of constituencies is likely to play a more important role in campaigning in Ghana. First, it serves as an
indicator of population density. Urban constituencies are smaller in their geographic size, but contain the
same number of inhabitants as rural constituencies so that the concentration of the population is higher
than in the countryside.
Second, urbanization is also an indicator for the costs of traveling to a constituency. Traveling to urban
centers is likely to require less time and money for the campaign than organizing rallies far away from
main cities which may impact the decision of where to hold campaign rallies. As an additional measure
of traveling costs and time, I also include the distance to the capital of each constituency. It is likely
to be cheaper to travel to constituencies that are closer to the capital, since both parties’ headquarters
are located there, and since the road network around the capital is more densely developed than in the
rest of the country. This might motivate campaigns to focus campaign rallies in constituencies close to
Accra.12
Third, the degree of urbanization of a constituency in Ghana, as in many other African countries, also
serves as an indicator of where the parties’ supporters are concentrated. It has been observed that in-
cumbents tend to gain more support in the rural areas and opposition parties gaining more votes in the
cities (Conroy-Krutz, 2006; Harding, 2010). In addition to this general rural-urban divide in elections
12This proxy for traveling time and costs was calculated using the software Quantum GIS. I estimated the distance between
the center of each constituency (spatial mean) to the city of Accra.
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in Africa, voters in Accra have shown a tendency to support the opposition, no matter which party is
in government (Harding, 2010, p. 3). Given that I expect the presidential candidates in Ghana’s 2012
election to aim at addressing their supporters on their campaign trail, I expect the challenger to focus his
visits in urban centers and in Accra, and the incumbent to campaign more in the countryside. I expect
the incumbent to campaign less in Accra than the challenger, but only when controlling for the share of
ethnic partisans of the NDC in the constituencies in Accra. This is because the Ga-Adangbe – one of the
ethnic groups that traditionally vote for the NDC – constitute the major ethnic group in some of Accra’s
constituencies.
5.3 Results: the allocation of campaign effort
I have argued that the presidential candidates should focus their visits in constituencies where their
partisans are concentrated. Figure 5.1 maps the allocation of rally events by the incumbent (a) and the
challenger (b) across NDC and NPP strongholds and swing constituencies. The number of events in
a constituency – represented by the size of the black dots – ranges from 0 to 8 for both candidates.13
The incumbent seems to have allocated his rallies across both his NDC strongholds (dark gray shading)
and swing constituencies (dotted shading). The pattern is less clear for the challenger, and needs to be
investigated in the subsequent statistical analysis.
Past research has shown that support for the NDC and the NPP is to a large extend determined by
voters’ ethnic identity (Fridy, 2007; Lindberg and Morrison, 2005). Therefore, the ethnic makeup of
the constituencies can also serve as an important source of information for candidates of where likely
supporters are concentrated. Figure 5.2 illustrates the allocation of rally events by the incumbent (a) and
the challenger (b) over the percentages of the ethnic groups who tend to support the NDC (a) and the
NPP (b). The allocation of the incumbent’s rally events by the incumbent shows some patterns of ethnic
targeting (a). He held rallies in almost all densely Ewe-populated areas in the East in the Volta Region.
In addition, his rallies cluster in Accra, which can be indicative of him trying to address the Ga-Adangbe.
As I have explained above, however, the concentration of the incumbent’s campaign on Accra would be
in line with various explanations and needs to be further analyzed in the statistical analyses.
The allocation of visits by the challenger shows similar, yet even clearer patterns.
13See also Figure 5.4 and Figure 5.9.
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Figure 5.1: Campaign rallies by the presidential candidates, over past support for the ruling
and the main opposition party
(a) Campaign rallies by the incumbent, over past support for the ruling party
(b) Campaign rallies by the challenger, over past support for the NPP
Notes: The black dots represent rally events held in a constituency; the larger the dots, the more rallies a candidate held in a
constituency. Dark gray means that a constituency is a stronghold of the NDC (a) or NPP (b). Dotted shading indicates that a
constituency is a swing constituency. White shaded constituencies are strongholds of the respective rival party.
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Figure 5.2: Rally events by the presidential candidates, over percentages of their respective
ethnic partisans per constituency
(a) Campaign rallies by the incumbent, over ethnic partisans of the NDC
(b) Campaign rallies by the challenger, over Ashanti population
Notes: The black dots represent rally events held in a constituency; the larger the dots, the more rallies a candidate held in a
constituency. Shading reflects percentages of Ewe, Ga-Adangbe and speakers of the Northern languages per constituency in
(a) and percentages of Ashanti in (b). Darker shading reflects a higher percentage of members of these ethnic groups. Gray
lines mark constituency boundaries.
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The challenger seems to have concentrated his visits in constituencies where the Ashanti are con-
centrated and, like the incumbent, seems to have hosted many rallies in the capital.
So far the results lend some support to the expectation that the candidates mainly allocated their vis-
its across the country with the aim to address their supporters. The question is whether the candidates
actually mobilized turnout in the constituencies populated by their partisans or if they paid these visits
to these voters with the aim to reward them for past support. As explained in Chapter 3, if campaigns
are concentrated in constituencies with a high share of a party’s supporters and low turnout histories I
interpret this as a strategy of mobilizing potential supporters. If candidates campaigned predominantly
in constituencies where their partisans are concentrated, but turnout has been high, this corresponds to
the strategy of the rewarding of loyalists (Nichter, 2008, p. 20).14 Figure 5.3 maps rally events by the
incumbent (a) and the challenger (b) across levels of past turnout. While the incumbent seems to indeed
have allocated quite a large share of his visits to constituencies with low levels of turnout in the 2008
elections, the challenger seems to have more frequently targeted areas of medium to high levels of past
turnout. The descriptive statistics with regard to turnout, hence, suggest that while the incumbent might
have mobilized turnout, the challenger seems to have rather rewarded voters for past turnout. However,
whether the effect of turnout varies across constituencies where the candidates faced more or less sup-
port, needs to be investigated with a statistical analysis.
To more carefully examine the targeting of groups of voters with candidate visits, I run a series of negat-
ive binomial models to estimate the relationship of affinity with the candidates and turnout levels across
constituencies and the number of times the candidates visited these constituencies.
14See Figure 3.2 in Chapter 3.
78
Figure 5.3: Rally events by the presidential candidates, over levels of past turnout
(a) Campaign rallies by the incumbent over past turnout
(b) Campaign rallies by the challenger over past turnout
Notes: The black dots represent rally events held in a constituency; the larger the dots, the more rallies a candidate held in a
constituency. Darker shading indicates higher levels of turnout in the 2008 presidential elections. Gray lines mark constituency
borders.
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The dependent variable is the number of events by the incumbent or the challenger per constituency.
As for such data OLS regression is inappropriate (Long, 1997), I use a count model. The negative
binomial model class is more appropriate than a poisson distribution, since the mean is larger than the
variance both for the rallies of the incumbent and those of the challenger.15 The data are hence displaying
signs of over-dispersion. This is also indicated by the over-dispersion parameter alpha. The regression
output of the models reported in Tables 5.3, 5.4, 5.5, and 5.6 show that alpha is significantly different
from zero and thus reinforces the notion that modeling the data as a negative binomial distribution is
more suitable than modeling a poisson distribution.16 The dependent variable is the number of visits per
constituency. To estimate the effect of partisanship and past turnout on the frequency with which the
candidates visited a constituency, I estimate the following equation
Ralliesc = α+ β1Partisanship+ β2Turnout+ β3Distance+ c, (5.1)
where Ralliesc is the number of rallies per constituency held by either of the candidates. Partisanship is
measured through various specifications of past vote shares of the parties in the constituency, the con-
centration of ethnic partisans and socio-demographic characteristics of the constituencies, as explained
above. Turnout reflects turnout in the 2008 presidential election, which preceded the 2012 elections.
Distance represents the distance from each constituency to the capital. The error term c denotes unob-
served characteristics that determine how often a rally was hosted in a constituency.
To asses whether candidates mobilized turnout predominantly among their partisans, I estimate the fol-
lowing equation
Ralliesc = α+ β1Partisanship+ β2Turnout+ β3Partisanship ∗ Turnout+ β4Distance+ i,
(5.2)
where Partisanship*Turnout denotes the interaction between the various measures of partisanship and
past turnout.
5.3.1 The incumbent
I first present the results with respect to the allocation of the incumbents’ campaign visits. Figure 5.4
shows the distribution of the dependent variable. It indicates that the incumbent visited almost half of
the constituencies at least once (125 constituencies). Of those that he visited, he held between 1 and
15The mean number of rallies by the incumbent per constituency is .63 and the variance is .95. It is .43 and .96 for the
challenger respectively.
16See the test statistic LR Alpha at the bottom of the regression tables.
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8 rallies there. The results of the statistical analyses, shown in Table 5.3, partly lend support to the
hypothesis that a logic of mobilizing supporters was at work. While indicators of partisanship, such as
the margin of victory of the NDC in past elections and the share of ethnic partisans, is positively related
to the number of rallies the incumbent held in a constituency, the level of turnout in the 2008 election
is negatively correlated with how often he visited a constituency. Before I further investigate the effect
of turnout, I discuss the results concerning the effect of the political makeup of a constituency on how
many campaign events were held here.
Figure 5.4: Distribution of the dependent variable
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Rallies per constituency by the incumbent
The effect of past support on the incumbent’s campaign
The direct measurements of partisanship, based on past votes that the NDC has gained in the 2000, the
2004, and the 2008 elections, show ambiguous effects. On the one hand, the NDC’s victory margin
in the three elections prior to the 2012 election has a positive and statistically significant effect on the
number of times the incumbent visited a constituency, lending support to Hypothesis 1 (see model 1). As
the interpretation of raw coefficients in non-linear models is not straightforward, I simulate the expected
number of rallies per constituency, depending on different levels of the key independent variables.17
According to model 1, the incumbent hosted on average .45 campaign rallies (+/- .06) in a constituency
at mean levels of NDC victory margin over the NPP, and only .10 rallies (+/- .07) in constituencies at
minimum levels of NDC’s past vote share. If the victory margin of the ruling party increased to its
17All the following simulations were conducted using Stata’s clarify software (Tomz, Wittenberg and King, 2003); control
variables were held at their median.
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maximum, the incumbent hosted 2 events (+/- .89) in such constituencies. This result suggests that the
incumbent aimed at reaching his party’s supporters with his rallies.
At the same time, when past support for the NDC is operationalized as a categorical concept, the
Table 5.3: Effect of co-partisanship on incumbent rallies
(1) (2) (3)
Victory margin Support categorical Ethnic partisanship
Victory margin 0.377∗∗∗
(3.06)
Turnout08 −1.343 −1.848 −3.047∗∗
(−0.97) (−1.45) (−2.48)
No sanitary 0.111 −0.111 0.497
(0.14) (−0.14) (0.63)
Urban 0.598 0.667 0.440
(0.93) (1.06) (0.68)
Distance to Accra 0.0811 0.122 0.0881
(0.85) (1.28) (0.90)
Primary −2.497 −1.401 −2.457
(−1.19) (−0.66) (−1.14)
Ethnic partisan 0.414 0.818∗∗ 1.069∗∗∗
(1.08) (2.29) (3.25)
Low status occupation −0.0736 −1.184 −1.229
(−0.06) (−0.96) (−0.96)
NDC stronghold 0.563+
(1.90)
Swing constituency 0.768∗∗∗
(3.18)
Constant 1.844 0.904 2.875
(0.87) (0.42) (1.35)
lnalpha −1.507∗∗ −1.706∗∗ −1.366∗∗
(−2.30) (−2.25) (−2.26)
Wald χ2 42.33∗∗∗ 43.34∗∗∗ 32.85∗∗∗
Pseudo R2 0.07 0.07 0.06
Pseudo Log-Likelihood −275.24 −274.73 −279.98
LR Alpha 3.56∗∗∗ 2.54∗∗∗ 4.32∗∗∗
Number of observations 274 274 274
Values are coefficients with t-statistics in parenthesis
+ p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
results indicate that the incumbent visited swing constituencies slightly more frequently than constitu-
encies that his party had consistently won in the past. The variable NDC stronghold is a dummy, taking
on the value 1 if the constituency has been won by the NDC in the 2000, 2004, and 2008 elections, and
0 otherwise. The variable Swing is coded as 1 if a constituency has not consistently voted for the NDC
or the NPP, and 0 otherwise. Both the effect of NDCstronghold and Swing is positive, which indicates
that the incumbent visited both his strongholds and swing constituencies more often than strongholds of
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the opposition. To further shed light on these effects, I simulate the expected number of rallies, based
on model 2, in Table 5.3, and plot the results in Figure 5.5. The graph shows that the number of times
the incumbent visited a constituency is highest in swing constituencies, followed by NDC strongholds
and is lowest in NPP strongholds. As the confidence intervals between swing constituencies and NDC
strongholds overlap, however, we can only infer that the incumbent campaigned more in his strongholds
and in swing constituencies, than in the opposition’s strongholds.
This pattern in the event data, which suggests that the incumbent spent most of his time in his party’s
strongholds and in swing constituencies, is supported by the interviews I conducted with various of
NDC’s campaign organizers. While the campaign managers I interviewed recognized the necessity to
also campaign in swing constituencies, they all emphasized the need to campaign in their own strong-
holds, and none of them pointed toward a strategy exclusively aimed at attracting indifferent voters.
Figure 5.5: Effect of past support on incumbent rallies
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Asked whether campaigning in one’s strongholds was not a waste of money and of the president’s
valuable time, a national campaign manager of the NDC disagreed:
“So it’s not necessary that this is my stronghold so my campaign strategy should be differ-
ent, no. You can lose in your stronghold.”18
The explanation he gave for why he regarded it necessary to campaign in NDC strongholds was that
18Interview with a member of NDC’s national campaign team, December 18, 2012.
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voters would expect the candidate to visit their constituency, and if he did not, they might turn away
from the party and decide to stay at home on polling day:
“Coming to them, makes you get the vote. If you don’t show them that respect [by coming
to their region][...], then you’ll not get the votes. Some will decide not to vote at all.”19
Regional campaign managers also confirmed the strategy of focusing presidential campaign rallies in
the party’s strongholds, as the following statement illustrates:
“When the president comes, you take him to the strongholds, [...]. We have about 47
constituencies [in one particular region]. The president cannot [...] visit all the constituen-
cies.[...] If he’s able to come back again, you can do it [visit areas that are not strongholds].
If he’s not able to come [back], you concentrate on our safe areas. So that’s how we do
it. [...] What I’m saying is that, actually, [...] you know we have our difficult areas and
you have our safe areas. When you talk about safe area, it means you have your member
of parliament at the place. That’s your safe area. So you need to hold that place very well.
And then you have other places that are very difficult and it wouldn’t work anyway.
MR: But you concentrate you effort of campaigning on the...?
NDC: You concentrate your efforts on the safe areas.”20
Another regional campaign manager explained to me that he hosted an equal amount of rallies in swing
constituencies and in his party’s safe havens. However, he then further explained the need to mobilize
turnout among NDC supporters as well:
“We want to make sure we get all our supporters there to come out and vote for us [...].
MR: This is about mobilizing those that are already on your side?
NDC: Yes.
MR: But you also go to swing areas for persuading those ...
NDC: Those who are not on our side and those who are not decided.”21
Various campaign managers of the NDC pointed to the difficulty of convincing opposition supporters,
as the following statement shows:
“You can’t go to those that say ‘no, no, I’m NPP, I don’t like you, NDC’. You can’t make
them... if he don’t (sic!) want to greet you, no, if you want to greet the person [...] they’ll
say ‘I don’t like NDC, I’m NPP.”’22
Even in cases in which the NDC campaigned in opposition strongholds, one campaigner manager ex-
plained that he tried to reach voters who are sympathetic toward the NDC in opposition strongholds,
rather than trying to persuade supporters of the NPP to switch toward voting for the ruling party:
19Interview with a member of NDC’s national campaign team, December 18, 2012.
20Interview with a member of a regional campaign team of the NDC, October 23, 2012.
21Interview with a member of a regional campaign team of the NDC, October 23, 2012.
22Interview with a member of a constituency campaign team of the NDC, December 1, 2012.
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“[...] you cannot have a particular area being for only one political party. Definitely, you’ll
have one or two people who will sympathize with you. So you don’t say that because this
area is an opposition area, you don’t go there. You go there.”23
The anticipation that convincing supporters of the opposition would be very difficult could account for
why the findings from the quantitative analysis indicate that the incumbent campaigned least in NPP
strongholds.
The effect of the ethnic makeup of constituencies on the incumbent’s campaign
To further investigate to what extent the incumbent targeted constituencies where his supporters were
concentrated, I look at a more indirect measure of partisanship; namely the share of members of the eth-
nic groups that tend to vote for the NDC. The coefficient of the variable Ethnic partisan suggests that the
frequency of campaign rallies is positively related to the share of the ethnic groups of the Ga-Adangbe,
the Ewe and the Northerners, reported in models 1 to 3 in Table 5.3. The relationship between the share
of ethnic supporters and rallies also holds when a dichotomous measure is used, where the dummy vari-
able Ethnic partisans dominant takes on the value 1 if these three ethnic groups taken together constitute
the largest ethnic coalition in a constituency, and 0 otherwise.24 The effect of this dichotomous measure
of ethnic partisanship is plotted in Figure 5.6.25 Simulating the expected number of rallies suggests that
the incumbent on average held .35 rallies (+/- .05) in constituencies where these ethnic partisans were
in the minority, and .74 campaign events (+/- .11) in localities where this ethnic coalition constituted the
largest ethnic group.
Interviews with campaign managers of the ruling party confirmed that they used ethnic profiles of con-
stituencies to infer where their likely supporters were concentrated. One illustration of this is the quote
cited earlier in this chapter on page 72, in which a member of the national campaign team of the NDC
explained which ethnic groups he regarded as his party’s ethnic partisans.26 Other interviews further
underline the importance for NDC’s campaigners to allocate campaign rallies with respect to ethnic
arithmetrics in the various constituencies.27 These investigations of the relationship between the con-
centration of actual and likely supporters on the number of rallies hosted in a constituency point to
the following: On the one hand, the incumbent seems to have visited swing constituencies potentially
23Interview with a member of one of NDC’s regional campaign teams, October 23, 2012.
24See models 1-2, reported in Table 5.4.
25Simulations are based on model 1, reported in Table 5.4.
26Interview with a member of the national campaign team of the NDC, December 18, 2012.
27“NDC: Yes, we have NDC strongholds and NPP strongholds, you see. Stronghold of NPP is New Weija. Then afterwards
typical NPP, because of the tribe, more Ashantis. Because when you see Mallam ward, we have Gas, we have Ewe, we have
Haussa, you see, so Mallam is fifty-fifty [...], fifty-fifty [between] NDC and NPP. So if you try hard, because we have Gas and
Haussa here at Mallam. When you go to Gbawe it’s the same thing. But when you enter the new side - Akan who normally
vote for NPP [concentrated there], so there’s nothing you can do.”(Interview with a constituency-level campaign manager of
the NDC, December 1, 2012.)
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slightly more often than his strongholds. However, the difference is marginal and not statistically sig-
nificant. The safest conclusion to draw from this finding is that there was a tendency for the incumbent
to travel more often to swing constituencies and his party’s strongholds than to NPP strongholds.28 On
the other hand, the effect of actual past support in these constituencies, operationalized with a continu-
ous measure of past vote share, and the effect of two different operationalizations of the share of ethnic
partisans corroborate the Hypothesis 1 that campaign efforts were concentrated on NDC partisans.
Figure 5.6: Effect of share of ethnic partisans on incumbent rallies
Minority Dominant
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
Ex
pe
ct
ed
 n
um
be
r o
f r
al
lie
s
Ethnic partisans Incumbent (NDC)
p10/p90 mean
The findings regarding the effect of the share of ethnic partisans are in line with the the positive
correlation between past vote share for the ruling party and how many times the incumbent visited a
constituency. Taken together, these findings suggest that the incumbent’s campaign followed a logic of
targeting his likely supporters.
Other characteristics of constituencies that could be indicative of where partisans of the NDC are likely
to be concentrated, do not show statistically significant effects on the incumbent’s campaign travel.
This is in line with past research on the determinants of voting behavior in Ghana that has found more
robust effects for ethnicity on voting behavior than for other socio-demographic voter characteristics
(Fridy, 2007; Lindberg and Morrison, 2005). If past support and ethnicity were better indicators of how
28I discuss potential motivations of candidates to travel to swing constituencies later in this chapter, after I present the
findings on the strategy of the challenger.
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Table 5.4: Effect of partisanship and turnout on incumbent rallies
(1) (2) (3)
Turnout Interaction turnout, ethnicity Interaction turnout, support
Turnout08 −2.168+ −2.948+ −1.026
(−1.68) (−1.83) (−0.47)
No sanitary 0.559 0.398 0.612
(0.75) (0.52) (0.79)
Urban 0.426 0.399 0.524
(0.65) (0.61) (0.83)
Distance to Accra 0.0924 0.0997 0.0738
(0.97) (1.05) (0.77)
Primary −1.887 −1.883 −2.306
(−0.86) (−0.86) (−1.10)
Ethnic partisans dominant 0.759∗∗∗ −0.742
(3.76) (−0.39)
Low status occupation −1.446 −1.388 −1.058
(−1.13) (−1.09) (−0.83)
Ethnic partisans*Turnout 2.116
(0.79)
Swing*Turnout 0.0782
(0.03)
NDC stronghold*Turnout −2.697
(−0.73)
NDC stronghold 2.770
(1.05)
Swing constituency 0.842
(0.40)
Constant 1.787 2.428 1.047
(0.81) (1.03) (0.43)
lnalpha −1.496∗∗ −1.512∗∗ −1.582∗∗
(−2.27) (−2.27) (−2.26)
Wald χ2 36.92∗∗∗ 37.54∗∗∗ 38.82∗∗∗
Pseudo R2 0.06 0.06 0.07
Pseudo Log-Likelihood −277.94 −277.63 −276.99
LR Alpha 3.54∗∗∗ 3.45∗∗∗ 3.07∗∗∗
Number of observations 274 274 274
Values are coefficients with t-statistics in parenthesis
+ p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Ghanaians are likely to vote than other voters characteristics, it would be rational that candidates mainly
look at these factors when allocating campaign effort. However, I will show later in this chapter that
the challenger did consider other demographic characteristics than ethnicity when deciding where to
campaign.
The effect of past turnout on the incumbent’s campaign
In order to identify whether the incumbent targeted areas of support and partisanship with the goal to
mobilize turnout, I present the findings on the effect of turnout in the following paragraphs. In all models
the size of the coefficient of past turnout is negative, as we would expect, based on the expectation
that parties mobilize turnout. Figure 5.7 plots the expected number of rallies per constituency by the
incumbent, relative to levels of turnout in the 2008 elections. The graph is based on model 3, reported
in Table 5.3. It indicates that constituencies at minimum levels of turnout of around 40% (in the 2008
election), received on average 1.3 visits by the incumbent (+/- .6) and constituencies at maximim levels
of 98% turnout, were only visited .22 (+/- .08) times, lending support to Hypothesis 2.
Figure 5.7: Effect of past turnout on number of rallies per constituency
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The results so far suggest that the incumbent visited constituencies in order to mobilize turnout.
In the following section, I investigate the effect of turnout, conditional on levels of past support and
ethnic partisanship, to see whether he only mobilized turnout among his likely supporters or also among
other voters. I estimate interactions between the dummy variables NDC stronghold and Swing and past
turnout. The results are reported in model 2 in Table 5.4. Neither the coefficient of the interaction NDC
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stronghold*Turnout, nor that of Swing*Turnout reach statistical significance. However, a graphical
investigation of the effect shows the expected tendency. Figure 5.8 illustrates the expected change in
the number of rallies by the incumbent if turnout increases from its minimum to its maximum value, in
NPP and NDC strongholds and in swing constituencies. The effect of an increase of turnout is always
negative. This is in line with the direct negative effect of turnout histories on incumbent visits. It means
that the incumbent mobilized turnout across constituencies, not only in his strongholds, but also among
NPP supporters and indifferent voters. However, confirming my expectations, the effect of past turnout
is substantially stronger in NDC strongholds, than in other constituencies, and only here is the effect
significantly different from zero, providing support for Hypothesis 2.
Figure 5.8: Effect of change in past turnout on number of rallies per constituency
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I also investigate whether the effect of past turnout on the number of times the incumbent visited a
constituency varies between areas where his ethnic partisans constitute the majority and where they are
in the minority. There is, however, no statistically significant difference.29
Summary of the findings on the incumbent’s campaign
The investigations of turnout and various measures of partisanship allow me to differentiate between
different goals the incumbent’s campaign has pursued, which are graphically illustrated in Chapter 3 in
29See model 3, reported in Table 5.4.
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Figure 3.2. The findings suggest that the incumbent concentrated campaign efforts on voters who are
likely to have a positive bias toward the candidate, based on their past voting behavior and their ethnic
background. Further in line with my expectation, the incumbent’s campaign concentrated efforts on
constituencies with low turnout histories, where it could anticipate unlikely voters to be concentrated.
These findings corroborate the hypothesis that the incumbent allocated his campaign rallies with the
aim to mobilize potential supporters, rather than to waste resources on his supporters who were likely
to turn out, had they not been addressed by him. He, hence, did not apply a strategy of “rewarding”
his “loyalists” (Nichter, 2008, p. 20), as the latter would have implied a positive relationship between
partisanship and the number of rallies hosted in a locality and with past turnout.
However, the findings do not speak for a strategy designed to mobilize turnout exclusively among po-
tential supporters. The findings rather indicate that the incumbent also mobilized turnout in swing con-
stituencies, where indifferent voters were likely to be concentrated. The strategy of mobilizing turnout
among indifferent voters has been referred to as double persuasion (Nichter, 2008, p. 20), as is illustrated
in Figure 3.2 in Chapter 3.
5.3.2 The challenger
I now turn to the logic behind the allocation of rally events by the challenger. Figure 5.9 shows the
distribution of the dependent variable. It suggests that the challenger campaigned in fewer constituencies
than the incumbent. According to the data, he visited only 69 out of the 275 constituencies during the
three-months campaigning period under investigation. This is likely due to the fact that the challenger
had visited many constituencies before the launch of the official campaigning period, as the national
campaign manager of the NPP confirmed in an interview.30 The incumbent was unable to engage in
early campaigning as he was only endorsed as the flagbarer of the NDC in August. In the visited
constituencies, the challenger organized between one and 8 campaign rallies per constituency.
I first estimate the effect of various measures of support, partisanship and turnout on the number of times
the challenger visited a constituency. The results are reported in Table 5.5. The results with respect to
ethnic partisanship are similar to those of the strategy of the incumbent. The percentage of the ethnic
partisans of the NPP – the Ashanti – is positively related to a constituency being visited by the challenger,
as the positive coefficient of the variable Ashanti (logged) suggests, lending support for Hypothesis 1.31
30“The phase started in July 2011 and ended in March, 2012. That was the long phase, where we exposed him to the public
for them to be able to define him for themselves and also begin to get our message across. We came to a medium phase. [...]
The idea was to give him exposure, also to take information and to engage small communities [...]. The phase ended in March
2012. In April 2012 began the medium phase and ended in August 2012.” (Interview with a member of the national campaign
team of the NPP, November 28, 2012).
31See models 1-3, reported in Table 5.5.
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In a constituency at average levels of Ashanti, the challenger held .37 rallies (+/- .05). This drops to
.14 rallies (+/-.09) in a constituency at minimum values of the share of the percentage of Ashanti and
increases to .85 (+/- .29) at maximum levels. of Ashanti residing in a constituency.32 Different from the
incumbent, however, whether or not his ethnic partisans were in the majority or minority does not have
an effect on the challenger’s campaign, when measured as a dichotomous variable (not shown).
Figure 5.9: Number of rallies per constituency by the challenger
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Rallies per constituency by the challenger
In contrast to this, the strategy of the challenger with respect to past vote shares of the NPP and
histories of turnout differed from that of the incumbent. The victory margin of his party over the ruling
party in past elections is negatively related to how often the challenger visited a constituency, as the
negative coefficient of Victory margin indicates.33 The challenger hosted .10 (+/- .07) rallies in con-
stituencies where his party had gained a maximum margin of victory. The expected number of rallies
increases to .29 (+/- .05) in constituencies at average levels of victory margin and it increases to 1.21
rallies (+/- .75) in constituencies where the NPP victory margin has been lowest in past elections. These
unexpected findings suggest that the challenger, different from the incumbent, tried to win new voters
both in competitive constituencies and in strongholds of the ruling party.
To further shed light on this strategy, I investigate the effect of how many times a constituency has
been won by the NPP and the NDC on how many opposition rallies were hosted here. The results are
32Calculations are based on model 1, reported in Table 5.5.
33See models 1 and 3, reported in Table 5.5.
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Table 5.5: Effect of partisanship on challenger rallies
(1) (2) (3)
Victory margin Support categorical Constituency characteristics
Ashanti (logged) 0.214∗∗ 0.133 0.153
(2.18) (1.63) (1.48)
Turnout 2008 0.923 0.683
(0.47) (0.35)
Victory margin −0.265 −0.355∗∗
(−1.58) (−2.14)
Distance to Accra −0.358∗∗∗ −0.335∗∗∗ 0.00377
(−3.40) (−3.27) (0.03)
NDC stronghold −0.0955
(−0.23)
Swing constituency 0.556+
(1.90)
Urban 1.941∗∗
(2.13)
Primary 1.279
(0.41)
Low status occupation −4.461+
(−1.75)
Constant −0.235 −0.0869 −2.252
(−0.16) (−0.31) (−0.74)
lnalpha 0.534+ 0.463 0.130
(1.81) (1.52) (0.38)
Wald χ2 25.10∗∗∗ 27.82∗∗∗ 49.26∗∗∗
Pseudo R2 0.05 0.06 0.11
Pseudo Log-Likelihood −220.51 −219.44 −208.43
LR Alpha 38.73∗∗∗ 35.14∗∗∗ 24.99∗∗∗
Number of observations 273 274 273
Values are coefficients with t-statistics in parenthesis
+ p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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illustrated in Figure 5.10.34 They suggest that the challenger campaigned most in swing constituencies,
followed by his rival’s strongholds and least in his own party’s safe havens. It is also underlined by the
qualitative evidence gained that the NPP campaign strategically chose constituencies where it hoped to
be able to persuade voters. Explaining why his campaign chose to host a rally in a particular constituency
in the South of the Volta Region, compared to in another constituency located in the North of the same
region, a national campaign manager of the NPP explained:
“we are more sure of the support up north than south. So there is no need to go and
preach to the converted. Secondly, Dzodze Aflao has lot of persuadables and we believe
that holding the rally there [...] may sway some people onto the bandwagon. So we chose
Dzodze.”35
So far the results suggest that the challenger campaigned among his ethnic partisans, but combined this
strategy with trying to attract new voters, mostly in swing constituencies, but also in the rival party’s
strongholds.
Figure 5.10: Effect of past support on the number of rallies by the challenger
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Among other characteristics of constituencies, the degree to which a constituency consisted of urban
or rural neighborhoods and the share of inhabitants with low status jobs seem to have affected the
challenger’s campaign. He held .36 rallies (+/- .07) in a constituency at average levels of the number of
households living in urban neighborhoods. He only held .17 rallies in most rural constituencies (+/- .07),
34The graph is based on model 2, reported in Table 5.5.
35Interview with a member of NPP’s regioanl campaign Team, November 28, 2012.
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and 1.3 rallies (+/- .84) in the most urbanized constituencies. This relationship between urbanization of
a constituency and the number of rallies held there is illustrated in Figure 5.11. The positive effect
of the degree to which a constituency was urban on how many times it was visited could be driven
by various motivations. One aspect certainly is that the challenger targeted urban centers, because the
population density is higher here than in rural areas and he could, thus, reach more people at a rally.
This is underpinned by the following statement by a member of NPP’s national campaign team:
“Yes, there are variables that determine our core and our weak areas. In planning the
rallies, for example in Volta Region... If you want to host a national or regional rally, where
do you host it? Within Volta Region we have bases of support, like Dzodze-Aflao. We have
a good number of supporters there. We get something close to 12,000 votes. Or all the way
up in the North, in Nkwanta we get around 16,000 votes. We chose Dzodze for a number of
reasons: Population density, as opposed to Nkwanta, where villages are scattered all over
the place. There, aggregating people will be time consuming and expensive.”36
The NPP’s focus on centers of population density is in line with campaigning strategies observed in
studies on US elections (e.g. Althaus, Nardulli and Shaw, 2002).
In addition to cities exhibiting a higher concentration of the population, the positive effect of the urb-
anization of a constituency on the frequency with which the challenger campaign here, is driven by a
concentration of the challenger’s campaign rallies in the NPP’s main strongholds Kumasi and the capital
Accra. This is indicated by the positive and statistically significant effect of the distance of a constituency
to Accra (Distance to Accra) on how many times it was visited by the challenger.37 The concentration of
rallies around Kumasi and Accra is also evident in Figure 5.1b. Indeed, one of the opposition’s regional
campaign managers confirmed the strategic concentration of campaign rallies in Accra, due to the fact
that the party generally gains more support in the capital, than anywhere else in the region of Greater
Accra:
“In Greater Accra, most of the concentration of votes are in the city itself.[...] For that
matter we have concentrated much more here than the on the rural [Greater] Accra, when
we greet them to vote in this election.”38
Moreover, the frequency with which the NPP’s campaign hosted rallies in urban centers is indicative of
the attempt to reach the party’s potential supporters who tend to be richer, more educated voters with
generally a higher SES who are most likely to be concentrated in urban areas (Fridy, 2007; Lindberg and
Morrison, 2005). This is underpinned by the statement of one of NPP’s regional campaign managers,
which I cited in the beginning of this chapter, on page 66, in which he explained that the NPP focused
36Interview with a member of NPP’s national campaign team, November 28, 2012.
37See Table 5.5.
38Interview with a regional campaign manager of the NPP, November 29, 2012.
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campaign rallies on “cosmopolitan areas” where the party “win[s] a lot of votes.”39 Finally, the inter-
pretation of the focus on urban centers as a strategy to address NPP partisans is also supported by the
negative effect of the share of inhabitants with low status jobs on how many times the challenger visited
a constituency. These are voters who, based on their income profiles, are likely to be rather partisans of
the NDC (see also Fridy, 2007; Lindberg and Morrison, 2005).
Figure 5.11: Effect of degree of urbanization on the number of rallies by the challenger
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Speaking about the rural constituencies in Greater Accra where the NDC has gained a plurality of
the votes, a regional campaign manager of the NPP said the following:
“The numbers there, the NDC wins there, but the numbers are not great. That is the rural
[Greater] Accra and then the Zongos.40 These are the areas NDC wins. The places are [...]
less endowed areas, [where][...] illiteracy and economic [hardship are higher].”41
Conditional effect of turnout
In order to test whether the challenger allocated his campaign rallies with the aim to motivate voters to
go to the polls, I now turn to the effect of past turnout.
39Interview with a member of one of NPP’s regional campaign teams, November 28, 2012.
40“Zongos” are communities of mostly Muslim Northerners who have emigrated out of the Northern Regions to live in
Southern Ghana.
41Interview with a regional campaign manager of the NDC, November 29, 2012.
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Table 5.6: Effect of partisanship and turnout on challenger rallies
(1) (2)
Interaction turnout, support Interaction turnout, ethnicity
Turnout 2008 0.0786 3.565
(0.03) (1.41)
Swing constituency −1.078
(−0.35)
NDC stronghold 0.259
(0.05)
Ashanti (logged) 0.120 0.381∗∗∗
(1.29) (2.73)
Distance to Accra −0.351∗∗∗ −0.265∗∗
(−3.24) (−2.38)
NDC Stronghold*Turnout −0.534
(−0.08)
Swing*Turnout 2.300
(0.55)
Ashanti*Turnout −3.406∗∗
(−2.27)
Constant −0.153 −1.385
(−0.07) (−0.83)
lnalpha 0.459 0.502+
(1.51) (1.70)
Wald χ2 28.45∗∗∗ 27.90∗∗∗
Pseudo R2 0.06 0.06
Pseudo Log-Likelihood −218.84 −219.11
LR Alpha 35.23∗∗∗ 38.42∗∗∗
Number of observations 273 273
Values are coefficients with t-statistics in parenthesis
+ p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
96
My findings do not suggest a direct effect of turnout on the allocation of the challenger’s campaign rallies
across constituencies. Compared to the inucumbent, turnout in the preceding election does not show a
statistically significant effect on the number of times the challenger visited a constituency.42 In order
to test whether the challenger mobilized potential supporters, I also investigated the effect of turnout
conditional on the political makeup of a constituency. I did not find that the effect of turnout varied
between strongholds of one of the two parties and swing constituencies.43 However, the effect of past
turnout differed across constituencies with a different share of NPP’s ethnic partisans, lending support
to Hypothesis 2. The negative size of the interaction term of the share of the Ashanti and past levels of
turnout suggests that the positive effect of the proportion of ethnic partisans decreases with increasing
levels of turnout. This means that the challenger campaigned more in constituencies with a high share
of ethnic partisans the lower past turnout was. This result speaks for a strategy of mobilizing potential
supporters, which is in line my theoretical expectations.
Summary of the findings on the challenger’s campaign
The findings on the strategic allocation of campaign rallies by the challenger suggest that he combined
a strategy of attracting independent voters with that of mobilizing ethnic partisans. This resonates with
the strategic calculations a member of the NPP’s national campaign team explained to me. On the one
hand, his main goal during the 2012 campaigns was to attract independent voters. The reason for this,
he said was that he evaluated partisan alignment among NPP and NDC supporters to be so strong that
there was not much to gain from trying to persuade opposed voters. In addition, he argued that there was
not much to lose from campaigning less among his own supporters.44 On the other hand, he argued that
rallies were better suited to addressing one’s supporters than to reach new voters:
“My thinking was that rallies only preach to the converted. If you hold a big rally, those
who will attend, are those who are going to vote NPP anyway.”45
This can account for why the challenger, in addition to holding rallies in swing constituencies, also
concentrated rallies in constituencies where its ethnic partisans were concentrated. The fact that the
challenger campaigned more in swing constituencies than in his own strongholds speaks for an attempt
to attract new voters. It is difficult, however, to further disaggregate this strategy. As I illustrated
in Figure 3.2 in Chapter 3, targeting indifferent voters, who are likely to be concentrated in swing
42See models 1 and 3, reported in Table 5.5.
43See model 1, reported in Table 5.6. See also Figure B.1 in the appendix for a graphical illustration of this result.
44“If NPP is in power, half their voters will always vote NPP. If NDC is in power, no matter how bad the economy is,
supporters vote NDC. That leaves a middle ground of about five to ten percent maximum. Those are the people we search”
(Interview with a member of NPP’s national campaign team, November 28, 2012).
45Interview with a member of the national campaign team of the NPP, November 28, 2012.
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constituencies, can be indicative of a strategy of pure persuasion or double persuasion. A pure persuasion
strategy would target voters who are indifferent between both candidates, but likely to turn out. A
strategy of double persuasion would motivate indifferent voters to develop an affinity for the candidate
and motivate them to turn out. As I neither found a direct effect of past turnout nor did I find a conditional
effect of turnout, depending on past voting behavior in a constituency, it is difficult to say whether the
NPP’s campaign followed a logic of pure or double persuasion. As the size of the coefficient for past
turnout is positive, however, it might be more likely that the NPP applied a pure persuasion strategy, but
the findings do not allow for certain inferences on this.
Differences in the incumbent’s and the challenger’s campaigns
The results with regard to the effect of turnout on the challenger’s rallies differ from how past turnout has
shaped the incumbent’s campaign. It seems that the incumbent more widely mobilized turnout among
both partisans and possible new voters, while the challenger only mobilized turnout in constituencies,
where the share of his ethnic partisans was high. One plausible explanation for why these candidates’
campaigns differed was that it was less important for the challenger to campaign in his strongholds than
for the incumbent. One reason might be that turnout rates have been higher in NPP strongholds than in
NDC strongholds or swing constituencies. Average turnout in NPP strongholds across the 2000, 2004
and 2008 elections was 78.5% (+/- 0.4), compared to 74% in swing constituencies (+/- .08), and 72.2%
(+/- .04) in the NDC’s safe havens.
Another reason for why the incumbent campaigned more among his potential supporters than the chal-
lenger, was probably that the NDC was more risk averse than the NPP. The NPP campaign was likely to
be more certain about how its supporters would react to its flagbarer Nana Akufo-Addo, than the NDC’s
campaign team was about their candidate. While the NPP’s candidate contested the office of the pres-
ident already for the third time, it was the first time for John Dramani Mahama to run for president. In
addition, it was the first time since Ghana’s re-introduction of multiparty elections that a Northerner ran
in a presidential election. This created a level of uncertainty for the NDC, because it was unclear how
the traditional ethnic partisans, the Ewe and the Ga-Adangbe would embrace this Northern candidate.
In addition, like in many West African countries, there is a North-South divide in Ghana, based on reli-
gion, with an overwhelmingly Christian South and Muslim North. The country is further divided along
income levels, with poverty being more severe in the Northern regions. The support for John Dramani
Mahama among NDC partisans in the South could hence not be taken for granted.
Moreover, there was even uncertainty involved in how Northerners would react to John Dramani Ma-
hama. While he does belong to the lose coalition of speakers of the Northern languages, Mahama hails
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from an ethnic and a religious minority in the North. He belongs to the ethnic minority of the Gonja,
and is a Christian. While his rival candidate was a Southerner, Nana Akuffo Addo’s running mate, who
vied for the office of the vice president, was a Northerner. This running mate, Mamadu Bawumiah is a
Mamprusi, which are part of the majority Dagomba ethnic group of the North. He is also a Muslim such
as 60 percent of Ghanaians who live in the three Northern regions (Ofori-Atta, 2012). The NPP thus
campaigned with a vice presidential candidate who was likely to appeal to a majority of Northerners
which might have created uncertainty for the NDC about how its traditional ethnic support base would
react to its own flagbarer.
The patterns I observe are in line with the theory of how party alignment structures campaigning
strategies. It has been argued in studies on campaigning in established democracies that in context
where party alignment is strong, parties will be likely to direct their campaign at indifferent and swing
voters (e.g. Althaus, Nardulli and Shaw, 2002, p. 53). When party alignment is weak or turnout is un-
even, campaigns have been argued to be more likely to be preoccupied with maintaining their support
base (ibid.). The difference between the incumbent’s and the challenger’s campaign might, hence, stem
from lower past turnout rates among NDC partisans, than among NPP voters. In addition, the NPP likely
estimated alignment among its supporters to be stronger than the NDC. The fact that two presidential
candidates pursued different strategies, also resonates with past research on US campaigns. In a study of
campaigning across counties within swing states in the 2008 elections, Chen and Reeves (2011, p. 549-
550) found that the incumbent Republican party pursued a mobilization strategy, while the challenger
followed a strategy of attracting new voters.
5.4 Summary
This chapter presented a first test of the dissertations key argument, that parties in African elections
should focus campaign efforts with the aim to mobilize potential supporters. I showed that both candid-
ates campaigned among their supporters, but that the challenger combined this with a quest for attracting
new voters, living in swing constituencies. By characterizing groups of voters by their partisan status
and their habit to turn out, I was able to further disaggregate the strategies these candidates used. My
findings suggest that the incumbent mobilized his potential supporters, combined with a strategy of
double persuasion, which aims at making independent voters develop a vote intention for the candidate
and motivate them to turn out. I, further, found that the challenger combined a strategy of mobilizing
support among the NPP’s ethnic partisans with attracting new voters, mainly in swing constituencies,
but to a lesser extend also among opposed voters. Had I only investigated the distribution of partisans
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across different constituencies and ignored the likelihood of voters in these constituencies to turn out
– like past research on campaign rallies has (Bartels, 1985, Hill and McKee, 2005, p. 706, Charnock,
McCann and Tenpas, 2009, Chen and Reeves, 2011, Doherty, 2007) – I would not have been able to
identify these strategies.
The next chapter tests whether the use of local promises made at these rallies also followed a logic of
mobilizing potential supporters. In addition, it puts the argument to test that candidates concentrate local
promises in contexts in which these promises can be expected to be most credible.
One of the statements by a national campaign manager of the NPP (cited on page 96) could raise the
concern that the pattern of campaigning observed is due to a particularity of campaign rallies, compared
to other campaigning strategies. The campaign manager explained that he organized rallies in his party’s
strongholds, because he thought rallies only “preach to the converted,” and are little suitable to convince
new voters. He, further, explained that to reach indifferent voters, he used door-to-door campaigning
in swing constituencies.46 Based on this information, the pattern of mobilization I identified could be
an artifact of the particular campaigning strategy applied. To rule out this concern, I test the argument
that parties use campaign efforts to mobilize their potential supporters in Chapter 8, in which I analyze
the use of clientelistic targeting. My interviews with lower-level campaign organizers suggest that such
targeting of voters with individual benefits is part of the door-to-door campaigning in Ghana.47 I will
46“The most effective way, I consider to reaching the persuadables, was to get them in their own environment, either their
homes or their work places or their villages, where they feel comfortable. Where they feel in control of their emotions. There
you can talk to them. So we designed the campaign on the basis of small outreach programs”(Interview with a member of
NPP’s national campaign team, November 28.)
47“As for the door-to-door we enter houses. We enter this house and we see this man and we approach him with great care
that we are NPP. We want to seek your support. We want to you to vote for our big man Nana Addo. Nana Addo is a man of
substance, is a man that is taking this country at the heart. It’s a man that wants to push every Ghanaian in this country to go to
school because education, education brought civilization. So from there we leave our party paraphernalia to them. Then we go
to another that’s house-to-house. Then offices to offices, too. [...] Some accommodate you because they need fertilizer. They
thought if they accommodate you that you can assist them by getting them fertilizer. Some even demanded for fishing nets.
Some even divided woods to construct boats, canoeing. You see, and then they...
MR: ...demand from you?
NPP: They demand from you. But how sure are you that they are coming to vote for you? That is the big question.
MR: So what do you do? Do you give it or you don’t?
NPP: No, no, no, some of the demands are so heavy and it’s our difficult zone, too, so the only thing we normally do is to
promise that, ‘let’s strike a deal, vote for me if I come, I will speak to your need’. You see?
MR: Would you be able to get back to that individual farmer then again after the campaign?
NPP: Yes, normally we hold a book like this. So when you’re talking your campaigners will be writing their names, their
phone numbers so you communicate [with] them through phone, through text to assure them that no, you haven’t forgotten
them. So you’ll be in close touch. This is some of the campaign strategy.
MR: But then after the election, you still don’t know if they voted for you?
NPP: Yes, when the voting finished and you go to that polling station you’ll realize that your strategy, you haven’t seen it [the
expected turnout]. You don’t need to talk to them again, you don’t need to talk to them again.
MR: But if you’ve seen it?
NPP: If you’ve seen, if you’ve seen the mark. Even though you didn’t win, but you’ve seen the mark which you are not
expecting. Then that means the people have tried to buy your ideas. So you need to be interacting with them. [...].
MR: So that means, you will then provide what you promised them?
NPP: No you cannot.
MR: Because you didn’t win?
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show in the analysis of campaigning in Ghana and nine other African countries in Chapter 8, that also
clientelistic benefits are concentrated on parties’ supporters, and not on indifferent voters.
NPP: Yes, but if you are in a position, assuming you have some contact with some companies, you can start with exchange.
You have the means, you can do it.
MR: You can give jobs or...?
NPP: Yes, you can give jobs.
MR: When it’s your own company?
NPP: Yeah, or a friend’s company” (Interview with a regional campaign manager of the NPP, December 15, 2012.)
101
Chapter 6
Credible candidates and responsive
constituents: the strategic use of local
promises
The preceding chapter has shown that presidential candidates in Ghana spent a substantive amount of
their time on the campaign trail motivating potential supporters to vote. I also found partial support for
the argument that candidates visit their party’s strongholds on their campaign trail if voters with a low
probability to turn out are concentrated there. The findings with regard to the candidate visits to the
various constituencies in Ghana lend support to the dissertation’s key argument that parties and candid-
ates focus their campaign resources on potential supporters, rather than exclusively targeting undecided
voters. This chapter puts this argument to a further test. It analyses the campaign promises made at the
campaign rallies investigated in Chapter 5. I investigate the promising of local club goods versus na-
tional public goods at rallies held in constituencies across Ghana during the three-months campaigning
period in the run-up to the 2012 presidential elections. In this analysis, I test whether candidates indeed
made such local promises in situations where they were most credible in making them.
“All politics is local. The country is not unified in terms of levels of development. There is a
lot of isolation in terms of [...] developmental needs. So the men sitting in Bongo care less
about roads. Because their world view and lifestyle does not lead them outside. So if we
are talking about roads, he (sic!) is not going anywhere. The key thing for him is that there
is no water in Bongo, right?! So his issue then becomes drilling more holes, so that he has
access to potable water for himself, his crops and his animals. If we are not able to address
their local issues, they are not interested. Politics is about solving the daily problems of
people. And identifying we are addressing the problems and get the attention much more
than with broad national programs, which may benefit them in the long run, but in the short
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run it will not benefit them. Or which may benefit them immediately, but they might not even
be aware of the benefits. [...]. Therefore, our messaging has to be localized. [...] So that
the candidate can walk into [...] [a community] and say ’Yes, you live in a cocoa growing
area [...]. Fishing is one of your most important off-season activities. But there is no bridge
to the other side of your cocoa farms. You have to go in canoes all the time with all the
crocodiles and risk your life. It is the government’s intention that, if you vote for us, we
will build a bridge over the river and allow you easy access to the other side of your [...]
lands.”1
This quote by a member of the national campaign team of Ghana’s main opposition party NPP illustrates
the importance for presidential candidates to include promises of local policies into their campaign
message. The campaign manager gives two reasons for why the promising of local policies to voters
can be a beneficial strategy when vying for votes. First, he emphasizes that voters might prefer parties
to implement local versus broad-based programmatic policies, because their impact can be felt much
quicker than that of national policies. In addition, the ramifications of local policies, he suggests, are
more visible than those of national policies. This evaluation is in line with research on the types of
policies that Ghanaian voters consider most when evaluating their members of parliament. In a study on
accountability pressures MPs face in Ghana, Lindberg finds the following. When making up their minds
of whom to vote for in parliamentary elections, voters consider the provision of local club goods by their
MPs more than their performance with respect to national public goods (Lindberg, 2010, p. 123-132).
The second feature of local promises, the campaign manager alludes to, is that the provision of local
policies can be made conditional on voting in an electoral constituency. As the benefits that are being
promised, such as the building of a new Senior High School, first and foremost benefit constituents
living in one electoral constituency, politicians can use the implementation of such projects as a means
to reward or punish voters for voting behavior in a constituency. This feature of local campaign promises
makes it a particularly effective strategy as voters might feel compelled to support a candidate, because
they want the High School to be built in their constituency. They might be less compelled to vote for
the party based on a national, programmatic promise such as the introduction of free SHS education, for
example. I argue that this is because voters know that the party cannot use the realization of free tuition
to target certain constituencies and reward or punish them. If a national programmatic policy, such as
the abolishment of school fees, is implemented, every child eligible for the policy will benefit from it,
no matter whether the constituency he or she lives in has supported the victorious party in the election
or not.
Of course, if the promising of local club goods is a particularly effective campaign strategy, parties
would like to apply it as widely as possible. The need for the provision of local club goods and basic
1Interview with a member of the national campaign team of the NPP, November 28, 2012.
103
local infrastructure is certainly wide-spread enough in a country with almost 40% of the population
without electricity and more than half of the population without access to pipe-borne water in their
home.2 In addition, voters use the attention they receive during the campaign season to make politicians
aware of their most urgent needs. Often they also signal to candidates that they will only support them
if candidates address the issues that are dear to them (see also Harding, 2013a).3 In the 2000 national
election campaigns Ghana’s newspapers featured headlines such as the following: “Mafi villages say,
‘no power, no vote”’ (Ghanaweb, 2000). It referred to voters demanding to be connected to the national
electricity grid and threatening not to vote if the relevant steps were not taken. The urgency of such
demands and their nation-wide scope is underscored by the fact that such demands are not limited to
rural, so-called ’deprived’ areas, but that they are also raised by urban dwellers in the capital as the
following quote illustrates:
“No Water, No Vote [...]. The people of Teshie, a suburb of Accra have threatened not to
vote in the 2004 general elections if steps are not taken to solve the perennial water shortage
affecting the town”(Ghanaweb, 2003).
Not only Ghanaian voters make use of the increased attention ordinary folk receive from politicians
during the campaign season. The “No land, No house No vote”-campaign, which was born in the run-up
to South Africa’s 2004 elections, is another example (Symphony Way Pavement Dwellers, 2011).
These observations suggest that the use of local promises might be a particularly effective and hence
attractive strategy to campaigners in young democracies. Hence candidates would like to broadly apply
this strategy. However if a candidate is concerned with his reputation in keeping campaign promises once
in office, he cannot respond to all needs in the run-up to an election. Candidates can rather be expected
to strategically choose groups of voters whom they target with election promises. I have argued that they
should focus their promises of local club goods in situations in which these promises can be expected to
generate additional votes. This is the case first, in situations where candidates are most credible. Second,
candidates should make local promises when they face voters who are unlikely to turn out without being
promised the provision of local club goods. Candidates’ credibility hinges on incumbency status and the
level of affinity residents in a constituency exhibit for them.
The remainder of the chapter discusses the expectations on the use of local promises that can be derived
from the central argument. In addition, I extend the argument, presented in Chapter 3, by formulating
hypotheses on how the incumbent’s use of local promises is likely to differ from the challenger’s. I then
2According to the most recent census, conducted in the year of 2010, 64.2% of households use electricity as their main
source of lighting (p. 17) and 46.5% of households use pipe-borne water as their main source of drinking water (Ghana
Statistical Service, 2012, p. 16).
3See Auyero (2000, p. 72) for evidence that this is a strategy also used by voters in Latin America.
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describe the data used in the analysis and present the results. The chapter concludes with discussing
the implications of these findings for the subsequent empirical chapters and the dissertation’s central
research question.
6.1 Theoretical expectations on the use of local promises as a campaign
strategy
I have argued in Chapter 3 that candidates should overwhelmingly make promises of local club goods
in situations, in which they are most credible in making these promises. I have further argued that their
credibility hinges on the audience they face in these constituencies. As candidates can be expected to
be more credible in making local promises in constituencies where their partisans are concentrated,4
promises are likely to be more effective here. Candidates have incentives to use those local promises
in contexts in which they anticipate them to be most effective. Therefore, I argue that they should
concentrate these appeals on constituencies, in which their partisans are concentrated.
I have, furthermore, argued in Chapter 5 that it would not be rational for candidates to target core
supporters who are certain to turn out with campaign rallies. The same logic also applies to their decision
of promising local club goods to voters. I expect candidates to focus such campaign promises on those
of their supporters, who would potentially abstain from voting, were they not promised local benefit.
In the following paragraphs, I present an additional expectation regarding the use of local promises. I
expect the credibility of campaign promises to hinge not only on whether voters support a particular
party or not. I argue that incumbents are more credible in promising benefits to voters than opposition
candidates, independent of the types of voters they make promises to. This argument is based on research
on political clientelism which regards incumbents as more credible in promising individual benefits to
voters than opposition candidates. This is the case, as at the time of making the promise, incumbents
already have discretion over the distribution of these goods (Medina and Stokes, 2007; Wantchekon,
2003, p. 422). They can, hence, make costly investments already at campaigning time which increases
the credibility that they will follow up on the promise after the election. A candidate can, for example,
promise to build a local road and already start the delivery of materials needed to build the road at the
time of the promise. This strategy is illustrated by the following example of a local promise made by the
incumbent in the Pusiga constituency, in the Upper East Region during the 2012 campaign period:
“In this area there are many communities waiting for electricity. I want to assure you, we
4This expectation is based on past research indicating that partisans evaluate campaign messages by candidates whose party
they feel close to more favorably than those by other candidates (see Bartels, 2002; Gerber, Huber and Washinton, 2010).
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have signed the Memorandum of Understanding with the Chinese government and some
poles have been delivered. I want to assure you as president of this country that in no time
your electricity is coming and the next time I come to Pusiga all your communities will be
shining as bright as the stars.”5
In most political systems in Africa, the executive enjoys a large leeway over state spending (e.g. van de
Walle, 2003). This includes the allocation of local club goods in many countries and also in Ghana
(Ichino and Nathan, 2013, p. 348).6 In such a context, incumbents can strategically allocate local club
goods just as they can distribute clientelistic benefits. Since they have access to state resources at the
time of the campaign and discretion over the allocation of resources, they can be expected to be more
credible when promising local club goods than opposition candidates.7 Against this backdrop, I expect
the incumbent to rely more on the strategy of promising local club goods than the challenger.
H1:The incumbent makes use of local promises more frequently than the challenger.
Based on the theoretical expectations summarized above, and in Chapter 3, I further formulate the fol-
lowing hypotheses:
H2: A candidate makes more local promises, the higher the levels of affinity with himself or
his party are in that constituency.
H3: Among constituencies where supporters are concentrated, candidates make more local
promises the lower levels of past turnout.
6.1.1 Testing the theory in Ghana
The empirical tests of the hypotheses on the strategic use of local promises is based on a content-analysis
of campaign speeches by the two main candidates in Ghana’s 2012 election. The collection of these data
is described in Chapter 4. As in Chapter 5, I perform a quantitative cross-sectional analysis where the
unit of analysis is the constituency. The results of this quantitative analysis are interpreted in the light of
the evidence gained from the interviews conducted with campaign managers.
Representativeness of the sample
The sample of campaign speeches includes 50 speeches by the incumbent and 47 speeches by the chal-
lenger. One important question is whether this sample is representative of the population of all rally
events held by the incumbent and the challenger. While there is no account of all campaign events
5John Dramani Mahama, Pusiga, November 10, 2012.
6See also the qualitative evidence of this in section 4.2, in Chapter 4.
7On the weakness of the parliament in decision making in Ghana see Lindberg (2010).
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available, against which to compare the sample used here,8 I can compare the subsample of speeches
against a deduplicated sample of rally events, which is based on information from two daily Ghanaian
newspapers and the speeches. These are the data that the analysis in the previous chapter was based
on.9 It is important that the sample of speeches not be biased with regard to the share of rallies held
by the incumbent versus the challenger, with regard to the levels of support by the two candidates, or
turnout histories. If the sample of speeches contained significantly more rallies by the incumbent than
the deduplicated sample, this would bias the sample in favor of finding support for my hypotheses. It
would be equally problematic if the speeches sample contained more rallies held in areas of high support
for the candidate campaigning there, or in constituencies with low levels of past turnout. Such concerns
can, however, largely be ruled out.10
The distribution of events by the incumbent compared to the challenger is similar across the deduplicated
sample and the sample based on only the speeches. The percentage of rallies held by the incumbent is
51.5% (50 out of 97) compared to 48.5% (47 out of 97) held by the challenger in the speeches sample. It
is 60% (173 out of 290) and 40% (117 out of 290) respectively in the deduplicated sample.11 This com-
parison suggests that in case of a bias in the recordings of the speeches, it goes against finding support
for the hypothesis that the incumbent more frequently made use of local promises than the challenger.
The more events of the challenger are included, the more local promises will also be included in the
sample. This means that only an over-representation of rally events by the incumbent in the speeches
would be problematic for the present analysis.
Table 6.1 shows that the distribution of events across strongholds of the two candidates and swing con-
stituencies is slightly different in the sample of speeches compared to the deduplicated sample. Ac-
cording to the speeches, the incumbent devoted 30% of his rallies to swing constituencies, 46% of his
campaign events to his strongholds and 24% of his rallies to the opposition party’s strongholds. This
compares to 50% of the incumbent’s rallies in swing constituencies, 29% of his rallies in NDC strong-
holds and 20% of rallies by the incumbent in opposition strongholds, according to the deduplicated
sample. This difference is likely driven by pure chance. The content-analysis of the newspapers shows
that the candidates oftentimes went on two to four-day tours throughout one region, before moving back
to the party’s headquarter in Accra, or to the next region. One of the presidential reporters might not
have been present at one of these tours of the president or on a few events of such a tour. Given the
8The most comprehensive and unbiased account of rally events are most certainly the itenaries of the candidate schedules
during the campaigning period compiled by the campaign managements of the two parties. Unfortunately, despite several
requests such itenaries were either inexistent or unavailable from the campaign management of the two parties.
9See Chapter 4 for a detailed description of this event dataset.
10Turnout was coded as low if turnout in the 2008 presidential election was lower or equal to the median of of 71.2%. It was
coded as high if it was above the median turnout level.
11The unit of observation is the rally. Percentages do not always add up to 100% due to rounding.
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relatively small size of the sample, this might have slightly biased the speeches sample towards more
coverage of strongholds.
Table 6.1: Distribution of rallies across NPP and NDC strongholds and swing constituencies
Swing Stronghold NDC Stronghold NPP
Speeches Dedup. sample Speeches Dedup. sample Speeches Dedup. sample
John Mahama 15 (50) 88 (173) 23 (50) 51 (173) 12 (50) 34 (173)
(NDC) 30% 50% 46% 29% 24% 20%
Nana Akufo-Addo 20 (47) 60 (117) 7 (47) 15 (117) 20 (47) 42 (117)
(NPP) 43% 52% 15% 15% 43% 36%
As for the rallies by the challenger, the speeches report 43% of his rallies being held in swing
constituencies, 15% of rallies in NDC strongholds and 43% of the challenger’s rallies being hosted in
his party’s strongholds. This compares to 52% of the challenger’s campaign events being located in
swing constituencies, 15% of his rallies hosted in ruling party strongholds, and 36% of his campaign
rallies organized in opposition strongholds in the deduplicated sample. Both samples indicate that the
incumbent devoted most of his time to his strongholds, followed by swing constituencies, and opposition
strongholds. Likewise, both samples suggest that the challenger devoted about an equal amount of time
on the campaign trail to his strongholds and to swing constituencies. Furthermore, he largely avoided
safe havens of the ruling party. While the ranking of the types of constituencies the candidates visited is
the same in both samples, the comparison also suggests that swing constituencies are somewhat under-
represented in the sample based on the speeches. I consider this in the interpretation of the results.
To compare the distribution of rally events across constituencies with low and high histories of turnout
(in the two samples) consider Table 6.2. According to the speeches, the incumbent allocated 61%
of his campaign events to constituencies with low turnout levels and 30% to constituencies with high
levels of past turnout respectively. The deduplicated sample suggests that the incumbent held 70%
of his campaign events in constituencies with low turnout histories and 44% of his campaign events in
constituencies with high levels of past turnout. Concerning rally activities of the challenger, the speeches
indicate that he spent 62% of his time in constituencies with low and 32% of his time in constituencies
with high turnout histories. In the deduplicated sample this compares to 47% of his rallies being located
in constituencies with low levels of turnout and 53% of his rallies located in constituencies with histories
of high turnout. While both samples suggests that the incumbent held more rallies in areas of low
past support and that the opposite is true for the challenger, rallies in constituencies with high turnout
histories seem to be slightly under-represented in the sample which is based on the speeches. I take this
into consideration when interpreting the results.
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Table 6.2: Distribution of rallies across constituencies with low and high turnout histories
Turnout Low Turnout High
Speeches Dedup. sample Speeches Dedup. sample
John Mahama 35 (50) 97 (173) 15 (50) 76 (173)
(NDC) 61% 70% 30% 44%
Nana Akufo-Addo 31 (47) 55 (117) 16 (47) 63 (117)
(NPP) 62% 47% 32% 53%
6.2 Results
While the hypothesis concerning the difference in use of local promises between the two candidates
can be tested using the full sample, Hypothesis 2 and Hypothesis 3 need to be tested separately for the
incumbent and the challenger. There are two specifications of the dependent variable. The first is a
dummy which takes on the value of one if a promise is made at a rally event and zero otherwise. The
second is a count variable reflecting the number of promises made at a rally, ranging from 0 to 7, as
illustrated in Table 6.3. Since neither of these variables are normally distributed, OLS regression is
inappropriate and maximum likelihood estimation is more suitable. However, the sample sizes are very
small, which makes maximum likelihood estimation unfeasible (Long, 1997).
The sample size for estimating the effect of candidate identity on the use of local promises is 97 speeches.
The tests of the effect of co-partisanship and turnout need to be run separately for each candidate so that
the sample size here is only 47 for the challenger and 50 for the incumbent. Since such small samples
sizes do not lend themselves well to multivariate regression techniques, based on maximum likelihood,12
I limit the analyses to descriptive results and bivariate hypothesis tests.
To test the three hypotheses formulated above for the case in which the dependent variable is a dummy,
I apply chi square tests if the independent variable has two categories. If the independent variables takes
on more than two categories, I apply the Marascuilo procedure (Marascuilo and MacSweeney, 1977).
The results are reported in Table 6.4.
When the dependent variable is measured as a count variable, I use Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney (WMW)
tests for the cases in which the independent variable takes on two categories.13 In the cases where the
explanatory variable has more than two values, I use Kruskal-Wallis tests (Kruskal and Wallis, 1952),
which are an extension of the WMW tests. Hereby, I test whether the overall difference in proportions
of the number of promises for different values of the independent variable is statistically significant.
12Long (1997) argues that the minimum number of cases to run multivariate regression analysis based on maximum-
likelihood estimation is 100.
13Different from the two-sample t-test this test does not depend on the assumption of normality for the two populations that
are being compared (Hollander and Wolfe, 1999).
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Table 6.3: Variation in rally events held by the incumbent and the challenger and local promises
made at these rallies
Variable Incumbent Challenger Total
Local (at least one
local promise per event)
0 30 45
1 20 2 97
Number of local promises (per event)
0 30 45
1 8 2
2 8
3 2
4 1
7 1
50 47 97
6.2.1 Did the incumbent make use of local promises more widely than the challenger?
I argue that the incumbent is more credible in making promises of local club goods than the challenger,
because he can underscore his determination to realize a proposed project by making costly investments
already at the time of the campaign. I hence expect the incumbent to turn to the strategy of making
local promises more widely instead of only disseminating the national promises entailed in his party’s
manifesto. Indeed, in many cases in which the incumbent John Dramani Mahama made a local promise
he emphasized that work related to the promise was already ongoing or that it was to begin within a short
delay. In a speech at the Pusiga constituency on November 10, 2012, cited on page 53, he promised
residents in the constituency to connect them to the national electricity grid. In order to underline
the credibility of this promise, he assured the audience that a memorandum of understanding with the
Chinese government for the funding of the project had been signed. In addition, he drew people’s
attention to the fact that some poles had already been delivered. The rally in Pusiga by no means stands
out as an exceptional example as the following quote illustrates:
“All the communities in this area that are on the electrification project are going to get
electricity. This is because we have secured the counterpart funding. [...] We have secured
money from the Chinese government credit. We were to pay a 15% counterpart funding
which we have done; I spoke to SADA and SADA has helped and so all the communities are
going to get their lights. As president I am assuring you, the poles have started coming and
you are going to get your lights very soon.”14
14John Dramani Mahama, Navrongo Central, November 11, 2012.
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Figure 6.1: Rallies at the which candidates made local promises
(a) Incumbent’s rallies
(b) Challenger’s rallies
Notes: The black dots represent a rally event held in a constituency, the red dots indicate that the candidate made at least one
local promise at at least one rally in the constituency.
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Figure 6.1 maps the campaign rallies of the incumbent and the challenger across Ghana (black dots),
and shows those rallies, where they made local promises (red dots). It is already evident from these
descriptive statistics that the incumbent recurred to promising local club goods at many more of his
rallies, than the challenger. In fact, while the challenger only made two promises of local club goods
at two campaign rallies, the incumbent made as many as 41 promises at 20 campaign rallies, out of
the 47 and 51 rallies recorded in the sample. Figure 6.1a shows the proportion of rallies at which the
incumbent made local promises. The incumbent made local promises at 20 of his 50 rallies (40%). The
proportion of rallies where the challenger promised local club goods, shown in Figure 6.1b, is as low as
(4%) for the challenger. He only made local promises at 20 of his 47 campaign events. This difference
in the use of local promises by the incumbent and the challenger is also illustrated in Figure 6.2a. The
difference is not only substantial in size, but also statistically significant at the 1%-level, as reported in
Table 6.4. This finding is robust to restricting the sample to speeches of full length, as shown in Table
C.1 Appendix C.15
The same trend is evident when considering the average number of promises made per rally event which
is .82 (+/- .19) for the incumbent and only .04 (+/- .03) for the challenger. See Figure 6.2b. The results
concerning the determinants of the average number of promises made per rally are reported in Table
6.5.16
Figure 6.2: The use of local promises by the incumbent and the challenger
(a) Rallies with and without local promises
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The WMW test suggests that this difference is also statistically significant at the 1%-level. While
these results could be influenced by the differences in the parties’ programmatic or ideological profiles
and not only by their incumbency status, this is unlikely to account for this striking difference in the use
15As a number of observations of five and smaller per cell might distort results of the chi square test (e.g. Conover, 1971), I
also ran a Fisher’s exact test. The difference remained significant at a p-value of 0.000.
16They are robust to restricting the sample to speeches recorded in full length, as reported in Table C.2 in Appendix C.
112
of local promises.
In order to rule out the possibility that the variation in the use of local promises across the incumbent and
the challenger is driven by other differences between the parties than the fact that one was in government
and the other was in opposition, I would ideally compare the 2012 election campaign to the one in
2000 or in 2004, where the NPP was in government and the NDC was in opposition. In fact, the
present study is the first attempt to systematically analyze the allocation of promises of local club goods.
Consequently, there are no previous findings to compare the 2012 election campaign to. Evaluating
another strategy where an incumbent candidate is similarly expected to have an advantage over the
challenger, we can largely alleviate potential concerns. Such a case is the distribution of individual
benefits. Concerning such clientelistic targeting of voters, incumbents are also expected to have an
advantage over the challenger for similar reasons as in the case of local campaign promises. As they
have access to state funds, they have more resources at hand to distribute during election campaigns than
opposition parties. Hence they not only have more resources to distribute, but are also believed to be
more credible in promising the delivery of private benefits after the election (e.g. Wantchekon, 2003).
Indeed, a regional campaign manager of the opposition party emphasized how the ruling party made
use of this advantage in the 2012 campaign, distributing benefits such as “money, soap,[...], lanterns,
mattresses, roofages,”17 and even giving out cars to party faithfuls:
“And you know then from then [from September 2012 onwards, four months to the election]
they [the ruling NDC] are even buying cars for some ladies. Those who can convince their
colleagues. Assuming you are somebody who a lot of people follows (sic!) you. So they buy
you a car, so you can talk to the other people that if they vote for your party what they did
to you, they can also do it for them. Because you, they are using as a big example, an [...]
example. So if they follow that train, they follow that train. That disturb (sic!) us.”18
Asked, why his party did not distribute benefits in the same way, the campaign manager explained that
his party had less money in the 2012 election than the ruling party. He alluded that his party had also
more frequently relied on distributing benefits to individual voters in the 2008 campaigns when it was
in government.
“We don’t have the money like they have. They are in government. Don’t forget this is the
second time Nana Addo [NPP’s candidate] is going. But this time, you know, we don’t have
a lot of money. We don’t have the money to match them, you see. [...] In the last campaign,
in the last campaign I can say that Nana Addo have (sic!) used a lot of money, a lot of
money.”19
17Interview with a member of a regional campaign of the NPP, December 15, 2012.
18Interview with a member of a regional campaign of the NPP, December 15, 2012.
19Interview with a member of a regional campaign of the NPP, December 15, 2012.
113
This anecdotal evidence supports the assumption that parties adopt their strategy to whether they are in
government or in opposition, and that the incumbent party has an advantage in using campaign strategies
that involve the promising or distribution of benefits to small groups of the electorate and to individual
voters.
Table 6.4: Hypothesis testing, proportion of rallies with local promises
Hypothesis Implication Significant Type of test Test statistic p-value
H1 Proportion of rallies with local Yes Chi2 17.65 (1) 0.000
promises incumbent > challenger
Proportion of rallies with local promises No 1.0870(2) 0.581
differs across levels of past support
H2 Rallies with local promises in NDC No Marascuilo 14.5 (dif), –
strongholds > swing constituencies 39 (cv)
Rallies with local promises in NDC No Marascuilo 14.5 (dif), –
strongholds > NPP strongholds 42 (cv)
Rallies with local promises if ethnic partisans No Chi2 0.4076 0.523
majority > ethnic partisans minority
H3 Rallies with local promises in NDC strongholds No Chi2 0.0154 (1) 0.901
if past turnout low > turnout high
Notes: Results are the difference in proportion of rallies with local promises across different values of the independent vari-
ables. Values displayed in column 5 are Pearson’s Chi-values for Chi2 tests, degrees of freedom in brackets; differences
(dif) and critical values (cv) for Marascuilo tests. Except for the test of the effect of candidate identity, where rallies of both
candidates are studied, all tests are performed for campaign events by the incumbent.
These findings with the regard to the use of local promises by the incumbent and the challenger
provide strong support for Hypothesis 1. Whether the causal mechanism at work is that the incumbent
was more credible than the challenger in promising local club goods, will be tested in Chapter 7, which
reports the results of the survey experiment. In the remainder of this chapter, I restrict the analysis of the
use of local club goods to the incumbent, as the results, presented so far, show clearly that the challenger
did not make use of local promises.
Table 6.5: Hypothesis testing, number of promises per rally
Hypothesis Implication IV Significant z-value p-value
H1 Promises per rally incumbent > challenger Candidate Yes 4.259 0.000
H2 Local promises per rally if Ethnic partisans No -0.528 0.5977
ethnic partisans majority > minority
Local promises per rally in NDC strongholds NDC stronghold No -0.818 0.4136
> swing const. or NPP strongholds
H3 Local promises in NDC strongholds if past Turnout No -0.343 0.7315
turnout low > past turnout high
Notes: Results of Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney tests of the difference in proportion of rallies with local promises
across different values of the independent variables. Except for the test of the effect of candidate identity, which
uses the full sample, all tests are performed for the incumbent.
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6.2.2 Did the incumbent focus local promises on his partisans?
I have posited that candidates should focus most of their promises of local club goods in areas where
potential supporters are concentrated, because such promises are likely to be most credible and thus
effective with these voters. In the following, I analyze to what extend the incumbent targeted con-
stituencies where his partisans were concentrated with local promises. I first apply a direct measure of
partisanship, reflecting how many times a constituency has been won by the NDC and the NPP over the
2000, 2004, and 2008 presidential elections. As in Chapter 5, strongholds of the NDC (NPP) are those
where the NDC (NPP) has won a plurality in all these three elections. Swing constituencies are areas
where not the same party has gained a plurality of votes across all these elections. Subsequently, as in
Chapter 5, I also apply a more indirect measure of partisanship, based on the share of ethnic partisans
living in the various constituencies.
Local promises in NDC and NPP strongholds, and in swing constituencies
Figure 6.3 maps rallies at which the incumbent made local promises, over levels of past support for the
NDC party in the 2000, 2004, and 2008 presidential elections.
Figure 6.3: Rallies by the incumbent, over past support for the ruling NDC
Notes: The red dots represent local promises, the larger the dots, the more local promises the incumbent made at rallies in
a constituency. Dark gray shading indicates ruling party strongholds. Dotted shading reflects swing constituencies. NPP
strongholds are shaded white.
115
The map suggests that the incumbent targeted both his party’s strongholds (dark-gray shaded) with
local promises and swing constituencies (dotted shading). As expected, he made least promises in op-
position strongholds (white shaded). The incumbent made 41 promises of local club goods in total. Out
of all the promises, he made 19 (46%) in his party’s strongholds, 11 (27%) in swing constituencies, and
11 (27%) in the rival party’s strongholds.
In line with Hypothesis 2, the incumbent did not only allocate most promises to his strongholds. Also,
the proportion of rallies at which he made local promises is higher for constituencies that have consist-
ently supported the NDC party in the past than for swing constituencies and opposition strongholds, as
Figure 6.4a illustrates. He made local promises at 48% (11 out of 23) of the rallies held in ruling party
strongholds, only at 33% (5 out of 15) of the rallies held in swing constituencies, and at 33% (4 out of
12) of the rallies organized in NPP strongholds. However, the overall difference in the proportion of
rallies with local promises across these past levels of support does not reach conventional levels of stat-
istical significance, as the results reported in Table 6.4 show. The same is true for the restricted sample,
including only speeches of full length, as reported in Table C.1 in Appendix C. While it is in line with
my argument that the incumbent made local promises at more of the rallies that were held in his strong-
holds, than in other constituencies, I would have expected him to make least promises in the opposition
strongholds. Instead, he made local promises at as many of his rallies held in swing constituencies as
at rallies hosted in opposition strongholds. This is likely due to the fact that he avoided campaigning
in opposition strongholds in the first place, which the findings reported in Chapter 5 show. In the few
instances where the incumbent did host rallies in NPP strongholds, the campaign might have regarded
it as particularly important to offer some local public goods to the voters living there. In doing so, the
incumbent’s aim most likely was to avoid to activate voters’ predispositions to vote for the opposition
NPP. Such an “activation” (Lazarsfeld, Berelson and Gaudet, 1968) might have been the consequence
of the incumbent campaigning in NPP strongholds without convincing these opposed voters with local
promises. I turn to this point again below.
The Marascuilo test on the difference in the proportion between NDC strongholds and swing constitu-
encies and between these strongholds and opposition strongholds paints a similar picture. According to
this test, the proportion of rallies where the incumbent made local promises is indeed 14.5 percentage
points higher than in swing constituencies. However, this difference does not cross the critical value
of 39 percentage points defined by the test and hence does not reach statistical significance. The test
suggests that the proportion of rallies with local promises which the incumbent held in NDC strong-
holds was 14.5 percentage points higher than that in NPP strongholds. Again, this difference does not
reach the critical value of 42 percentage points, defined by the test. The same is true for the comparison
116
between swing constituencies and opposition strongholds, as reported in Table 6.4. The results are ro-
bust to restricting the sample to those speeches that are recorded full length, as shown in Table C.1 in
Appendix C.
Concerning the average number of local promises the incumbent made across NDC and NPP strong-
holds and swing constituencies consider Figure 6.4b. While the incumbent made most of his promises
to his strongholds in absolute terms, the average number of promises per rally is highest for strongholds
of the rival party. This unexpected finding is not that surprising at a second look. While the incumbent
seems to have avoided holding rallies at opposition strongholds – by holding only 12 rally events out of
the 50 rallies in the sample in such constituencies – once he visited such hostile crowds, he might have
been compelled to promise his rival’s supporters some local projects.
Figure 6.4: Allocation of local promises by the incumbent across past support for the ruling
party
(a) Rallies with and without local promises
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A member of a regional campaign team of the ruling party explained that he tries to avoid sending
the president to areas where the party does not intend to make a local promise and more importantly, start
delivering on it before the election. Asked why the campaign in the region of Greater Accra had focused
so much on holding rallies in strongholds, and if his party had traveled more to swing constituencies,
had it had more time,20 he provided the following answer:
“Yes, we would have gone to swing states more than necessary. We would have visited,
whatever would be their demands – we didn’t have time on our side. Because when you go,
they will make demands. We are in government and we have to make sure that those things
are addressed, before you go again. Because if you go again, you came, we asked, we said
this, this is no good. At least we need to be able to do some, then you can go back.”21
20As mentioned in Chapter 4, the original candidate, late president John Evans Atta Mills passed away unexpectedly on 25
July 2012, so that the NDC began its official campaigns only on October 5, 2012. Not only did the party have to endorse a new
candidate, but also respect a period of mourning, before officially entering the campaigning period.
21Interview with a member of the national campaign team of the NDC, December 18, 2012.
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The strategy this campaign manager describes is similar to the attempt of avoiding to polarize an un-
friendly crowd against supporting the party that is campaigning, as Fenno (1978) describes for US
election campaigns. The finding that the number of promises per rally held in opposition strongholds
is relatively high should not be overemphasized, however, as the Kruskal-Wallis test does not suggest
that the difference between the average number of local promises made across these different types of
constituencies is statistically significant. The same is true for the sample restricted to speeches recorded
in full length, as reported in Table 6.5 and in Table C.2 in Appendix C.
Did the incumbent target his ethnic partisans with local promises?
Besides using the direct measure of support for the incumbent to assess its effect on the local promises
he makes, I use a more indirect proxy. Here, I investigate to what degree the concentration of ethnic
partisans affected where the incumbent promised local club goods. The classification of the Ewe, the Ga
and the speakers of the Northern languages, as partisans of the ruling NDC, is the same as in Chapter 5.
The results of the chi square test, reported in Table 6.4, show that there is no significant difference in the
proportion of rallies with local promises between constituencies which are dominated by the incumbent’s
ethnic partisans and others (chi value of -0.4076, p-value of 0.523). I neither find a difference in the
number of promises the incumbent made at those of his rallies held in localities where his ethnic partisans
were in the majority compared to those where they constituted a minority. The result is reported in Table
6.5 (z-value of -0.343, p-value of 0.7315). The most plausible interpretation for these results is that the
incumbent almost only campaigned in constituencies where his ethnic partisans were in the majority. In
fact, he hosted 46 of his campaign events in constituencies where his ethnic partisans were dominant
and only four rallies in other constituencies, according to the sample based on the speeches. It seems
that a similar logic applies to the targeting of his strongholds compared to other constituencies. He
campaigned much more in constituencies where his likely supporters were concentrated, but the few
times he visited more hostile areas, he also made local promises.
Consequently, the results with regard to the targeting of partisans with local promises only provide weak
support for Hypothesis 2. Although the incumbent made most of his promises in his strongholds, the
results with regard to the proportion of rallies with local promises do not support Hypothesis 2. The
same is true for the number of local promises per rally. To conclude that the incumbent did not aim
to reach his supporters on his campaign trail from these findings, would not be safe either, however.
The results presented in this chapter and in Chapter 5 rather suggest that he campaigned more in his
strongholds than anywhere else in the first place.
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6.2.3 Did the incumbent use local promises to mobilize turnout?
I argue that it is not rational for candidates to concentrate resources on targeting strong supporters who
are likely to turn out but rather to allocate local promises with the goal to mobilize potential supporters.
Figure 6.5 maps the allocation of local promises by the incumbent over levels of past turnout. The map
suggests that the incumbent made most of his campaign promises at medium levels of past turnout.
To analyze whether the incumbent did indeed focus his local promises on those constituencies that
have supported his party in the past, but where levels of turnout have been low, I conduct hypothesis
tests on a restricted sample, including only those rallies that he held in NDC strongholds. Overall, the
incumbent made 13 local promises in his party’s strongholds where past turnout was at median or below
median turnout levels in the 2008 presidential election. He made 6 such promises in constituencies with
comparatively high levels of turnout. Figure 6.6a illustrates this.
The results do not support my expectation. The proportion of rallies at which the incumbent made
local promises in constituencies of low levels of past support is with 47% slightly lower compared to
constituencies with high past turnout levels (50%). However, we should not place too much weight on
this finding, as the difference is minor and does not reach conventional levels of statistical significance,
as reported in Table 6.4. The same is true for when the sample is restricted to speeches of full-length, as
shown in Table C.1 in Appendix C.
Figure 6.5: Local promises by the incumbent over turnout in 2008
Notes: The red dots indicate that the candidate made at least one local promise at at least one rally in the constituency,
larger dots reflect more promises. Shading reflects level of turnout in 2008 per constituency, darker shading reflects a higher
percentage.
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Figure 6.6: Local promises by the incumbent held in his strongholds over past turnout
(a) Rallies with and without local promises, over levels
of turnout in 2008
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The findings concerning the average number of local promises the incumbent made at rallies in con-
stituencies with histories of low and high turnout among his strongholds are more in line with Hypothesis
3. I find that the incumbent made on average .72 promises (+/–2.3) in constituencies where turnout was
comparatively low and .5 promises (+/–2.9) on average in constituencies with high past turnout levels,
as illustrated in Figure 6.6b.22 The evidence presented in this chapter, and in Chapter 5, suggests that the
incumbent avoided hosting campaign rallies in constituencies with high levels of turnout. This might
account for why we cannot identify a statistically significant effect of past turnout on the number of
promises he made at these campaign rallies.
6.3 Summary
In line with the theoretical expectations derived from the dissertation’s key argument, I have found that
the incumbent made much more use of the strategy to promise the implementation of local club goods
to electoral constituencies than the challenger.
The evidence presented in this chapter is also in line with some, but not all predictions derived from
the argument that the candidates use promises of local club goods to mobilize turnout among their
likely supporters. In line with my argument, the incumbent seems to have made the bulk of these local
promises in his strongholds and in constituencies where past turnout has been low. As the sample of
campaign rallies analyzed in this chapter is slightly biased towards the incumbent’s strongholds and
constituencies with low turnout histories, however, we should not place too much emphasis on these
22The results are again robust to restricting the analysis to the sample of speeches that were recorded in full length, as
reported in Table C.2 in Appendix C.
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results regarding the question of the mobilization of core supporters. In addition, I did not identify
strong and robust effects of past support and turnout on the proportion of rallies at which the incumbent
made local promises, or on the average number of promises made per rally.
The most important finding in this chapter is that making campaign promises to provide local benefits
to communities is a strategy nearly exclusively used by the incumbent. This result lends support to
the assumption that the incumbent is more credible in making local promises than the challenger. The
data used in this chapter do not allow us to rule out other explanations for this finding, however. To
further investigate the plausibility of my argument, I test central assumptions regarding the credibility
of candidates and their promises in the survey experiment reported on in Chapter 7.
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Chapter 7
The credibility of local campaign
promises: evidence from a survey
experiment
The preceding chapter has shown that local promises in Ghana’s 2012 election campaign were made
strategically. It was a strategy nearly exclusively applied by the incumbent and mainly used in areas
where the incumbent’s (potential) supporters were concentrated. The content-analysis of the speeches
the candidates held at various rallies further revealed that the incumbent often tied his campaign prom-
ises of local club goods to immediate investments. Moreover, the interviews conducted with various
campaign managers suggested that the incumbent focused promises of local projects in areas where he
had already secured funds to implement these promises. These observations lend support to the argu-
ment that candidates apply promises of local club goods overwhelmingly in situations in which they
anticipate to be most credible with them. If this is true, this could account for why parties spend so
much time and resources on campaigning among their supporters in young democracies.
The present chapter analyzes the conditions under which campaign promises are credible and why. To
address this question, I test several assumptions underlying the argument. I analyze whether there is a
general credibility advantage of incumbents vis-a`-vis opposition candidates. Another central assump-
tion that is tested is whether partisans regard promises made by candidates of the party they feel close
to as more credible than other voters. Lastly, I test whether local promises are per se more credible than
national promises. If the latter were the case, then this could explain why local promises were used in a
more strategic manner than national promises in Ghana’s 2012 election campaigns.
I test these assumptions in a survey experiment conducted during the presidential campaigns of the 2012
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Ghanaian elections. The sample consists of 447 randomly chosen respondents in 16 polling station areas
and four selected constituencies in Ghana’s capital Accra. In this experiment, respondents were asked
about the likelihood of the two main presidential candidates fulfilling different kinds of campaign prom-
ises, if elected. In addition, the questionnaire contained questions on respondents’ exposure to news,
their political inclinations, their ethnic backgrounds, and on other demographic characteristics. There
were four experimental conditions. Each group of respondents was confronted with a set of either local
or national experimental promises, assigned to either the incumbent, or the main opposition candidate.
The local and the national promises differed only in their framing, but not with regard to the content of
the promises. Both candidates were assigned the same kinds of promises.1
7.1 Theoretical expectations
7.1.1 Incumbency status
One of the dissertation’s key theoretical arguments is that candidates make use of distributive campaign-
ing strategies under conditions where these strategies should be most effective, the least costly, and the
least risky. I have further argued that the effectiveness of campaigning hinges not only on the types of
voters a candidate tries to address, but also on his credibility in promising future distribution. The ana-
lysis of the allocation of promises of local projects across electoral constituencies in Ghana, presented
in Chapter 6, revealed that the incumbent made use of local promises much more frequently than the
challenger. I argued that this is due to a credibility advantage the incumbent has over the challenger in
promising such local club goods. As I have described in more detail in Chapter 6, this resonates with an
argument in the literature on political clientelism. Incumbents have been assumed to be more credible
in promising clientelistic redistribution than opposition candidates, because at the time of making the
promise, they already have discretion over these goods (Medina and Stokes, 2007; Wantchekon, 2003,
p. 422). This allows them to make costly investments already at campaigning time and thus increases
their credibility that they will follow up on the promise after the election. In the survey experiment I test
the following expectation:
H1: The incumbent is more credible in making local promises than the challenger.
1Details on the research design of the experiment are provided in Chapter 4.
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7.1.2 Local versus national promises
I have argue that candidates should be more strategic in making local promises at campaign rallies than
in promising national public goods. This is because making national promises at an additional rally
does not change the cost of providing the public good, which by definition is non-excludable (Cornes
and Sandler, 1999, pp. 8–9). To illustrate this point with an example, one of the opposition’s main
campaign promise was that it would provide free secondary education. The cost of implementing this
policy would have been the same had the NPP disseminated this promise at campaign rallies in twenty
or in eighty constituencies. However, had the party concentrated its campaign on promising the building
of new schools in particular constituencies, making this promise to yet another constituency would have
increased costs considerably.
Wantchekon (2003) suggested that promises of local club goods might be more credible to African
voters than those regarding national policies. This is because voters can more easily hold candidates
accountable for local than for national promises. The implementation of a local promise – like finding
out whether the promised clinic was built in a constituency – is straightforward. To evaluate to what
extend the government has followed up on the promise of increasing the nationwide doctors-patient ratio
is more difficult.2 Knowing that candidates might avoid making local promises in constituencies where
they do not intend to follow up on them (given that these candidates care about their reputation) might
increase the credibility of local promises among voters. If this is true, then respondents in the experiment
should consider a promise as more credible if it is framed as a local promise than if it is framed as a
national campaign promise. These considerations lead me to formulate the following expectation:
H2: Local promises are perceived by voters to be more credible than national promises.
7.1.3 Partisans versus independent or opposed voters
The credibility of campaign promises might not only hinge on voters’ ability to assess the consequences
of a promise, but also on general trust levels towards a particular candidate (Wantchekon, 2003). I have
argued in Chapters 5 and 6 that the reason why the presidential candidates in Ghana’s 2012 election
focused their campaign visits in constituencies where their potential supporters were concentrated and
the incumbent focused promises of local club goods in his strongholds, is because supporters perceive
campaign promises as more credible and are hence more likely to positively react to them. This is
consistent with research on the political psychology of voters that voters adopt favorable attitudes toward
candidates whose party they identify with (Bartels, 2002; Gerber, Huber and Washinton, 2010; Weisberg
2See Atchade, Wantchekon and McClendon (2012, p. 6) for similar examples.
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and Greene, 2003) and that voters exhibit greater levels of trust in government, if they identify with the
party who is in power (e.g. Keele, 2005). The relationship between partisanship and voters’ evaluation of
campaign messages remains under-researched for African election. Studies on the relationship between
ethnicity – which often functions as a proxy for partisanship – and trust in government suggests that
co-ethnics of the president tend to exhibit higher levels of trust in government than voters who are not
affiliated with the president’s ethnic group (Kuenzi, 2008).
I have further argued in Chapters 3 and 5 that the effect of partisanship on the evaluation of campaign
promises should be particularly pronounced with respect to local promises, as voters know that different
from public goods, the provision of local club goods can be used to reward or punish voting behavior in
a locality. Based on these considerations, I expect voters to judge promises as more likely to actually be
fulfilled if they are made by a candidate whose party they support and posit the following:
H3: Voters perceive local promises as more credible if they are attributed to the candidate
they are affiliated with, than if they have been made by another candidate.
7.2 The survey
The survey was conducted among a random sample of 447 respondents in 16 polling station areas and
four selected constituencies in Accra. Details on the sampling procedure of the experiment and the data
collection are provided in Chapter 4. Accra was chosen as a sampling site for two central reasons. First,
Accra’s population is very diverse in terms of their socio-economic background and in particular with re-
gard to ethnicity. Conducting the experiment in the capital hence allowed me to maximize the diversity
of respondents while operating with budget constraints that would not have allowed me to conduct a
country-wide experiment. Second, conducting the experiment in Accra allowed for a conservative test
of the hypothesis that incumbents are more credible with local campaign promises than challengers. As
I have described in Chapter 5, election data from Ghana’s 1992 to 2008 elections show that incumbent
governments tend to receive substantially lower support in the capital than in rest of the country, no
matter which party is in power (Harding, 2010, p. 3). Choosing Accra as a testing ground hence biased
the results against finding support for my hypothesis that incumbents are more credible in making local
promises than opposition candidates. In this survey, respondents were asked about the likelihood of the
two main presidential candidates fulfilling different kinds of campaign promises, if elected. In addition,
the questionnaire contained questions on demographic and political background information with sur-
vey items taken mainly from the Afrobarometer round 5 questionnaire. There were four experimental
conditions, as illustrated in Table 7.1. Each group of respondents that fell in one experimental condition
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was confronted with a set of three either local or national experimental promises assigned to either the
incumbent or the main opposition candidate. The local and the national promises differed only in their
framing, but not with regard to the content of the promise. Both candidates were assigned the same
kinds of promises. All promises covered infrastructure issues concerning the provision of electricity,
clean water and streetlights. The promises were designed to be compatible with both parties’ manifes-
tos (New Democratic Congress, 2012; New Patriotic Party, 2012).3 Details on the conceptualization of
local and national promises are provided in Chapters 2 and 4. The following is an example of a promise
framed as a national promise:
“Imagine President John Dramani Mahama, who is also the flagbarer of the NDC, had
made the following promise at a rally held in your constituency: ‘If I win this election, I
will improve the availability of clean water in all urban communities across the country by
connecting more households to pipe water and by building more treatment plants.’ Do you
think by the end of his term in 2016 he would have improved the availability of clean water
in all urban communities across the country?”
The local framing of the same promise is:
“If this constituency votes massively for me and my party in the presidential elections, I
will connect more households to pipe water in your constituency. Do you think by the
end of his term in 2016 he would have connected more households to pipe water in your
constituency?”
The answer options were “Yes definitely”; “Yes probably”; “No, probably not”; “No definitely not”.
The other two promises are referred to as the energy and the street lights promises. Exact wording of
these other two experimental promises is provided in Appendix A.2.
Table 7.1: Four experimental conditions in the survey
Condition Candidate Type of Promises
1 Incumbent National
2 Incumbent Local
3 Challenger National
4 Challenger Local
There are a number of advantages to the experimental design. First, it was designed explicitly to test
the credibility argument. Because the only difference between the two treatment groups was candidate
3I chose to identify the pledges the parties were making to their voters, during the 2012 election, from their manifestos,
because manifestos have shown to indeed affect policy outcomes (Ba¨ck, Debus and Dumont, 2011; Ba¨ck, Debus and Klu¨ver,
Forthcoming; Costello and Throup, 2008). They were hence likely to serve as a valuable source of information on the policies
parties were intending to pursue. In addition, the parties were making an effort to widely disseminate the pledges entailed in
their manifestos (Frimpong, 2012; Peace FM, 2012) so that if participants in the experiment were informed about the campaign
promises by the NDC and the NPP, this information was likely to be in line with the manifestos.
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identity, we can attribute any difference in credibility ranking to the identity of the candidate. The same
holds true for testing the effect of the local versus the national version of the promises. Despite these
advantages, this experimental method has limitations. First, the hypothetical nature of the experiment
could call into question its external validity. However, the setup of the experiment was designed to
maximize external validity. I conducted the experiment during ongoing election campaigns, with names
of real candidates. Furthermore, the formulation of the experimental promises was closely guided by
actual promises made in the parties’ manifestos. Additionally, I tested the external validity of the in-
ferences drawn from the credibility of local versus national promises through focus group interviews.
The evidence from the focus groups supports the “content validity” (Miller, 2011, pp. 89–90) of my
measurements of local and national promises.4
I should note that this experiment does not contain a control group, as experiments commonly due. In or-
der to make the treatments as realistic as possible, it was not feasible to design a campaign message that
neither contained a local or a national promise or a campaign message that was assigned to no candid-
ate. This is why the effects of candidate and voter identity and those of the local or the national message
the credibility of the promises should always be understood as the difference between one framing and
another.
7.3 Results
7.3.1 Balance between different treatment groups
I begin by assessing whether the randomized selection of respondents into the four different treatment
conditions was successful in identifying comparable groups of respondents. To do this, I conduct two-
sample tests of equal proportions of respondents with certain characteristics in the different treatment
groups. Differences across the groups are documented in terms of a wide range of observable character-
istics. In Figure 7.1, I contrast the group assigned local promises with that which was asked to evaluate
national promises. I compare the groups based on their basic demographic profiles (age, gender, school-
ing), a number of proxies reflecting their income-level, their exposure to news, ethnicity, their political
affiliation, and their degree of cosmopolitanism – namely how many of their relatives live outside their
constituency and the region of Greater Accra (GA) and how often they travel outside the constituency
and this region. The graph shows the proportion of respondents with certain characteristics in each of
the treatment groups. Because demographic and baseline political variables are unaffected by the in-
4The details on the nature of these focus groups and the finindgs with regard to the validity of the concepts tested are
presented in Chapter 4.
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tervention, any difference occurring between the different groups should be understood as a product of
chance. There are generally no differences between the group assigned local promises to that assigned
national promises that reach conventional levels of statistical significance.
In Figure 7.2, I compare groups of respondents who were asked to evaluate promises ascribed to the in-
cumbent to those who were presented promises attributed to the challenger. Again, there are generally no
differences between the two treatment groups. The exception is that there is a higher proportion of par-
tisans of the ruling party in the group which was assigned promises by the incumbent than in the group
that was asked to evaluate promises by the challenger. Likewise, the proportion of respondents who
report that they feel close to the main opposition party is slightly higher in the group which evaluated
promises assigned to the opposition candidate, than the group which was asked to assess the credibly of
promises ascribed to the incumbent. In addition, the proportion of people who report intending to vote
for the ruling and opposition party and that of people consuming news on a weekly basis also differs
across the treatment conditions. Such differences can arise, particularly when the sample size is small,
even if the protocol of randomized selection of respondents was strictly adhered to (Diekmann, 2005,
p. 299), which was the case in this survey experiment.5 In order to rule out the possibility that these
variables, for which balance has not been achieved, influence the estimates, I run a series of multivariate
ordered logit regressions, in which I include these variables as controls.
Figure 7.1: Proportion of respondents who were asked to evaluate local or national promises
5See Chapter 4 for a detailed description of the sampling process.
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Figure 7.2: Proportion of respondents who were asked to evaluate promises attributed to the
incumbent or the challenger
7.3.2 Estimation strategy
I run a series of ordered logistic regressions, testing the hypotheses on each of the three experimental
promises separately. The dependent variable for each promise takes on four values, ranging from “No,
definitely not” to “Yes, definitely.” To establish robustness, I also run a series of logistic regressions,
measuring the dependent variable as a binary concept. This dichotomous measure takes on the value 1
if respondents said that a promise was probably or definitely going to be fulfilled, and 0 otherwise. Such
a validation is adviced as respondents might have discriminated more between whether or not a promise
was going to be fulfilled, and less between the degree to which they thought a promise was going to be
followed up on, or not. As the results presented in Appendix D show, however, the findings produced
in this chapter are robust to the two specifications of the dependent variable. I cluster standard errors
on the polling station level, to account for spatial dependency. To test whether the incumbent is indeed
more credible than the challenger in making local promises, I estimate the following equation
Credibilityi = α+ βIncumbent+X
′
iδ + i, (7.1)
where Credibility is one of the experimental promises, ranging from one to four, Incumbent denotes a
dummy, taking on the value 1 if the promises were assigned to the incumbent and taking on the value of 0
if they were assigned to the challenger. The vectorX ′i represents a set of observable characteristics at the
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individual level for which balance was not achieved. The error term i denotes unobserved characteristics
that determine how credible a voter estimates the promises to be.
To asses whether local promises are more credible than national promises, I estimate the following
equation
Credibilityi = α+ βLocal +X
′
iδ + i, (7.2)
where Local denotes a dummy, taking on the value 1 if the promises were framed as local promises, and
taking on the value of 0 if they were framed as national promises.
To asses the effect of co-identity with a candidate on the credibility of promises, I estimate the following
equation
Credibilityi = α+ βPartisan+X
′
iδ + i, (7.3)
where Partisan denotes a dummy, taking on the value 1 if the respondent is a partisan of the respective
candidate’s party and 0 otherwise.
7.3.3 Is the incumbent more credible than the challenger?
The analysis of the allocation of promises of local projects across electoral constituencies in Ghana,
presented in Chapter 3, revealed that the incumbent much more frequently made use of local promises
than the challenger. I argued that this was due to a credibility advantage the incumbent has over the
challenger in promising such local club goods. I now turn to the results of the survey experiment,
which directly tests this claim. Table 7.2 reports the results. In line with my expectation, the sign of
the coefficient for the dummy Incumbent is positive, indicating that the same promises are regarded as
more likely to be implemented by the respondents if they are ascribed to the incumbent than if they are
assigned to the challenger. This is true for all three experimental promises, but the effect only attains
statistical significance for the energy promise and only at the 10-%-level (p-value of 0.085). These
findings are robust to estimating the same models with the dependent variable being binary, as reported
in Table D.1 in Appendix D.
As the interpretation of raw coefficients in non-linear models is not straightforward, I illustrate the effect
of candidate identity on the assessment of the likelihood that a promise is being fulfilled by graphing
predicted probabilities. The predicted probabilities of respondents saying that the energy promise will
“Yes definitely,” “Yes probably,” “No, probably not,” or “No definitely not” be fulfilled are presented
in Figure 7.3. In line with the hypothesis that promises are evaluated as more credible when made by
the incumbent, the probability that a respondent says that he or she thinks that a promise will “Yes,
definitely” be fulfilled is higher when the promise is ascribed to the incumbent, than if the same promise
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is ascribed to the challenger.
Conversely, the probability of a respondent saying that no, a local promise will definitely or probably
not be fulfilled is higher when assigned to the challenger, than to the incumbent. Furthermore, the most
frequent category respondents chose when evaluating the promise assigned to the incumbent is “Yes,
definitely,” whereas respondents evaluating the same promise ascribed to the challenger were as likely
to choose this category, as the category “Yes, probably.” However, these differences are statistically not
significant, as the overlapping confidence intervals indicate.
Table 7.2: Effect of incumbent status on the credibility of campaign promises
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Energy promise Water promise Street lights promise Interaction
Incumbent 0.527+ 0.360 0.232 0.228
(1.72) (1.20) (0.85) (1.21)
News 0.0905 0.0907 0.123 0.0486
(1.33) (1.26) (1.40) (1.38)
Education 0.0126 0.00369 −0.00261 −0.00990
(0.19) (0.07) (−0.04) (−0.28)
NPP partisan 0.978+ 0.687 0.694∗∗∗ 0.614∗∗∗
(1.81) (1.58) (2.69) (2.58)
NDC partisan 0.101 0.159 0.0860 0.168
(0.30) (0.49) (0.25) (0.72)
Local −0.104
(−0.35)
Incumbent*Local 0.192
(0.49)
cut1 −0.587 −0.601 −1.039∗∗ −1.315∗∗∗
(−1.34) (−1.08) (−2.43) (−4.67)
cut2 0.813+ 0.540 −0.0524 0.124
(1.84) (1.05) (−0.13) (0.52)
cut3 2.000∗∗∗ 1.746∗∗∗ 1.280∗∗∗ 1.310∗∗∗
(3.71) (2.93) (3.00) (5.26)
Wald χ2 10.03+ 5.20 14.39∗∗ 22.18∗∗∗
Pseudo R2 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.01
Pseudo Log-Likelihood −244.87 −248.66 −222.67 −524.31
Number of clusters 15 15 15 16
Number of observations 188 189 191 396
Models 1-3 use the local framing of the promises as the dependent variable
Model 4 uses local and national versions of the energy promise as the dependent variable
Values are coefficients with t-statistics in parenthesis
+ p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
It is only the difference in the probability that a respondent will choose the highest compared to the
lowest category of credibility of the energy promise, which attains statistical significance. If the promise
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is assigned to the incumbent, a respondent has a probability of more than 34% (+/-.06) to say that yes,
the promise will be fulfilled and will only choose to say that a promise will definitely not be fulfilled at
a probability of just 13% (+/-.02).
The most plausible explanation for why the effect of candidate identity only reaches conventional levels
of statistical significance for the energy promise, but not for the clean water and the street lights promise,
lies in the specific salience of the provision of energy in the country during the data collection. In
September 2012, three months prior to the election, the Ghana Grid Company began a nationwide “load-
shedding,” which is a deliberate measure to cut power in a particular neighborhood. The reason for this
power curtailment was that a damage to the West African Gas Pipeline in Togo and the shutting down
one of Ghana’s thermal plants for routine maintenance had caused a severe shortfall of power production.
Power was cut at least once a week in each of the different neighborhoods of the city of Accra (Quartey,
2012). Load-shedding was still under way in November 2012 during the data collection. It is thus a
plausible assumption that the issue of load-shedding was of particular salience to respondents in the
survey, which might have caused them to choose their answers particularly carefully.
Figure 7.3: Effect of candidate status on the credibility of the energy promise
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Respondents might not have discriminated as clearly between the different answer options of the
other two experimental promises, because they were not of the same salience to them as the energy
promise.
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Among the controls, only the frequency with which respondents consume news, and whether or not they
are NPP partisans have a statistically significant effect on the credibility of campaign promises. NPP
partisans seem to find the campaign promises more likely to be fulfilled than respondents who do not feel
close to the opposition, independent of whether a promise is ascribed to the incumbent or the challenger.
This finding requires further investigation in subsequent replications of this experiment.
In order to see whether the credibility advantage of the incumbent is particular to local promises, I also
estimated an interaction between incumbency status and the framing of a promise on the credibility of
the energy promise. The positive sign of the coefficient of the interaction term is positive, suggesting that
the incumbent’s credibility advantage might be stronger in case of a local promise. However, the effect
does not attain statistical significance. A graphical inspection of effect confirms that the difference is not
statistically significant, which suggests that the incumbent is more credible than challenger with both
types of promises (not shown). This is in line with Down’s argument (Downs, 1957) that incumbents
might be more credible in proposing any type of policy. Evaluating the credibility of any proposition by
incumbents might be easier for voters, because they have information about the policies the incumbent
has implemented in the past (ibid.). An incumbent might therefore be more credible with any promise
than opposition candidates, provided that he has shown to adhere to his promises. To the contrary, voters
might be less certain about anticipating the credibility of promises by opposition candidates, as these
candidates might have never been in government (ibid.).
Another interesting finding is that the more frequently respondents read or listen to the news, the more
likely they are to believe that these experimental campaign promises will be fulfilled.6 A plausible
interpretation for this effect is that the more often these respondents consumed news, the better they
were informed about the candidate’s campaign platforms. All experimental promises were designed to
be in line with the parties’ manifestos and the better informed respondents were, the more likely they
were to know this. Aragones and Palfrey (2007, p. 853) argue that voters evaluate campaign promises
in the light of prior information and that they are more likely to believe a promise if it is in line with
positions candidates usually take; what they term “incentive-compatibility.” This might mean for the
present analysis, that the more informed voters are about the parties’ manifestos and the policies they
tend to propose, the more likely they recognized that the experimental promises were in line with the
information candidates usually disseminate. This could account for why more informed respondents
6The phrasing of the item measuring news consumption is taken from the Afrobarometer round 4 questionnaire and reads
as follows: How often do you get news from the following sources (Radio, newspapers, TV, internet)? The answer options
are: Every day; a few times a week; a few times a month; less than once a month; never (Afrobarometer Network, 2011a). I
use an index combining radio, newspaper, and internet consumption which ranges from 1 to 13. I exclude the item on news
consumption on TV, because including this item would decrease the internal consistency of the measure, reflected in a lower
Cronbach’s alpha. See Cronbach (1951) on Cronbach’s alpha as a measure of internal consistency of an index.
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regarded the promises as more credible.
The findings on the credibility of promises attributed to the incumbent compared to those assigned to
the challenger, provide support for Hypothesis 1.
7.3.4 Are local promises more credible than national promises?
Past research has assumed that the fulfillment of local promises is easier to observe than that of national
campaign promises (Atchade, Wantchekon and McClendon, 2012, p. 6).7 Based on this assumption
and on experimental evidence from Benin, which showed that a local campaign message was more
effective in delivering votes for candidates (Wantchekon, 2003), I argued that voters might perceive
local promises as more likely to be fulfilled. This is because candidates might avoid making promises
of local club goods in instances where they do not intend to follow up on them, as it is easy for voters to
find out whether a local promise was fulfilled or not. For the present experiment this implies that local
promises are generally judged as more credible than national promises.
However, there is a caveat in order. The survey was conducted in Accra, not in the rural countryside.
Past research has argued that local club goods might actually take on the nature of public goods in urban
centers (Ichino and Nathan, 2013, p. 344). This is because the two defining features of local club goods,
which I have described in Chapter 2, might not characterize local club goods provided in cities. First,
the main beneficiaries might not be those voters living within the boundaries of a constituency, as city
dwellers move daily from constituency to constituency. City dwellers might benefit nearly as much from
local infrastructure, like schools or clinics, in neighboring constituencies as from those located in their
constituency (Ichino and Nathan, 2013). Second, if this is the case, then the targeting of club goods to
particular constituencies to win their votes is not going to be as effective, as on the countryside, where
constituencies are more geographically segregated from each other (Kramon 2013a, p. 51). A voter
living in a large city, might know that not only the voters in her constituency would profit from a local
promise, but also those living in neighboring constituencies. She will feel less pressured to vote for the
candidate who is making the promise, because it is unlikely that the candidate will renege on the promise
if he does not attain the desired number of votes in her constituency. This is because denying the benefit
to one constituency will also punish voters living in the neighboring constituencies where the candidate
might have gained more support.8 Based on these considerations, respondents in Accra might not have
understood differences between the local and the national promises.
The results of the quantitative analysis are reported in Table 7.3. The coefficient for the dummy variable
7See also Harding and Stasavage (2014, p. 232) on a similar argument.
8This in line with the patterns of ethnic voting Ichino and Nathan (2013) have detected in Ghana, which vary across rural
and urban areas.
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Local takes on a positive sign in all three models, but the effect is not only minimal in size, but also
does not reach conventional levels of statistical significance in any of the models. The results are the
same if I use the binary dependent variable, as Table D.2 in Appendix D reports. Figure 7.4 graphically
illustrates the credibility of the energy promise, depending on its framing. The graph shows that the
predicted probabilities for each category of the dependent variable do not differ between the local and
the national version of the promise.
Table 7.3: Effect of framing of the promises on their credibility
(1) (2) (3)
Energy promise Water promise Street lights promise
Local 0.00822 0.0624 0.101
(0.04) (0.31) (0.64)
News 0.0552 0.0830+ 0.117∗∗
(1.51) (1.77) (2.11)
Education −0.0175 −0.0300 −0.0468
(−0.51) (−0.67) (−1.04)
NPP partisan 0.555∗∗ 0.254 0.229+
(2.46) (1.05) (1.90)
NDC partisan 0.217 0.169 0.0821
(0.89) (0.72) (0.47)
cut1 −1.406∗∗∗ −1.127∗∗∗ −1.476∗∗∗
(−5.19) (−4.46) (−5.43)
cut2 0.0219 0.0505 −0.518+
(0.10) (0.17) (−1.87)
cut3 1.199∗∗∗ 1.223∗∗∗ 0.804∗∗∗
(5.33) (3.87) (3.06)
Wald χ2 8.56 5.92 10.75+
Pseudo R2 0.01 0.01 0.01
Pseudo Log-Likelihood −525.87 −531.45 −476.49
Number of clusters 16 16 16
Number of observations 396 397 397
Values are coefficients with t-statistics in parenthesis
+ p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Furthermore, respondents who were presented a local promise and those who were asked to evaluate the
national promise on the curtailment of energy both chose the same category the most often, that is that
the promise will “Yes, definitely” be fulfilled. The results from the experiment thus indicate that local
promises are not per se more credible than national promises and do not provide support for Hypothesis
2. The qualitative evidence gained in focus group interviews can help to interpret this finding. The res-
ults, presented in Chapter 4, validate my conceptualization of local and national promises. The majority
of the participants of the focus groups thought that the main beneficiaries in case of local promises would
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be the inhabitants living in one constituency. Conversely, they thought that the beneficiaries of national
promises would go beyond one constituency. Further in line with my coding of promises as local and
national, no participant considered it likely that a candidate would resort to political punishment in the
case of national promises, but many thought it was possible that this could happen in the case of local
promises.
However, while punishment was considered more likely in case of local than in case of national prom-
ises, the majority of participants did not consider it likely that the winner of the election would punish
a constituency, even when they were asked to evaluate local promises. They participants gave several
reasons for this. One of the promises that I asked them to talk about had been made by the incumbent in
the area where he is from. Some participants argued that no matter how the inhabitants of the particular
constituency voted, the president was going to fulfill the promise, because it was his hometown.9Another
argument brought forward was that as the candidate had made the promise in public and to a large audi-
ence, he was obliged to stick to it.10 Others thought it would not be rational to punish a constituency,
because the candidate should consider the next election and be interested in gaining votes in this same
constituency in the future.11
Talking about this point, one participant emphasized that candidates should be particularly reluctant to
punish swing constituencies.12 Another participant argued that punishment was a risky strategy in gen-
eral, as it would hurt a president’s reputation of catering to all Ghanaians.13 Finally, those who had
considered the beneficiaries of a local club good to exceed the boundaries of a single constituency, ar-
gued that political punishment was unlikely, as it would not only harm one constituency, but potentially
also the beneficiaries living in other areas who might have actually supported the candidate.14
9“He’d still do it. It’s his hometown” (Focus group Anyaa Sowotuom, December 22, 2012). “I also hold the same view:
that he will fulfill his promise because it is his home town”(Focus group Anyaa Sowotuom, December 22, 2012).
10“He has to do it because this is a promise he made and everyone is aware of it so he should make sure he does it”(Focus
group Anyaa Sowotuom, December 22, 2012).
11“Yes he will if he has the resources. He will definitely build it because he knows that even though they did not vote for
him, if he builds it, it will enhance his chances of winning more votes the next time” (Focus group Ayawaso Central, December
21, 2012). “I think that he will work for them so they will vote for him next time” (Focus group Ayawaso East, December 22,
2012).
12“As I said before, normally those constituencies that are labeled for a particular party, those are the places the parties
in power tend to punish them if they are not for them. But if it’s a swing constituency, they tend to develop there either
ways because they want their votes in the next election but I don’t know about Amasaman. [...] if Amasaman is a swing
[constituency], then I think they will still develop the place”(Focus group Ayawaso West-Woguon, Decmber 21, 2012)
13“It is a national cake. If you want to be a statesman, sometimes you have to be very careful about the way you speak.
When you utter any word, you will have to by it. So if you say the people of Kasoa don’t have a school and you know it’s
a problem there, you have to do it. You said it yourself whilst they did not complain. You promised them you will build the
school for the inhabitants and they didn’t trust whether you can do it or not. But after the whole national election, you have
won, then as a president, you know where the problem is. You have to make sure you fulfill your promise so they know that
you are a statesman” (Focus group Ayawaso Central, December 21, 2012).
14“If he wins the election and fulfills his promise, it would benefit everyone. This is because people can come from Kumasi
or Accra to buy things they need. So if he can do it, it will benefit all of us. He can continue to do it for them because if he does
so it will help everyone” (Focus group Anyaa Sowotuom, December 22, 2012). “I really disagree. It wasn’t a contract. It was
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Figure 7.4: Effect of framing on the credibility of the energy promise
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There are two reasons why the participants in the survey experiment seem to have regarded local
and national promises as equally credible as the focus groups suggest. First, the participants of the
focus groups seemed to be rather optimistic of candidates’ intentions to fulfill any kind of promise,
after it had been made in public. This tendency might be somewhat overrated by the responses given
by participants, however, as they might reflect not opinions, but rather wishful thinking. Some of the
following statements suggest that some participants were expressing what they thought was morally
right for a candidate to do, rather than a rational assessment of how candidates would likely behave, as
the following statements illustrate:15
an appeal for vote. In their manifesto, you said they are going to build 250 schools. They haven’t mentioned the areas that they
will build those schools at but we are assuming that most of them will be in the Northern Region because they are deprived.
Here is the case that he has specifically mentioned one of the places that he is planning to build those schools. It is a national
project and we don’t know where he is building those schools at. And he has come at a rally and he has mentioned Kasoa as
one of them so you can mark Kasoa. So me, I think even though he lost at Kasoa, but because it’s a national project, he can’t
exclude Kasoa”(Focus group Ayawaso West-Woguon, December 21, 2012). “If Nabdam hadn’t voted for him and he wins,
will they still get the new districts because it’s something for the whole country. They are splitting districts that are too big.
You can’t say you won’t do it for Nabdam because they didn’t vote for you” (Focus group Ayawaso West-Woguon, December
21, 2012).
15“You have promised and as a father of a nation, you have to fulfill it. You can’t say part of the people didn’t vote for me so
I will fulfill the promises of those who voted for me. If you have that attitude, you can’t stay for that four years” (Focus group
Ayawaso Central, December 21, 2012). “He will build it at Kasoa because he promised to build the school at Kasoa. Though
he has lost there, he promised them, so he will do it for them” (Focus group Ayawaso East, December 22, 2012). “I think they
will benefit from it because Ghana is not only for one person. Ghana is for all of us so there is no need for one person to say
that this place has not voted for me so when am in power, I will not help this district because Ghana is for all of us. So I think
if he is power and Amasaman did not vote for him, he will still fulfill his promise” (Focus group Ayawaso East, December 22,
2012).
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“Yes they will still benefit from the promise because he has promised them and he is sup-
posed to fulfill his promise, so they will benefit from it.”16
“Just that because they have just promised them, whether he loses the vote there or not,
because he has just promised them, they can benefit.”17
Second, the participants of the focus group interviews exhibited a tendency to sometimes understand
local promises as national promises. This is quite astonishing as in electoral contexts where provisions
of particularistic benefits are wide-spread (e.g. Chandra, 2004; Kramon and Posner, 2013) and where
voters’ evaluation of office-holders will hence most likely be that redistribution hardly follows a need-
based logic, and that parties favor their political support base. In such contexts, we might rather expect
voters to understand national promises as local, than the other way around. To illustrate this with an
example, a politician might promise to increase the teacher-student ratio across the country, in order to
ameliorate the quality of education. He might specify some objective criteria of how many extra teach-
ers schools will receive. Based on the definitions presented in Chapter 2, this would be programmatic
or national campaign promise (Stokes, Nazareno and Brusco, 2013, p. 7-10).18 However, in contexts
where the distribution of resources is perceived to be used to cater to one’s supporters or to one’s ethnic
group (see Kasara, 2007), voters might – upon hearing this promise – understand that the politician will
create many more additional jobs for teachers in the schools in his strongholds.19 This does not seem to
be the case in Ghana, or at least among the urban population of Accra. The most plausible explanation
for this is that, as the analysis of campaign speeches has shown, candidates make many more national
promises at public rallies than local promises. Voters hence hear much more often about candidates’
national, than local promises. This might make national promises more incentive-compatible with what
candidates typically say in public, and increase their credibility. Overall, the focus group evidence hence
suggests that part of the reason why respondents in the experiment did not discriminate between local
and national promises is that they sometimes might have understood a local promise as a national prom-
ise. However, as participants in the interviews did in general differentiate between local and national
promises in the same way as I conceptualized these promises, this cannot alone account for the non-
finding of the survey experiment.
Rather, it is plausible that the reason why respondents did not consider local promises as more or less
likely to be fulfilled than national promises in the experiment, is due to the fact that the experiment was
conducted in Accra. First, as said above, in a city like Accra, local club goods might essentially function
16Focus group Ayawaso East, December 22, 2012.
17Focus group Ayawaso East, December 22, 2012.
18See Chapter 2 for details on local and national promises and programmatic and political modes of distribution.
19I thank Eric Kramon for drawing my attention to this point.
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as national or public goods to all inhabitants of the city, as these urban dwellers move across constitu-
ency borders constantly (Ichino and Nathan, 2013, p. 344, see also Velasquez, 2013). Second, the reason
why respondents considered any promise as quite credible, be it one that was framed as a local or as a
national promise, might be that they know that Accra is of strategic importance for any candidate. The
experimental promises all referred to infrastructure development. It might be of particular importance
to the government to develop the infrastructure in the capital, in order to foster the industrial and the
business sector, which is concentrated here, but also because these projects are particularly visible in
the capital, as media attention is likely to be higher here than on the rural countryside. Furthermore,
according to the ‘urban bias’ thesis (Lipton, 1977), governments might be particularly careful to avoid
dissent among urban populations, who are more essential to their political survival, than rural popula-
tions. Bates’ seminal work on the political economy of rural Africa has indicated that such an urban bias
was particularly pronounced in Sub-Saharan Africa under autocratic rule (Bates, 1981). While recent
research suggests that this urban bias has been alleviated since the (re-)introduction of multiparty polit-
ics (Harding, 2010; Stasavage, 2005), the perception of voters might still be that the support of urban
dwellers, and particularly those living in the capital is crucial to the government, and that politicians will
avoid making promises here, which they do not intent on fulfilling:
“Somewhere like Greater Accra, he was talking of Ledzokuku and its being a swing region
(sic!) [participant means constituency, not region], no matter what happens, when you
get votes here or not, you will have to develop there. This is the capital. Even if he [the
incumbent] lost [here] but won the national election, he will have to develop that place.”20
Participant 1: “I quite remember when that policy was brought about. It was for the people
in the Northern Region and for girl child education.[...] It was just that the nation looked
at Ashanti Region who are (sic!) into cocoa. The government gave subsidies for cocoa
farmers to sponsor their fertilizers. They looked at the Northern Region and saw they don’t
have too many good schools. [...]”
Participant 2: “You were saying government subsidized the fertilizers [in the South]. Have
you ever heard government subsidizing cereals and tuber for the Northerners?”
Participant 1: “I have never heard of it.
Participant 2: So it means they are deprived. So in actual fact, the southern sector is closer
to the government. So the farther you go from Accra, the more deprived you are.”21
The fact that urban dwellers in the capital of Ghana perceive election promises as generally quite credible
might account for why the survey experiment did not provide any support for the hypothesis that local
promises are more credible than national promises. In the following section, I turn to the results of the
survey experiment, concerning the effect of partisanship on the credibility of campaign promises.
20Focus group Ayawaso West-Woguon, December, 21, 2012.
21Focus group Ayawaso West-Woguon, December 21, 2012.
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7.3.5 Do partisans regard promises by candidates of the party they feel close to as more
credible ?
I have argued that the reason why the incumbent allocated so many of his local promises in his strong-
holds is that he is more credible here than elsewhere. To assess whether partisans do indeed perceive the
same campaign promises to be more likely to be implemented if they are made by the candidate whose
party they feel close to, than by another candidate, I estimated a series of models, reported in Table 7.4.
I coded respondents as partisans if they reported to feel close to the party of the candidate making the
promise.22 In line with my expectation, partisanship has a strong and statistically significant effect on
the credibility of all three experimental campaign promises. According to the model, reported in column
1, in Table 7.4, the probability that a partisan says that he or she thinks that the energy promise will “Yes,
definitely” be fulfilled is 66.5% (+/-.05). It is only 25.1% (+/-.03) for a respondent who does not identify
with the candidate’s party. This means that partisans are nearly three times as likely to think that the
promise will definitely be fulfilled than other respondents.23 Conversely, the likelihood that a partisan
will say that the promise will definitely not be fulfilled is as low as 3.5% (+/-0.00). Non-partisans on
the other hand are much more likely to think that the promise will definitely or probably not be fulfilled
(over 17% and over 25%, respectively).
While the presented findings indicate that partisans do indeed regard promises assigned to candidates
whose party they feel close as much more credible than other respondents, this is comparing partisans
to both undecided and opposed voters. I further disaggregate non-partisans in undecided voters, those
who reported to not feel close to any party, and voters who said they felt close to the candidate whose
promise they were not presented with. Figure 7.5 graphs the results for the energy promise. It shows that
undecided voters regard promises as substantially less likely to be fulfilled than partisans, even though
they regard promises by a candidate as more likely to be fulfilled than supporters of the main competitor
of the candidate whose promise is being evaluated, lending support to Hypothesis 3. The results are the
same for the other two experimental promises (not shown). This supports the assumption made in my
argument that opposed voters are least receptive to campaign promises, followed by undecided voters
and that supporters are most likely to believe a campaign promise made by the candidate whose party
they are affiliated with.
22The phrasing of these survey items is taken from the Afrobarometer round 4 questionnaire. Respondents were asked “Do
you feel close to any particular party?” and if they responded yes, then the second question read “Which party is that?”.
23All other characteristics are held at their median so that this is calculated for a respondent who has completed secondary
school, is not an ethnic partisan and who has a level of news consumption of 8 on a 13-point scale, higher values indicating
more regular news consumption.
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Table 7.4: Effect of co-identity with the candidates on the credibility of their promises
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Energy promise Water promise Street lights promise Interaction
Partisan 2.709∗∗∗ 2.177∗∗∗ 2.245∗∗∗ 2.566∗∗∗
(11.16) (7.32) (8.54) (7.79)
Ethnic partisan −0.0820 −0.399∗∗ −0.274∗∗ −0.0736
(−0.48) (−2.09) (−1.97) (−0.44)
Independent 1.028∗∗∗ 0.776∗∗∗ 0.961∗∗∗ 0.823∗∗∗
(4.51) (3.48) (4.41) (3.03)
News −0.0130 0.0316 0.0700 −0.00864
(−0.34) (0.69) (1.24) (−0.22)
Education 0.0234 −0.00854 −0.0141 0.0227
(0.57) (−0.16) (−0.30) (0.54)
Local −0.476
(−1.61)
Partisan*Local 0.351
(0.78)
Independent*Local 0.465
(0.92)
cut1 −1.043∗∗∗ −1.025∗∗∗ −1.136∗∗∗ −1.231∗∗∗
(−3.18) (−3.37) (−4.02) (−3.77)
cut2 0.607+ 0.267 −0.0931 0.431
(1.83) (0.73) (−0.34) (1.27)
cut3 2.121∗∗∗ 1.669∗∗∗ 1.452∗∗∗ 1.949∗∗∗
(5.95) (4.56) (5.11) (5.15)
Wald χ2 205.17∗∗∗ 57.13∗∗∗ 84.28∗∗∗ 417.94∗∗∗
Pseudo R2 0.12 0.08 0.09 0.12
Pseudo Log-Likelihood −493.59 −514.22 −462.90 −492.30
Number of clusters 16 16 16 16
Number of observations 416 417 418 416
Values are coefficients with t-statistics in parenthesis
Model 4 is uses the energy promise as the dependent variable
+ p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Contrary to my expectations, however, the effect of partisanship is not stronger for local than for national
promises, as the non-significant coefficient of the interaction term between the framing of the promise
and whether or not a respondent was a candidate’s partisan, reported in column 4, in table 7.4 suggests.
This is in line with the results described above that the participants of the experiment do not seem to
have considered local promises as more credible than national promises. A graphical inspection of the
interaction confirms that there is no difference (not shown). All findings with regard to the effect of
co-identity with a candidate are robust to using the binary conceptualization of the dependent variable.24
24See Table D.3 in Appendix D.
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Figure 7.5: Effect of voter identity on the credibility of the energy promise
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I also run robustness checks using ethnic identity as a proxy for partisanship. I code Ewes, Northern-
ers, and Ga as ethnic partisans of the incumbent and Akyems and Ashanti as co-ethnics of the challenger,
in line with previous codings of ethnic partisans in Chapters 5 and 6.25 While the incumbent concen-
trated rally events and local promises in constituencies where these ethnic partisans were concentrated,
ethnic partisans did not seem to regard campaign promises as more likely to be fulfilled than other re-
spondents. To the contrary, the negative sign of the coefficient of Ethnic partisan suggests that they
were less likely to believe promises ascribed to the candidate whose party their ethnic groups tends
to support. The most plausible explanation for this observation lies again in the location of the data
collection. Afrobarometer evidence suggests that people tend to trust more in co-ethnics than in non-
coethnics (Kuenzi, 2008) and experimental evidence shows that they are also more likely to cooperate
with members of their own ethnic group than with others (Habyarimana et al., 2009). However, Foddy
and Yamagishi (2009) also show in various experiments on co-identity and trust that participants only
expect to be favored by another player whose identity they share, if they are told that this other player
knows about their identity. Transferring this to voters’ perception of how likely a candidate will follow
up on a campaign promise, this might mean that voters are only going to trust the co-ethnic candidate
25In the experiment I also coded Akyems as co-ethnics of the challenger, not only NPP’s traditional support base of the
Ashanti. This was done as the candidate, Nana Akufo-Addo, is an Akyem and not an Ashanti. A shared identity with
the candidate and not only with the party might affect the credibility of the candidates’ campaign promises among these
respondents so that I also coded members of the Akyem group as co-ethnics in the experiment.
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more than the non-co-ethnic candidate if they think that they can be identified as in-group members by
the candidate. If they cannot be identified as being ethnic partisans, then the candidate cannot favor them
or reward them for past support and hence they do not expect to receive more benefits from the co-ethnic
candidate than from another candidate. This idea is supported by patterns of ethnic voting in Ghana’s
2008 elections (Ichino and Nathan, 2013). Ichino and Nathan (2013) show that voters tend to vote for a
candidate who belongs to the dominant ethnic group in the locality they live in, no matter whether these
voters themselves are of this dominant ethnic group, or whether they belong to an ethnic minority.26
The rationale put forward by Ichino and Nathan (2013) is that voters have an incentive to vote with the
dominant ethnic group, because they anticipate that candidates reward co-ethnics for support at the polls
with the provision of public goods. The more support these candidates receive, the more benefits they
will deliver to a locality (ibid.). As at the level of the community, no voter can be excluded from a public
local good, also those of a different ethnic group than the candidate will benefit from it. This means, that
all voters have an incentive to drive up the vote share of the candidate from the dominant ethnic group
in the locality. In the sample of the present study there are constituencies where one ethnic group dom-
inated, as is often the case in rural constituencies. Participants in the experiment might hence consider
it unlikely that they can be identified as ethnic partisans of the candidates. These considerations serve
to explain why there is no positive effect of ethnic partisanship on the credibility of these experimental
promises.
However, why ethnic partisans regarded campaign promises as less credible than others, requires fur-
ther investigation. One possible explanation is that these co-ethnic voters are better informed about the
extend to which candidates engage in ethnic favoritism (e.g. Kasara, 2007) toward their group than oth-
ers. Because they might be aware that these candidates tend to cater to the constituencies where ethnic
partisans are concentrated – which is not in Accra – they might consider it unlikely that the candidates
fulfill promises elsewhere. The present study advances our knowledge on the effectiveness of campaign
promises, particularly those involving targeted transfers. It shows that the credibility of campaign prom-
ises hinges both on candidate and voter identity. Furthermore, it helps to identify one of the mechanisms
that makes promises effective; that is credibility. However, a limitation of the findings is that the sample
is exclusively urban. Future research should improve on this by conducting similar analyses on the
countryside. Sampling various polling stations in four purposively selected constituencies in Accra had
the advantage of achieving great variation on ethnic backgrounds and various socio-demographic vari-
ables that might influence voters’ perception of the credibility of the experimental campaign promises.
26See also Carlson (2010, p. 15) who finds in a voting experiment in Uganda that the strongest predictor of ethnic voting is
whether somebody is part of the dominant ethnic group in the locality she lives in.
143
However, while I was able to produce a sample of great variety in terms of these characteristics of re-
spondents, they all share one important trait, which is that they are urban dwellers, living in the capital.
As I have suggested, the responsiveness of voters to local versus national promises and the credibility
of promises made by co-ethnic candidates might be different in the countryside, future research should
replicate the study on a a rural sample, which I was unable to do in the context of this dissertation, due
to time and budget constraints. Follow-up studies should, however, go beyond a mere replication of the
results as the same treatments in different contexts can produce quite different results. Rather, it would
be advisable to combine a replication of the treatments of the present experiment with a more profound
investigation of the causal mechanisms at work (Wantchekon and De la O, Ana L., 2011, pp. 292–293).
Subsequent studies could, for example, identify why partisans regard promises as more credible if they
are made by candidates whose parties they feel close to. They could investigate whether this is because
the candidates they support have catered to them in the past and hence have a reputation among support-
ers of keeping campaign promises or whether this is independent of the expected future performance of
candidates and simply an outcome of a social identity formation (see Weisberg and Greene, 2003).
7.4 Summary
This chapter tested one of the central assumptions made in past research on clientelistic targeting: Voters
vary in their responsiveness to promises of particularistic benefits and this variation is grounded in the
credibility of such campaign appeals (Wantchekon, 2003). The evidence from the survey experiment
conducted during Ghana’s 2012 election campaigns provides support for the argument that incumbents
are more credible in promising particularistic benefits (to voters) than challengers (see Medina and
Stokes, 2007; Wantchekon, 2003). I have provided qualitative evidence to underscore that this finding is
not an artifact of a difference between these two particular candidates, but that they are likely grounded
in one of them having been the incumbent and the other the challenger. As the results from one single
experiment can never be considered conclusive, however, these findings need to be replicated in other
elections in Ghana, or elsewhere to further establish external validity.
The evidence presented in this chapter does not provide support for another argument made in some
studies on clientelism, which is that promises of local club goods are more credible to voters than
promises of broad-based national promises (Atchade, Wantchekon and McClendon, 2012; Wantchekon,
2003). Further tests of this argument are needed to establish whether the responsiveness of voters to
local compared to national public goods has been over-estimated, or whether Ghana differs from other
African countries. As Ghanaian parties have clearer programmatic profiles than parties in most other
144
African countries, the consequences of promises concerning macro-economic policies might be easier
for them to anticipate. This might make national promises more credible to them than to African voters
in countries where parties’ profiles are less clear-cut.
The results of this survey experiment resonate with findings from the literature on the political psy-
chology of voters. They underscore the argument that partisanship is an important filter of campaign
information (Hagner & Rieselbach 1978, Kraus et al. 1962, LeDuc & Price 1979, Lang & Lang 1962,
Sigelman & Sigelman 1984) and that voters evaluate campaign messages made by candidates whose
party they are affiliated with much more positively, than those by other candidates (Iyengar & Kinder
1987, Popkin 1991, Zaller 1992).27 These findings challenge the argument in favor of a persuasion or
vote-buying logic that it would be most rational for parties to focus their campaign appeals on attracting
new voters (Cox and McCubbins, 1986; Lindbeck and Weibull, 1987; Stokes, 2005; Stokes, Nazareno
and Brusco, 2013).
The chapter’s findings provide support for one of the central arguments I have proposed for why parties
campaign so much among their own supporters. The fact that candidates can more credibly make cam-
paign promises to their own partisans can serve as an explanation for why the main candidates in Ghana’s
2012 elections spent so much time travelling to constituencies where likely sympathizers of their party
were concentrated and why the incumbent focused local promises mainly in these same areas.
The evidence gained in the survey experiment, furthermore, underpins the plausibility of a central in-
terpretation I have made with respect to the use of local promises in these campaigns in Ghana. The
incumbent seems to have more frequently made use of local promises, because he was regarded as more
credible by the voters than the challenger.
27This literature is reviewed in more detail in Chapter 2.
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Chapter 8
Clientelism and voter intimidation
The previous chapters have analyzed campaign rallies and campaign promises, and have provided evid-
ence that these strategies are applied by candidates to mobilize turnout among likely supporters. The
two explanations advanced in the theoretical argument that I have tested so far are first, that parties cater
to their supporters if these supporters are unlikely to turn out, and second, that parties campaign among
their partisans, because they are much easier to influence than other voters, as they trust more in what
the candidates promise them. The present chapter tests the third explanation, formulated in my theory;
namely that parties concentrate benefits on their supporters, because they use violence and intimidation
to demobilize voters, whose support would be too costly to gain. In addition to testing this theoretical
proposition, this chapter provides yet another test of whether benefits are used by parties to mobilize
their supporters, studying the strategic allocation of individual benefits.
Observers of elections in young democracies have contended that the use of clientelism is often only one
strategy on parties’ “menu of manipulation” (Schedler, 2002). Anecdotal evidence from Kenya’s 2007
(Gutie´rrez-Romero, 2014), Nigeria’s 2007 (Bratton, 2008), Uganda’s 2011 (Common Wealth Observer
Group, 2011) or Zimbabwe’s 2008 elections illustrate how parties combine the manipulation of elect-
oral outcomes through the distribution of gifts to some, with the intimidation of other voters. The mix
of clientelism and violence by the ruling ZANU-PF in Zimbabwe’s 2008 elections serves as a case in
point. On the one hand, the government engaged in clientelism, by giving out farm tools and even land
to rural constituents, as the following example illustrates:
“He [President Mugabe] also attempted to bolster support through the ‘agricultural mech-
anization programme’, a thinly disguised vote-buying exercise in which mountains of farm
equipment have been given away at Zanu-PF election rallies. The tactic appeared to have
persuaded some supporters to stay loyal. Christine Machada, 46, a mother of six who re-
ceived a harvester and a tractor, said she had voted for him again, although her 25-acre
farm was producing few crops” (Birch, Dziva and Thornycroft, 2008).
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On the other hand, President Mugabe and his ruling party militia engaged in large scale intimidation,
warning voters not to “vote wrongly,” which would have meant to vote for the opposition (Zvomuya,
Roussouw and Moyo, 2008). Examples of a mix of illicit campaigning strategies, ranging from paying
voters for their support to intimidating them with violence, are not restricted to African elections, as
recent elections in Bulgaria (Mares, Petrova and Tsveta, 2013), Honduras (Global Research, 2013) or
Guatemala (Gonzalez Ocantos et al., 2013) illustrate. The literature on clientelism has, however, largely
failed to acknowledge both in theoretical models and in empirical analyses, that the costs and benefits
associated with its use, are also impacted by other strategies, such as voter intimidation. The present
chapter provides one of the first attempts to systematically analyze the use of clientelism and violence
as two strategies in a party’s campaigning repertoire.1
I have argued in Chapter 3 that benefits are used to mobilize turnout among likely supporters and that
violence is used to demobilize voters. If electoral violence is indeed applied to disenfranchise voters,
whose support parties find difficult to win with benefits, this can be part of the answer to why independ-
ent voters receive so few benefits during election campaigns. So far, I have investigated the targeting of
groups of voters at the constituency level. The present investigation is based on a joint research project,
in which we analyze the targeting of individual voters with clientelism and intimidation, using data from
the Afrobarometer survey.2 Our data cover elections in Burkina Faso, Ghana, Kenya, Liberia, Malawi,
Mozambique, Namibia, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe, held between 2007 and 2011. In the follow-
ing, I summarize the expectations regarding the goals that parties apply clientelism and violence with,
and the groups of voters they address. Then the empirical implications of the argument and the res-
ults are presented. The chapter concludes with linking the findings to the dissertation’s central research
question.
8.1 Theoretical expectations
My expectation with regard to the use of violence is that it is applied to intimidate independent voters,
to induce them to stay away from the polls. In Chapter 3, I have presented three main arguments in favor
1See Collier and Vicente (2012) for a theoretical paper on the use of vote-buying and violence to impact elections outcomes,
and Bratton (2008), Gonzalez Ocantos et al. (2013), Gutie´rrez-Romero (2014), Mares, Petrova and Tsveta (2013) on empirical
studies of elections in Nigeria, Kenya, Guatemala, and Bulgaria, respectively.
2This chapter is based on a conference paper, which was co-authored with Matthias Orlowksi, PhD candidate at the Hum-
boldt University, Berlin. The paper was entitled “Political Geography and the Strategic use of Redistributive and Coercive
Campaigning Strategies,” and was presented at 4th Annual General Conference of the European Political Science Association,
June 19-21, 2014, in Edinburgh. In this paper, my co-author particularly focused on the empirical analysis of how electoral
competition affects the use of clientelism and voter intimidation. He developed the measure of electoral competitiveness at the
regional level, merged data from different sources, and implemented the statistical procedures we applied in order to test our
theoretical expectations. See the declaration of co-authorship provided in Appendix E for further details on this.
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of this thesis. First, based on past empirical studies, I have assumed that the most common consequence
of pre-electoral violence is that voters shy away from the polls (Bratton 2008, Hickman 2009, Meredith
2002, Kuhn 2013, Sisk & Reynolds 1998). Realizing this, I have argued that it is most rational for parties
to apply violence with the aim to demobilize voters, rather than to persuade voters to vote for them, or
to mobilize turnout among their supporters. Second, I argued that as observing turnout is easier than to
find out how voters vote, it is rational for parties to use violence with the aim to impact turnout, rather
than vote choice. Third, I have posited that it is more rational for parties to use violence to demobilize
independent voters, rather than supporters of their rival party. This is because while parties might indeed
have the strongest incentives to demobilize strong supporters of their opponent, the amount of coercion
they would have to apply is likely going to be much higher than if they are trying to demobilize voters
who are less determined to vote for the rival candidate.3 In addition, instigating violence in strongholds
of the rival candidate risks polarizing these voters against the party.4
8.2 Empirical implications of the argument
In the present analysis, we characterize voters by their political affiliation and their likelihood to turn
out. All the elections we study are presidential elections, which mostly constitute a race between the
candidates of two major parties. We identify voters as supporters of either of the two main parties or
as unaffiliated with any of these two parties. In addition, we characterize them as more or less likely to
participate in elections. As it can be difficult for parties to find out about individuals’ political makeup
and to anticipate how likely these individuals will turn out in the election, we also take the political
makeup and turnout histories of the locality where voters live into account. This aggregate-level inform-
ation can serve parties as easily available indicators on where their own supporters, those of the rival
candidate, and independent voters are likely to be concentrated. One meaningful unit of analysis for
campaigns to infer the political inclination of voters they aim to address in a campaign is the electoral
constituency, as I have argued in Chapter 5. The number of respondents per constituency in the Afroba-
rometer survey is too small to conduct constituency-level analyses, however. In addition, the information
of where respondents reside is only given at the district, not at the constituency-level, which makes it
difficult to locate respondents in a particular constituency. Given these constraints, we move our ana-
lysis to the regional level, where past turnout and vote share is also publicly available. Regions not only
serve as meaningful units of observations for parties because past election results and turnout levels are
3See Stokes 2005 (pp. 319–321) and Nichter (2008, p. 23) for a similar argument, regarding the use of clientelistic benefits.
4See Althaus et al. 2002, or Fenno 1978 for a similar argument about why parties might avoid campaigning in their rival
party’s strongholds.
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available, but also because the borders of regions oftentimes coincide with the concentration of specific
ethnic groups (Conteh-Morgan, 1997).5 As ethnicity is an important determinant of voting behavior in
Sub-Saharan Africa (e.g. Bratton, Bhavnani and Chen, 2013), it serves as a vital source of information
for parties of where partisans are likely to be found. We hence expect parties to condition their attempts
to bribe and intimidate voters both on voters’ individual characteristics and on the political makeup and
turnout history of the region they live in. The number of regions in the countries we study range from
four regions in the small country of Sierra Leone to 25 regions in Tanzania.
Several observable implications can be derived from the argument that it is rational for parties to pre-
dominantly use clientelism to mobilize core voters who are uncertain to turn out and to use coercive
appeals to demobilize independent voters. In order to evaluate these expectations with the regional and
individual-level data described below, we need to introduce two additional assumptions. The Afroba-
rometer survey offers exceptionally fine-grained data on characteristics of those individuals being ad-
dressed with clientelism and those fearing violence. The survey not only provides information about
personal experience with clientelism and an individual’s assessment of the risk to be intimidated with
violence, but also contains information on the political inclination of voters and their habit to turn out.
This is an improvement over studies of politically motivated targeting with violence that use informa-
tion only on the group-level (e.g. Balcells, 2011; Wilkinson and Haid, 2009), where the use of such data
would mean equating violence in swing regions, for example, with violence directed at swing voters.
However, the Afrobarometer data also come with a caveat, namely that they do not contain information
on which party has targeted voters with clientelism, or which party voters feel threatened by. Lacking
this information, we make the assumption that the bulk of campaigning reported on is a function of the
activity of the two main parties in the election who are likely to have more campaigning resources than
small third parties. We further assume that parties largely avoid campaigning in their rival’s strongholds,
so that the campaign appeals we observe here can predominantly be attributed to campaigning by the
party whose strongholds this region is. This is in line with literature on candidate visits to different re-
gions or states during campaigns, where it has been argued that candidates avoid campaigning in hostile
areas, because this carries the risk of polarizing these opposed voters against the candidate and hence
pushing them even further away from him (Althaus et al. 2002, Fenno 1978).
The assumption also seems reasonable, as parties have frequently tried to prevent rival candidates to cam-
paign in their strongholds. Kenya’s then ruling party KANU, for example, prevented its main challenger
from campaigning in its safe havens through its organs “Youth for KANU” (YK ’92) and “Operation
5This is particularly relevant, as the geographic concentration of ethnic groups is higher in Sub-Saharan Africa, than
anywhere else (Gurr, 1993, Mozaffar, 2006, p. 241).
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Moi Win” and “with the backing of [the] provincial administration” (Laakso, 2007, p. 231). The EU’s
elections observation of Kenya’s 2007 elections also states that the two main presidential candidates
avoided campaigning in the other party’s strongholds, “in order to avoid hostile receptions” (EU Elec-
tions Oberservation Mission, 2008, pp. 19–20). Another example are Ghana’s 2008 election campaigns,
in which the main parties contesting the general elections “declared their respective [...] strongholds
’no-go-areas’ for their opponents” (Gyimah-Boadi et al., 2008, p. 1). With this assumption, different
implications about the effect of individual turnout propensity, partisanship, and regional competitive-
ness, and turnout on the likelihood of a voter to be targeted with any of the two campaign strategies can
be derived, depending on whether the strategy is meant to mobilize, demobilize, or persuade voters. The
different implications are summarized in Tables 8.1 and 8.2.
8.2.1 Expectations on the use of clientelism
Characterizing voters by their affiliation with the parties campaigning in the election, and by their like-
lihood to turn out, allows us to distinguish the strategy of the mobilization of potential supporters from
alternative strategies parties could use. These are rewarding their loyalists, persuasion, and double per-
suasion (Nichter, 2008, p. 20), which are illustrated in Table 3.2 in Chapter 3. Table 8.1 summarizes the
implied effects of regional and individual-level factors on an individual’s likelihood to be targeted with
clientelism, when parties follow the goal of mobilization. It also illustrates the implied effects we would
need to see if parties were rather pursuing the goal of rewarding their loyalists, or that of persuasion or
double persuasion.
If the dominant party in a region employed a strategy to mobilize its own supporters, we expect it to
target voters living in those of its strongholds, where past turnout has been low. These strongholds in
our data are characterized by a low level of competitiveness. Within these regions, we expect parties to
concentrate clientelistic appeals on their partisans, and particularly on those of them who are unlikely to
go and vote. This means that a voter’s affiliation with the dominant party in a region should increase her
likelihood to be targeted with clientelism and her probability to turn out should decrease her likelihood
to receive an offer to buy her support with clientelism. The competitiveness and the level of past turnout
of the region she lives in should decrease her probability to be targeted with clientelism. This leads us
to formulate the following expectations:
Individual-level factors
H1: Voters who are affiliated with the dominant party in a region are more likely to be
targeted with clientelism than other voters.
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H2: The lower a voter’s likelihood to turn out, the more likely she is to be targeted with
clientelism.
H3: Voters who are affiliated with the dominant party in a region are more likely to be
targeted with clientelism, the lower their likelihood to turn out.
Regional-level factors
H4: The less competitive the region a voter lives in is, the more likely she is to be targeted
with clientelism.
H5: The lower the level of past turnout was in the region a voter lives in, the more likely
she is to be targeted with clientelism.
As we expect parties to mobilize turnout predominantly among their supporters, we expect them to
campaign most in those of their strongholds (non-competitive regions) where turnout has been low. This
leads us to the following expectation:
H6: The negative effect of regional-level competitiveness on a voter’s likelihood to be tar-
geted with clientelism becomes stronger, the lower past turnout has been in the region she
lives in.
To the contrary, if clientelism were used to reward loyalists, we would expect parties to focus this appeal
also on their strongholds, but on those regions where past turnout has been high. In addition, we would
expect parties to predominantly target those partisans who are likely to turn out. This means that an
individual’s affiliation with the dominant party in the region she lives in and her habit to turn out would
then increase her likelihood to be addressed with clientelism. Regional-level competitiveness would
decrease and regional-level turnout would increase her probability to be targeted with clientelism.
Another option is that parties use clientelism to attract independent voters. If they focused clientelistic
targeting in competitive regions with high past turnout, and among independent voters, who are likely to
turn out, this would imply a goal of persuasion. What we would observe is that a voter’s affiliation with
the dominant party in a region would decrease, but her habit to turn out would increase her likelihood
to be targeted. Regional-level competitiveness and past turnout would increase her likelihood to be ad-
dressed with clientelism.
If parties rather concentrated clientelistic appeals on those competitive regions where turnout has been
low and on those independent voters, who are unlikely to go and vote, this would imply the aim of
double persuasion. We would observe that the affiliation with the dominant party and her habit to turn
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out decreased a voter’s probability to receive an offer to buy her support with clientelism. The competit-
iveness of the region she lives in would increase and past regional turnout would decrease her probability
to be targeted with clientelism. Lastly, parties could be using clientelism to pay voters to stay away from
the polls. As has been described in Chapter 2, this strategy has not been studied as much as turnout-
buying and vote-buying. Findings from a formal model suggest that parties should concentrate attempts
to buy the abstention of opposed voters who are likely to turn out (Gans-Morse, Mazzuca and Nichter,
2014, pp. 417–418). If parties were pursuing such a strategy, we would hence see that partisans with a
high likelihood to turn out are targeted and those voters living in non-competitive regions with histories
of high turnout. This would empirically not be distinguishable from a strategy directed at rewarding
loyalists. We have not included this strategy in Table 8.1, because we have made the assumption that
parties avoid campaigning in rival parties’ strongholds. However, if parties were predominantly using
clientelism to pay opposed voters not to vote, this would mean that they overwhelmingly campaign in
strongholds of the rival party. We discuss this possibility, nonetheless, when we interpret our results on
the use of clientelism.
Table 8.1: Implied effects of regional and individual-level factors on an individuals’ likelihood
to be targeted with clientelism
Individual level Regional level
Affiliation with Likelihood to turn out Competitiveness Turnout level GOAL
dominant party
Increases likelihood Decreases likelihood Decreases likelihood Decreases likelihood MOBILIZATION
Increases likelihood Increases likelihood Decreases likelihood Increases likelihood REWARDING OF
LOYALISTS
Decreases likelihood Increases likelihood Increases likelihood Increases likelihood PERSUASION
Decreases likelihood Decreases likelihood Increases likelihood Decreases likelihood DOUBLE
PERSUASION
8.2.2 Expectations on the use of violence
We have argued that parties should apply violent intimidation of voters with the aim to demobilize
independent voters. We expect voters who are unaffiliated with the dominant party in a region to be
most at risk to experience violence and those living in competitive regions, as is illustrated in Table 8.2.
A voter’s affiliation with the dominant party in a region should hence decrease her risk to suffer from
intimidation. Regional-level competitiveness should increase her likelihood to be intimidated. We do not
have any expectation with regard to whether parties demobilize certain or potential independent voters,
as there are good reasons for them to use either strategy. One the one hand, parties would probably
be most interested in demobilizing those of the independent voters, who are likely to vote, in order
to prevent them from voting for the other party. On the other hand, however, intimidating voters who
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already have high voting costs, is likely to be cheaper for parties, and might hence be a an option they
prefer. Our considerations lead us to formulate the following expectations:
Individual-level factors
H7: Voters who are unaffiliated with the dominant party in the region they live in are more
at risk to suffer from violent intimidation than partisans of this party.
Regional-level factors
H8: The more competitive the region voters live in is, the more at risk they are to suffer from
violent intimidation.
Alternatively, parties could also apply violence to discipline their own partisans and coerce them into
turning out for them (e.g. LeBas, 2006), as is illustrated in Figure 3.3, in Chapter 3. If parties were
following such a goal, we would expect them to concentrate attempts to intimidate voters on their own
strongholds and on their own partisans, as is summarized in Table 8.2. A voter’s affiliation with the
dominant party in a region would then increase her risk to suffer from intimidation and regional-level
competitiveness would decrease her likelihood to be addressed with violence.
Table 8.2: Implied effects of regional and individual-level factors on an individuals’ risk to be
targeted with violence
Individual level Regional level
Affiliation with Likelihood to turn out Competitiveness Turnout level GOAL
dominant party
Decreases likelihood No expectation Increases likelihood No expectation DEMOBILIZATION
OF INDEP. VOTERS
Increases likelihood No expectation Decreases likelihood No expectation INCREASE COHESION
8.2.3 Data and methodology
We test the expectations formulated above on a sample of 10 African countries. Sub-Saharan Africa
serves as a good testing ground for our arguments, as these countries represent a combination of relat-
ively competitive elections and yet a prevalence of the use of illicit campaigning strategies.6 Our sample
includes Burkina Faso, Ghana, Kenya, Liberia, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Tanzania, Zambia, and
Zimbabwe. These are the countries for which regional-level election results were available, from vari-
ous sources, and data on the use of campaign strategies were available from the Afrobarometer round
5 survey. In addition, these countries share important similarities. They all (re-)introduced multiparty
6See Lindberg (2003); van de Walle (2003); Young (2009); Weghorst and Lindberg (2011); Collier and Vicente (2014);
Vicente (2014) for studies on clientelism and Basedau, Erdmann and Mehler (2007); Bekoe (2010); Goldsmith (Forthcoming)
for the occurrence of pre-electoral violence in Sub-Saharan Africa.
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democracy in the 1990s so that parties have a similar history of campaigning and – more importantly –
they all are presidential systems where the president is elected through popular vote and with a majorit-
arian electoral formula. At the same time, this sample exhibits substantial variation in turnout levels and
competitiveness across subnational regions.
Our main data source to test the propositions outlined above is the fifth round of the Afrobarometer.7
Two items lend themselves as measurements for the dependent variables of interests. First, respondents
are asked whether and if so, how often a candidate or party representative offered them something in
return for their vote in the last national election.8 We recoded this item to an indicator variable that
distinguishes between respondents who report any bribery attempts and those who do not.9
Unfortunately, there is no equally valid measure for individuals’ personal experiences with election re-
lated intimidation or violence we could use. There is, however, an item asking respondents about how
much they fear political intimidation or violence in election campaigns in general.10 This item is not
ideal for our purposes since it neither relates to a specific election nor to the personal experience of
respondents. Lacking a better measure of intimidation, we content ourselves with this item as a proxy,
as others have done before (Bratton, 2008; Kuhn, 2013). It is reasonable to assume that respondents
with personal experience are more likely to report fear of electoral violence or intimidation than others,
and that they weight recent experiences more heavily in their responses than events further in the past.
As with the vote buying item, we recoded the original variable from ordinal level to a binary, where
zero indicates no fear of violence at all and one subsumes the three categories indicating any fear of
intimidation.11
We derived the two main independent variables at the regional level from regional-level election res-
ults from various sources.12 The fifth round of the Afrobarometer relates questions about presidential
elections to those held in the respective country between 2007 and 2011. To measure levels of turnout
and competitiveness preceding these elections, we collected election results for the previous election
between 2002 and 2008. Whereas the measurement of turnout is straightforward, the measurement of
electoral competition at the regional level has to ensure comparability across countries and regions with
different party systems. Even though presidential election campaigns mostly constitute a race between
the candidates of two major parties at the national level, there is considerable variation in the structure
7Country specific data sets are available at www.afrobarometer.org.
8Question Q61F: “And during the last national election in..., how often, if ever, did a candidate or someone from a political
party offer you something, like food or a gift or money, in return for your vote?”
9We also report results of our analyses, using the original variable in Appendix E.
10Question Q54: “During election campaigns in this country, how much do you personally fear becoming a victim of
political intimidation or violence?”
11Results of our analyses, using the original variable, are reported as robustness checks in Appendix E.
12A list of all data sources is provided in Table 4.5 in Chapter 4.
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of electoral competition at the regional level. Whereas election results in some regions indicate a clear
victory of either one, or a close race between the incumbent and one challenger party, opposition is
split among several equally sized parties in other regions. In order to account for this variation in our
measurement of competitiveness, we employ an entropy-like index developed by Endersby, Galatas and
Rackaway (2002) who compare competitiveness across districts with differing numbers of candidates.13
The index is bound between zero and one with larger values indicating a more competitive situation.14
We coded individuals’ partisan status in relation to the dominant party in the region the respondent lives
in. The Afrobarometer data contain a filter for party identification and ask for the party a respondent
identifies with if applicable.15 We used these two items to generate a nominal variable indicating sub-
jects who (1) do not feel close to any political party, (2) identify with the dominant party in their region,
or (3) feel close to some other party. The dominant party is defined based on the election results we
collected at the regional level. It is the party that received the plurality of votes in the region.
In order to measure individuals’ likelihood to vote independently from potential effects of clientelism
and intimidation, we applied a two-step procedure. First, we split the full sample of nearly 11,000 ob-
servations into respondents who reported bribery attempts or any fear of intimidation or violence on
the one hand, and those who did not do so, on the other. From the sample with only respondents who
neither reported bribery nor intimidation, we then created two subsamples. For each region, respondents
were randomly assigned to one of these samples. One of the two subsamples was then merged back into
the data set with respondents who were targeted by illicit campaigning strategies and set aside for the
subsequent analyses. These data, containing both those respondents who reported to have been targeted
with (at least) one of the strategies and those who were not targeted with any of the strategies were to be
used in the analyses of the use of illicit campaigning tactics.
We estimated an individual’s propensity to vote for the other subsample, fitting a hierarchical logistic
model with a random intercept, similar to that described in Table 8.2.16 Based on the model estimates,
we then predicted the probability to vote for all respondents in the sample set aside for the analysis of
13 In a given region, competitiveness among k candidates is measured as:
ck = k
k
k∏
i=1
pi (8.1)
where pi is the vote share of candidate i in the region. k is set to the nearest integer to the effective number of electoral parties
in the constituency calculated as 1/
∑k
i=1 pi.
14ck = 1 if all candidates receive the same vote share in a region and ck = 0 if a single candidate gains all votes.
15 Question Q89A: “Do you feel close to any particular political party?” and Question Q89B: “Which party is that?”
16Question Q27: “With regard to the most recent national election in ..., which statement is true for you?”. Respondents
are given a choice between “You voted in the elections” and several alternatives providing excuses for non-voting in order
to reduce bias due to social desirability. We recoded the item into a binary where all options containing information about
non-voting were coded zero.
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illicit campaigning strategies. Since our interest is to capture individuals’ propensity to vote as perceived
by political parties rather than that derived from a fully specified model, we only included predictors in
the turnout model that are easily observable by parties:17 respondents’ (1) age, (2) gender, whether they
contacted (3) local or (4) party officials, (5) how often they attend community meetings, (6) whether they
attended electoral campaigns, and (7) an indicator for them belonging to the dominant ethnic group in
their region. We centered all non-binary variables to the region mean. Descriptive statistics are available
in Table E.1 in Appendix E.
Posterior means, standard deviations and 95% highest posterior density intervals for all parameters are
reported in Table 8.3. We included a second order polynomial of age to allow for a non-linear relation-
ship between the probability of voting and a voter’s age. Indeed, the probability of voting increases with
age until respondents are about 18 years older than the average adult citizen in their region.18 We do not
find an effect of gender or of being a member of the predominant ethnic group in a region. Contrary to
these demographic factors, the variables capturing community and political activity all have relatively
strong effects in the expected direction. The odds that a respondent voted in the last national election are
more than twice as large for those who attended at least one campaign meeting as compared to others,
holding constant all other factors in the model. Slightly weaker but still substantial is the difference
between respondents who had contact to party officials and those who did not.
Despite their strength, these effects cannot be interpreted as being causal. There are a whole range of
unmodeled factors that might affect both respondents’ turnout decision as well as their choice to attend
community meetings, for example. We are not interested in estimating causal effects, however. The
goal is to use easily observable indicators to specify a sparse model that predicts individual turnout
reasonably well. Figure 8.1 depicts the ROC curve for model predictions in and out of sample, based on
the model reported in Table 8.3. Of course, predictions of individual turnout for the subsample set aside
17The following Afrobarometer items were used to code these variables:
1. Q1: “How old are you?”
2. Q101: “Respondent’s gender” (question to interviewer)
3. Q30A: “ During the past year, how often have you contacted any of the following persons about some important
problem or to give them your views: A local government councilor?”
4. Q30D: “During the past year, how often have you contacted any of the following persons about some important problem
or to give them your views: A political party official?”
5. Q26A: “Here is a list of actions that people sometimes take as citizens. For each of these, please tell me whether you,
personally, have done any of these things during the past year. If not, would you do this if you had the chance: Attended
a community meeting?”
6. Q29A: “Thinking about the last national election in ..., did you: Attend a campaign meeting or rally?”
7. Q84: “Let us get back to talking about you. What is your ethnic community, cultural group or tribe?”
.
18Our sample is restricted to citizens being 18 or older.
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Table 8.3: A model of individual turnout based on easily observable covariates
Mean SD Lower Upper
Age 0.081 0.006 0.069 0.094
Age2 -0.002 0.000 -0.003 -0.002
Female -0.169 0.127 -0.424 0.072
Member of dominant ethnic group 0.202 0.140 -0.087 0.451
Contact local official 0.311 0.160 0.026 0.651
Contact party official 0.123 0.051 0.031 0.228
Attends community meetings 0.759 0.131 0.506 1.022
Attended campaign 0.637 0.208 0.229 1.039
(Intercept) 1.533 0.199 1.169 1.919
ICC 0.111 0.028 0.057 0.167
Observations 2913
Regions 115
Dependent variable is an indicator of individual turnout in last election. ICC is the
intra-class correlation. Lower and Upper indicate 95 % Bayesian credibility intervals.
All independent variables are centered to the region mean. Results of two MCMC
chains with 100,000 simulations stored after discarding the first 50,000 iterations.
for further analysis below are worse than the in-sample predictions. Still, the model performs reasonably
well. Even when marginalizing the information contained in the intercept estimates, information about
the observable factors contained in the model allows to predict individuals’ choice to turnout to vote to
a reasonable degree. We therefore accept the model predictions as a plausible measure of individuals’
propensity to vote which parties consider in their allocation of different campaigning strategies.
8.3 Results
Several individual and regional-level variables that can affect both voters’ probability to vote or to sup-
port a certain party and their likelihood to be targeted with illicit campaigning strategies are added as
controls in the models reported below.19 These are voters’ poverty level, their consumption of news,
whether they live in urban or rural areas, their level of education, their gender and age. Past research
suggests that poorer voters are more likely to be targeted with clientelism than wealthier voters (Brat-
ton, 2008; Kramon, 2013a; Stokes, 2005; Scott, 1969; Weitz-Shapiro, 2012, 2014). At the same time,
turnout tends to be higher among poorer voters in Africa than among their wealthier counterparts (Brat-
ton, 2008, pp. 624–625, Kuenzi and Lambright, 2011, p. 784). To control for this, we include a measure
of experiential poverty that has shown strong construct validity and reliability when trying to capture
individual-level poverty in Sub-Saharan Africa (Mattes, 2008). Following Mattes (ibid.), we construc-
ted a lived poverty index from five items in the Afrobarometer survey asking respondents about their
19See Tables 8.4 and 8.5.
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Figure 8.1: In-and out-of-sample predictions of individual turnout
regular access to food, water, health care, cooking fuel, and cash income. These items were included in
a principal component factor analysis from which a single factor was extracted for the entire sample.20
Factor scores are used as an interval-scaled indicator of individuals’ poverty level with higher values
indicating poorer living conditions.
Another factor that has shown to impact the prevalence of clientelism are settlement patterns, although
the findings are mixed. In a study on Nigeria’s 2003 and 2007 elections, Bratton (2008, p. 625) finds
that rural voters are more likely to be targeted with clientelism, but detects no correlation with settlement
and voter intimidation. An analysis of Mexico’s 2000 elections suggests that clientelism clusters around
urban dwellers (Cornelius, 2004). Settlement patterns have also shown to affect turnout. Rural voters
tend to be more likely to participate in elections than urban voters in Africa (Bratton, Gyimah-Boadi
and Mattes, 2005, Kuenzi and Lambright, 2011, Bratton, 2008, pp. 625–626). We therefore control at
the individual level whether a respondent lives in an urban area.21 Since turnout and competition are
correlated with settlement structures at the macro level, we also control for urbanity at the regional level.
20The respective questions are: “Over the past year, how often if ever, have you or anyone in your family gone without:”
Q8A: “Enough food to eat?”
Q8B: “Enough clean water for home use?”
Q8C: “Medicines or medical treatment?”
Q8D: “Enough fuel to cook your food?”
Q8E: “A cash income?”
We recoded the items such that higher values indicate a lack of access to the respective resources.
21Question URBRUR: “Urban or Rural Primary Sampling Unit?”(Question to interviewer)
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The share of respondents living in urban areas in a region serves as the respective indicator. A second
control variable we added at the regional level is the group mean of the poverty index as a measurement
of regional differences in wealth. To distinguish between macro- and micro level effects, all non-binary
individual-level independent variables were centered to the region mean and the regional-level indicat-
ors to the grand mean. Table E.2 in Appendix E provides descriptive statistics on all variables before
centering.
Individuals who are better informed about political issues might be more likely to identify with a polit-
ical party and have a higher propensity to vote. A study on turnout in African elections has found that
media exposure increases participation in elections (Kuenzi and Lambright, 2007). In addition, past
research suggests that the more information voters have about parties, the more likely they are to form
partisan attachments (Huber, Kernell and Leoni, 2005). The frequency with which respondents consume
news is, however, also a potential correlate with our measure of intimidation. The item might partly cap-
ture individuals’ perception of intimidation and political violence independent of personal experience.
The more respondents read the news or listen to them on the radio, or watch them on TV, the more their
individual assessment of the risk to experience violence might be in line with what is reported on in
the media. In order to control for this effect, we included an indicator that captures subjects’ exposure
to media. We create an index using the average of four items asking respondents about their usage of
different information resources on an ordinal scale, ranging from “never” to “every day”.22
In addition, respondents’ educational attainment is included as a control variable in all models.23 Edu-
cated individuals have been shown to be more likely to vote in African elections (Kuenzi and Lambright,
2011, p. 784). Bratton’s study on Nigerian elections shows that these voters were at the same time less
likely to be targeted with intimidation (Bratton, 2008, p. 624) and clientelism (ibid., p. 635).
We further include the respondent’s gender as a control variable in all the analyses. Wantchekon found in
his experiment conducted in Benin that men are more receptive to clientelism than women (Wantchekon,
2003, pp. 418–419) and argued that this is due to the fact that men are more likely to profit from cli-
entelistic benefits such as jobs in the public sector. As gender has shown to also play a role in turnout
in Africa, with men more likely to participate in elections than women (Kuenzi and Lambright, 2011,
p. 783), we include gender as a control variable.
Lastly, we also control for the age of respondents. Turnout has been shown to be higher among older
22 The respective questions are: “ How often do you get news from the following sources:”
Q13A: “Radio?”
Q13B: “Television?”
Q13C: “Newspapers?”
Q13D: “Internet?”.
23Question Q97: “What is the highest level of education you have completed?” (answers on a ten point scale from “No
formal schooling” to “Post-graduate”)
159
than among younger individuals (Kuenzi and Lambright, 2011, p. 783). In addition, older voters might
be more likely to profit from clientelistic benefits than younger voters (Wantchekon, 2003) and hence
receive more offers to buy their support than their younger counterparts.
We fit the following hierarchical logistic random intercept model to the binary indicators for bribery and
intimidation:
Pr(yij = 1) =
1
1 + exp(−αj − βXi) (8.2)
αj ∼ N (γZj , σ2) (8.3)
The dependent variable is the probability that an individual reports to have been targeted with clientelism
or to fear electoral violence. Subscript i indicates the individual which is nested in regions which are
indexed by j. X is a matrix with individual-level covariates and β the vector with the corresponding
regression weights. We model the region average as being randomly distributed with common variance
σ2. The mean regional intercept is conditional on a set of regional-level covariates Zj and the vector of
corresponding coefficients γ.
We estimated all model parameters using Markow Chain Monte Carlo Methods with weakly informative
priors. We put an inverse Wishart priorW−1(1, 0.002) on σ2 and used normal priors N (0, 108) for all
fixed effects.24 Results are reported for two chains with 100,000 simulations after discarding the first
50,000 iterations.
8.4 Estimation results
8.4.1 Clientelism
Table 8.4 depicts summary statistics of the posterior distribution for the parameters of three models of
our clientelism indicator. Most demographic control variables have effects in the expected direction.
According to our model estimates and in line with past studies (Bratton, 2008; Kramon, 2013a; Stokes,
2005; Scott, 1969; Weitz-Shapiro, 2014, 2012), individuals living in poverty are more likely to be tar-
geted with clientelism compared to wealthier residents in the same region. We do not find an effect
of regional-level poverty on the average level of bribery in a region, however, as the 95% credibility
interval covers zero.25
24We used Hadfield’s package MCMCglmm for R to fit all models. Details on the prior specification can be found in the
excellent Course Notes that come with the package vignette.
25The 95% credibility interval serves as an measure of the certainty associated with the effects. The larger the interval is,
the more uncertain we are about the effect. If the credibility interval covers zero, we cannot be sure that there is any effect at
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The effect of the information indicator is positive with a probability of more than 95%. Subjects who
inform themselves from different sources more regularly have a higher probability to receive favors in
return for their vote. The corresponding credibility interval is comparatively large, however, indicating
great uncertainty about the size of this effect. The result contrasts to a certain extend with findings gained
in an experiment in India which suggested that better informed voters are less receptive to clientelistic
campaign appeals (Banerjee et al., 2011, p. 2). If this were true, then we would not expect parties to
target these voters more than those with less information. A plausible interpretation of the positive cor-
relation between voter information and clientelism is that parties target individuals who are influential
in their communities and who can motivate others to vote as they do. These individuals might also be
more informed about the ongoing election campaign than others. This relationship is discussed in more
detail below when we turn to the results concerning individual-level turnout and clientelism.
In contrast to previous research (Bratton, 2008; Cornelius, 2004), we do not find an effect for urban
residency within a given region, as the Bayesian credibility interval covers zero. The same is true for
regional-level urbanity. We neither find an effect of education on respondents’ likelihood to be targeted
with clientelism, contrary to Bratton’s findings from Nigeria (Bratton, 2008, p. 625). Controlling for the
demographic characteristics in the model and for respondents’ usage of different information sources,
educational attainment does not affect the probability for them being targeted with clientelism.
The probability to be targeted with clientelism decreases with age and is lower on average for women,
compared to men. This is in line with Wantchekon’s argument that women and younger voters might be
less receptive to clientelism, because the type of benefit which is often used in clientelistic distribution
are public sector jobs, which men and older voters disproportionately profit from.26
Is clientelism used to mobilize turnout among partisans?
We now turn to the effects of the key independent variables of interest. In line with Hypothesis 1, partis-
ans of the dominant party in a region have more than 40% higher odds to be targets of bribery attempts
than non-partisans in the same region. Generally, these independent voters have the lowest probability
to be targeted with clientelism in a given region. Their odds to be targeted are also about 35% lower
than those for partisans of any other party than the dominant one. This finding speaks in favor of parties
targeting their supporters rather than independent voters.
Contrary to our expectations, formulated in Hypothesis 2, however, we find a strong positive effect of
all.
26See Robinson and Verdier (2013, p. 261) on why the promising of jobs in the public sector serves politicians well to attract
voters.
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individuals’ propensity to turn out to vote on the probability for them being targeted by election-related
bribery. Holding constant the other covariates, individuals whose turnout propensity is one standard
deviation above the mean likelihood to turn out in their region have 55% higher odds to be approached
with clientelism compared to individuals with an average likelihood to turn out. We discuss plausible
interpretations of this effect and our expectation on a conditional effect of turnout (Hypothesis 3) below.
The findings with regard to the competitiveness and turnout histories of the regions voters live in provide
strong support for Hypotheses 4 and 5. Electoral competitiveness in a region, independent of turnout
levels, has a negative effect on respondents being targeted with clientelism. With all individual-level
variables at their regional mean and an average level of turnout, the predicted probability of respondents
from a region where the competitiveness is one standard deviation above the mean have 35% higher
odds to be addressed with clientelism than those living in a region at average levels of competitiveness.
The effect of regional-level turnout is also negative, as we expected, and even stronger than that of the
competitiveness of a region. The odds of respondents to be targeted with clientelism in a region where
turnout is one standard deviation above the mean are almost 40% lower than for voters living in a region
with an average level of past turnout.
To test whether clientelism is used by a party to mobilize turnout among its potential supporters, we
estimated an interaction between regional-level competitiveness and turnout. Figure 8.2 illustrates the
effect of the competitiveness of a region on a voter’s likelihood to be targeted with clientelism, at dif-
ferent levels of regional turnout. The graph illustrates that voters in regions that are not competitive
and where past turnout has been low are more likely to be targeted than voters living in more contested
regions where turnout has been high. The slope of the effect of competitiveness is slightly steeper for
regions with low turnout histories than for those regions where turnout has been high, suggesting that
the effect of competitiveness is stronger in regions with histories of low turnout. This provides support
for our expectation formulated in Hypothesis 6 that parties mobilize turnout among their partisans.
We did not find support for Hypothesis 3, however. The effect of respondents’ likelihood to turn out on
their probability to be targeted with clientelism did not differ between partisans of the dominant party,
and other respondents (not shown). We also estimated the same models, using a respondent’s ethnic
identity as a proxy for partisanship. We replaced the measure of self-reported support for a region’s
dominant party with the affiliation with the ethnic group that tends to support the dominant party. The
effect of individual turnout propensity and regional-level turnout and competitiveness are robust to this
specification. The results are provided in Table E.4 in Appendix E. However, while the sign of the coef-
ficient for co-ethnicity with the dominant party is positive, as we would expect, the credibility interval
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covers zero, so that we cannot be sure that there is an effect at all.27
As outlined above, we consider clientelism as a strategy to mobilize potential support. Accordingly, we
expected voters who are unlikely to vote and who are affiliated with the dominant party in a region to
be the principal targets of clientelism used by that party. Furthermore, we expected voters who live in
a region with low past turnout levels to have a higher probability to be targeted with attempts of clien-
telism, than voters living in regions with comparatively high turnout histories. Thus, while the findings
concerning partisanship and regional-level turnout are in line with our expectations, the positive effect
of individual- level turnout is not. The latter does not support the idea that clientelism is predominantly
used to mobilize support rather than to persuade or demobilize voters.
Figure 8.2: The effect of regional-level turnout and competitiveness on clientelism
Notes: Simulated predicted probabilities of the likelihood of a voter to be targeted with clientelism, based on the model with
the interaction between competitiveness and turnout, reported in Table 8.4. The red area illustrates the effect of a region’s
competitiveness if turnout is at it’s 10th quantile, the blue shaded area shows the effect of competitiveness if turnout is at the
90th quantile.
27The classification of the the ethnic groups that tend to support the dominant parties in the regions in our sample is based
on Ishyiama (2012, pp. 771-775).
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There are at least three potential interpretations for the positive relationship between individual-level
turnout and the likelihood to be targeted with clientelism. First, parties might be rewarding their loyal
supporters. While this would be in line with the individual correlates of clientelism, we would expect
parties to reward voters not only for their vote choice, but also for consistency in their turnout for them
(Gans-Morse, Mazzuca and Nichter, 2014; Stokes, Nazareno and Brusco, 2013). This would imply a
positive correlation between regional-level turnout and clientelism, which we do not observe.
Second, parties might be paying voters to stay away from the polls (Cox, Kousser and Morgan, 1981,
p. 656, Schaffer, 2002, p. 78). For several reasons, we regard it as unlikely that this is a strategy parties
in our sample predominantly apply, however. If parties were buying abstention, we would expect them
to focus campaigning on opposed voters with a high likelihood to turn out (Gans-Morse, Mazzuca and
Nichter, 2014, p. 423). On the regional level, this would imply a positive correlation between clientelism
and regional-level turnout, which is not what we find. In addition, if clientelism were predominantly used
to demobilize opposed voters, then given our findings on partisanship, we would have to conclude that
parties campaign more in their opponents’ strongholds than in their own strongholds. As the survey data
we use do not entail information on which party the respondents are targeted by, we cannot rule out this
possibility, but we regard it as unlikely. We do not make the assumption that only the dominant party
in a region campaigns in this region. However, based on evidence from elections in Ghana, Kenya, and
the United States which indicates that parties avoid campaigning in their rival candidate’s strongholds
(Althaus, Nardulli and Shaw, 2002; Fenno, 1978; Gyimah-Boadi et al., 2008; Laakso, 2007, p. 53), we
consider it unlikely that the majority of campaigning activity in a party’s stronghold we observe can be
ascribed to the rival party.
A third explanation for the discrepancy between the effect of turnout at the regional level and on the
individual level would be a divergence of preferences between the central campaign managers and the
local brokers who are responsible for forging the “benefit-for-vote” deals with voters. This argument
is developed by Stokes and co-authors (2013) in their explanation of a similar puzzle. Observing that
central government spending clusters in swing regions or constituencies, while individual loyal core
voters receive the bulk of clientelistic benefits during elections, Stokes, Nazareno and Brusco (2013)
argue that campaigners have an interest in directing funds to marginal voters, whereas local brokers
rather choose the less costly strategy of targeting loyalists.28 If we followed this logic, our findings would
suggest that campaigners are targeting regions with comparatively high levels of potential support (low
competitiveness) but low turnout levels, but that local brokers within these regions target loyal voters
28One reason why brokers mainly target loyalists according to the authors is that by targeting loyalists, brokers spend fewer
resources on mobilizing support than if they were targeting swing voters, which allows them to extract rents for themselves
(Stokes, Nazareno and Brusco, 2013).
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who would turn out anyway. While our findings are in line with this idea, the data do not permit us to
subject it to further tests.
Finally, whether what we observe on the individual level is a function of broker or party interests,
voters with comparatively high turnout propensities might plausibly be targeted because they act as
multipliers and convince others to vote as they do. Since our measure of turnout propensity includes
information on political activism and information on whether a respondent is a community leader, the
positive correlation between this and the propensity to be targeted with distributive appeals is in line with
this idea. This interpretation also resonates with findings from a recent study of the use of clientelism in
Benin and Kenya. The study finds that respondents who are more involved with political parties are more
likely to be targeted with attempts to buy their vote, than those with no partisan attachments (Guardado
and Wantchekon, 2014). This interpretation is further supported by qualitative information I collected
in the interviews with campaign managers in Ghana. A regional campaign manager of the NPP, for
example, explained how the ruling party targeted individuals who are influential in their communities
with gifts during the campaign, hoping that these persons would motivate others to support the NDC:
And you know [...] from then [from September 2012 onwards], they [the NDC] are even
buying cars for some ladies. Those who can convince their colleagues. Assuming you are
somebody who a lot of people follows (sic!) you. So they buy you a car so you can talk to
the other people that if they vote for your party what they did to you, they can also do it for
them. Because you, they are using as a big example.”29
The findings with regard to the individual and regional-level correlates of clientelism are robust to using
the original scale of the variable. See Table E.3 in Appendix E for the results.
8.4.2 Intimidation
Summary statistics for the posterior distributions of all parameter estimates for the intimidation models
are presented in Table 8.5. Regarding the individual demographic characteristics, the effects largely
correspond to those reported for the clientelism models. The lived poverty index is positively associated
with individuals’ likelihood to report fear of intimidation and the effect of age is negative. This can be
seen as an indication that the young and the poor are targets of both, electoral violence and clientelism.
In contrast to the experiences with bribery, women are more likely to fear electoral violence than men
with the effect being of the same magnitude as the one reported in 8.4. Whereas women seem to suffer
more from electoral violence, men are more likely to be paid for their vote. As in the case of clientelism,
the effect of our information indicator is positive. The variable thus accounts for one problem with our
29Interview with a regional campaign manager of the NPP, December, 15, 2012.
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dependent variable. We control for the fact that better informed people are more likely to recognize
incidents of election related violence in their region and therefore report greater fear of violence irre-
spective of their personal experience with it. Again, controlling for news consumption and the other
covariates, we do not find an effect of respondents’ educational attainment, nor is there a credible differ-
ence between individuals from urban or rural areas within a region.
We do not find an effect of an individual’s likelihood to turn out on her probability of fearing intimida-
tion. This suggests that parties do not differ in their use of intimidation against voters with a lower or a
higher likelihood to turn out. The same holds for regional-level turnout histories.
Regional-level poverty and urbanity also do not affect individuals’ fear of intimidation, as the credibility
intervals for these effects also cover zero.
Is intimidation used to demobilize independent voters?
In line with our expectation, formulated in Hypothesis 7, we find a negative effect of identifying with
the dominant party on intimidation. Subjects identifying with the dominant party in their region have
almost 20% lower odds to fear intimidation than non-partisans, suggesting that independent voters might
be more at risk than partisans of the two main parties. However, the credibility interval of the corres-
ponding coefficient covers zero, indicating that there is less than 95% certainty that a difference between
these groups exists at all. In accordance with previous findings (Gutie´rrez-Romero, 2014), and Hypo-
thesis 8, we furthermore, find a strong effect of electoral competitiveness on average probabilities to fear
intimidation at the regional level. Compared to respondents from regions with average levels of compet-
itiveness, respondents living in a region where competitiveness is one standard deviation above the mean
have more than 90% higher odds to be intimidated. These results are robust against the inclusion of the
two regional-level control variables for both of which we do not find an effect. Our findings indicate
that indeed, independent voters and those living in competitive regions are the principal targets of voter
intimidation, which is what our argument predicted. Our findings are largely robust to measuring the
dependent variable on the original scale. See Table E.5 in Appendix E for the results. We also estimated
the same models as reported in the chapter, replacing partisanship by membership in the ethnic group
that supports the dominant regional party. As for clientelism, the effects of the key independent variables
and the covariates remain robust to this modification. However, while the effect of membership with the
ethnic group affiliated with the dominant party is negative, as we would expect, the credibility interval
covers zero. See Table E.6 in Appendix E for the results.
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8.5 Summary
We have argued that clientelism and violence are used for different purposes during election campaigns.
We evaluated these claims using regional-level election data and fine-grained individual-level survey
data. We showed that while clientelism was concentrated in strongholds of the main contenders of the
electoral race with low turnout histories and among partisans, intimidation was most pronounced in
competitive regions and among non-partisan voters. These findings largely corroborate the notion that
these two manipulative strategies follow different logics. We further argued that distributive appeals are
predominantly used to mobilize potential support and that intimidation appeals are used to demobilize
independent voters. Our findings are in line with some, but not all predictions derived from this argu-
ment. On the one hand, our results with regard to clientelism lend more support to our idea that parties
mobilize turnout and cater to their own supporters, than to the alternative use of clientelism to attract
swing voters. In line with other findings of this dissertation, presented in Chapters 5 and 6, our results
speak more in favor of a turnout-buying than a vote-buying logic. On the other hand, however, the fact
that individual’s likelihood to turn out is positively correlated with the likelihood of being targeted with
clientelism suggests that on the individual level, parties channel benefits to loyalists or multipliers who
are likely to convince others to vote the way they do. This suggests that parties campaign among cer-
tain rather than potential supporters and is against both the vote-buying and the turnout-buying model
(Stokes, 2005; Nichter, 2008), but in line with other empirical studies (Stokes, Nazareno and Brusco,
2013, pp. 67–72). To further discriminate between different strategies that clientelistic and violent cam-
paigns are used for would require data on the parties targeting individuals, which so far is only available
for single countries.30
Finally, our results corroborate the validity of the third answer that I have proposed in Chapter 3 to the
question of why swing voters receive so few benefits during election campaigns in young democracies.
The evidence presented in this chapter suggests that parties indeed attempt to disenfranchise independ-
ent voters, rather than trying to persuade them with benefits. This most likely frees resources for parties
to spend on motivating their supporters to vote, which might be why we see parties spend so much time
and money on their campaign trail on courting their own supporters.
30See the survey data Bratton (2008) uses for his analysis of vote-buying and violence in Nigeria, for example.
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Chapter 9
Conclusion
This dissertation has addressed one of the main puzzles regarding elections in young democracies: why
do swing voters receive so little attention during election campaigns? I develop a theoretical argument
which provides three key answers for this puzzle and I present empirical support for them. First, parties
do not waste resources on courting their supporters who are likely to turn out, at the expense of cam-
paigning among swing voters. They rather mobilize those of their supporters who would otherwise not
go and vote. Second, in contexts where parties’ campaign promises have little credibility, the organizers
concentrate their energy on those voters who trust them the most, namely their core supporters. Third,
in situations in which parties use electoral violence to impact election outcomes, they concentrate their
attempts of intimidation on citizens who would be difficult to convince to vote for them, and rather dis-
enfranchise them. This frees up resources for making campaign promises and offering benefits aimed at
mobilizing their core voters to turn out on Election Day. In the remainder of this last chapter, I summar-
ize the main theoretical contributions the dissertation makes and relate them to my key findings. I then
discuss the methodological contributions and the broader ramifications of my findings.
9.1 Theoretical contributions
9.1.1 Adapting theories of distributive campaigning to African elections
The dissertation’s central argument advances existing models of distributive campaigning by addressing
three central assumptions which are unfounded in the context of African elections. These are that voters
vary in their ideological distance to parties, that parties are credible and deliver on their promises, and
that parties do not intentionally demobilize voters. I argue that voters vary in how much they trust in the
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parties’ promises more than in their ideological distance to the parties. Related to this is my argument
that partisans are more receptive to appeals by the party they feel close to, than indifferent or opposed
voters.
In addition, I relax the assumption that parties always deliver on their promises, which is particularly
relevant in African elections, where parties have been shown to be inconsistent in their policies (Bleck
& van de Walle 2011, Bleck & van de Walle 2013, Carey 2002, p.64, van de Walle 2003, p.304). One
central assumption underlying my argument is that supporters believe campaign promises made by the
candidates whose party they support more than campaign promises by other candidates. Based on this,
I argue that parties should focus campaign promises in situations where they are most credible. The
investigation of the use of campaign promises at campaign rallies in Ghana, presented in Chapter 6, un-
derpins this argument. It shows that candidates avoid making promises of future benefits in contexts in
which they have little credibility with their audience. The incumbent, who was likely to be more credible
than the challenger in promising future benefits (see also Medina and Stokes, 2007; Wantchekon, 2003),
much more frequently promised local club goods than the latter. In addition, he focused these promises
in areas where his likely supporters were concentrated. The results from the survey experiment, presen-
ted in Chapter 7, confirm that voters tend to regard promises of future benefits as more credible, when
they are made by the incumbent than by the challenger. They further show that supporters tend to find
campaign promises made by the candidate whose party they are affiliated with much more credible than
when the same promise is said to have been made by a different candidate. This finding corroborates
my argument that core voters are most responsive to campaign messages by the party they are affiliated
with, and that this is why parties spend so many resources on their partisans during election campaigns.
Lastly, I challenge the assumption implicitly made in the literature on modern campaigning that parties
do not intentionally demobilize voters (Ansolabehere 1994, Ansolabehere et al. 1999, Gerstle et al.
1991, Berelson et al. 1954, Lazarsfeld et al. 1968). The analysis of the use of clientelistic targeting
and voter intimidation in 10 African countries, presented in Chapter 8, shows that candidates can indeed
combine the use of clientelism with efforts to demobilize voters. It shows part of the answer to the
puzzle this dissertation addresses: parties may choose not target the support of independent voters with
benefits and instead demobilize this group with violence.
9.1.2 Advancing the vote-buying versus turnout-buying debate
Most models of distributive politics and in the subfield of clientelism, have assumed that it is most ra-
tional for parties to buy votes, not turnout, and to target swing voters, rather than wasting benefits on
their own supporters (Cox and McCubbins, 1986; Lindbeck and Weibull, 1987; Stokes, 2005; Stokes,
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Nazareno and Brusco, 2013). Dixit and Londregan (1996, pp. 1153–1154) have acknowledged that
parties can have an incentive to target their supporters if they are better at delivering benefits to them,
compared to swing voters. They maintain the key assumption, however, that parties would like to deliver
most benefits to swing voters if they could (Stokes, Nazareno and Brusco, 2013, pp. 33). At the same
time, scholars have observed a gap between theoretical predictions and empirical evidence, with too
many benefits being targeted at core voters, for the swing voter model to hold (Dunning and Nilekani,
2013; Liu, 1999; Nichter, 2008; Stokes, Nazareno and Brusco, 2013). Stokes and her co-authors offer an
explanation for this “puzzle of distributive politics” (Stokes, Nazareno and Brusco, 2013). They argue
that while parties have an incentive to focus benefits on undecided voters, the intermediaries they rely on
to distribute the benefits, have different incentives and therefore over-proportionally target loyal voters
as this is less costly than attracting new voters. The evidence presented in this dissertation in Chapters
5 and 6 challenges this explanation. The analyses of the use of campaign rallies and promises of local
club goods reveal that parties buy turnout among likely supporters, rather than trying to sway independ-
ent voters. This is true despite the fact that these are strategies that do not require the use of brokers,
different from clientelism.
The findings of this dissertation are more in line with the turnout-buying model (Nichter, 2008). How-
ever, the evidence presented also suggests that the reason which the turnout-buying model offers as to
why independent voters receive few benefits, is not sufficient to solve this puzzle. When targeting takes
place at the group level, and groups are geographically concentrated, votes are as easy to observe as
turnout. My analyses of the use of campaign rallies and local promises show that parties also pursue a
strategy of mobilization at this group level. The fact that if people vote is easier to observe than how,
can thus no longer serve as the only explanation for why parties target their core voters. The evidence
gained in this dissertation rather supports the argument that candidates consider how credible they are
with campaign appeals when choosing which group to address during elections.
9.1.3 Integrating various campaigning strategies into one model
This dissertation develops a model which integrates modern campaigning strategies and illicit strategies,
like the manipulation of voters with particularistic benefits and their intimidation via violence, into one
model. By extending the repertoire of strategies that candidates can use, it acknowledges that the incent-
ive for a party to use one strategy is conditional on the costs and benefits associated with using another
strategy. I develop an argument whereby parties can mobilize voters with campaign rallies, campaign
promises, and clientelistic targeting and they can demobilize voters by using violence. Considering the
counter-factual for strategic decisions which campaigners take is crucial for understanding their motiv-
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ations. The analysis of the use of clientelistic targeting and voter intimidation in 10 African elections,
presented in Chapter 8, provides support for this approach. While clientelism is concentrated on partis-
ans who were unlikely to vote, intimidation concentrates on independent voters. Parties hence seem to
mobilize some voters with particular strategies and demobilize other voters with another strategy.
9.2 Methodological contributions
9.2.1 Measuring campaigning strategies directly
Research investigating the logic of clientelistic targeting has mainly relied on voter surveys (Brusco,
Nazareno and Stokes, 2004; Lindberg and Morrisson, 2008; Stokes, 2005; Young, 2009) or on observing
patterns of the allocation of pork-barrel spending across regions or other geographical units (Banful,
2011; Barkan and Chege, 1989; Case, 2001; Cole, 2009; Grossman, 1994; Jablonski, 2014; Khemani,
2007; Pereira, 1996; Veiga and Veiga, 2013; Worthington and Dollery, 1998). Typically, these studies
are interested in understanding the strategic calculations made by parties regarding which types of voters
to target. However, it is far from obvious that the patterns in targeting are a direct function of electoral
strategies by the candidates contesting national elections. A considerable amount the allocation of goods
across voters might be a function of specific interests by those agents carrying out the distribution of
benefits at the geographical units being studied (Stokes, Nazareno and Brusco, 2013). I contribute to
this literature by measuring electoral strategies directly, through the study of the strategic use of promises
of local public goods by presidential candidates. This allows me to be more certain in concluding that
the patterns of targeting observed actually reflect strategic decisions by the presidential candidates and
their campaign teams.
9.2.2 An experimental test of the responsiveness of voters to campaign promises
In order to shed light on the vote-buying versus the turnout-buying debate, it is important to test what
types of voters are receptive to campaign appeals and why. This is a question that has not sufficiently
been tackled with respect to campaigning in African elections. In a survey experiment conducted during
Ghana’s presidential election campaign, I was able to directly test and provide support for my assumption
that the credibility of a campaign promise hinges on the relationship between candidates and voters.
The findings from this experiment also raise doubts on the assumption that promises of the provision of
particularistic benefits are more credible to African voters than campaign promises about public goods
(Atchade, Wantchekon and McClendon, 2012; Wantchekon, 2003). While the results from one single
experiment can never be considered conclusive, and certainly need to be replicated in other elections,
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my findings caution against taking this assumption as given.
9.3 Broader implications
The findings produced in this dissertation have broader implications for the study of the quality of
elections in young democracies and for democratization processes in Africa.
9.3.1 Clientelism, accountability and democratization
The use of particularistic benefits to impact the outcome of elections is problematic for the quality of
democracy for at least two reasons. First, when voters sell their vote, it does not carry much information
about their preferences on broader national policies. Hence, their interests cannot be inferred by parties,
nor adequately represented (Stokes, 2007a, p.90). This is exacerbated by the fact that parties target some
groups of voters more than others, which excludes the aggregation and representation of the interests of
certain segments of the electorate. This violates Dahl’s equal consideration principle which posits that
the interest of every voter must be known and voiced in an election (Dahl, 1987). Second, vote-buying
reduces the power of elections to “throw the rascals out,” as those whose votes are bought do not cast
their vote on the basis of the evaluation of the government’s performance on macro-economic policies
(Stokes, 2007a, p. 92). What is even more grave, is that clientelism can reverse the chain of accountab-
ility. In what Stokes (2005) has termed “perverse accountability,” candidates are no longer accountable
to voters, but voters are accountable to candidates by delivering their vote in the hope of being granted
access to individual benefits that are vital to them, such as scholarships to attend school, and access to
healthcare or food. This is because voters might fear that they will be excluded from these benefits if
they do not continue to support a particular party (Stokes, 2005).
If parties buy turnout, rather than vote choice, as my findings suggest, this may induce voters to parti-
cipate in elections, but allow them to vote as they please (Kramon, 2013a, p.260). If this is true, then
concerns about the representation of voter preferences in these elections and preoccupations with per-
verse accountability can be assuaged to a certain extent. My findings raise doubts about the ability of
parties to co-opt elections and to manipulate the evaluations of voters. Indeed, recent studies on determ-
inants of vote choice in Africa suggest that voters do not allow parties to completely divert their attention
from their governments’ performance on macro-economic policies. Rather, they point to African voters
behaving in similar ways to voters in established democracies, who cast their votes less on clientelistic
or ethnic grounds, and more on economic performance by their governments (e.g. Bratton, Bhavnani
and Chen, 2013; Young, 2009).
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9.3.2 Incumbency advantage, turnover, and democratization
The findings concerning the use of local promises and the credibility of these promises support the
argument made in the literature on clientelism that incumbents have a credibility advantage in promising
future benefits, compared to opposition candidates (Medina and Stokes, 2007; Wantchekon, 2003). This
has implications for the study of democratization in Africa, more broadly-speaking. The ability of
incumbent governments to divert public funds and use them to co-opt dissidents and to buy support
among the electorate has been regarded as one of the main reasons why we have seen so few turnovers of
power since the (re-)introduction of multiparty politics in the beginning of the 1990s (e.g. van de Walle,
2003). My findings suggest that incumbents not only have an advantage in distributing benefits, as they
have more resources at hand than opposition parties, but that even their promises of future delivery of
goods are deemed more credible. This underlines the importance of leveling the playing field in these
elections, by curbing ruling parties’ discretion over the use of public funds e.g. by institutionalizing
public funding provisions in order to increase campaigning funds for opposition parties.
9.3.3 The strategic use of violence
Lastly, the evidence provided in this dissertation also has important implications for efforts to ameliorate
the quality of elections in Africa. One important contribution is that my findings help identify those
voters who are most at risk to suffer from violent intimidation. The evidence sugests that these are
voters who are unaffiliated with the main parties contesting in the elections and those living in contested
regions. At the same time, however, the finding that the use of one illicit strategy seems to be conditional
on the use of another complicates propositions of how to curb the use of manipulative strategies. This
is because, in principle, efforts to curb the use of clientelism by incumbent governments, could, as an
unintended consequence, increase their incentives to use less costly means to impact election outcomes,
like violence. In fact, Mugabe’s extensive use of violence in Zimbabwe’s 2008 elections has been
interpreted as being triggered by a collapse of the economy (Collier and Vicente, 2012, p.137), which
had severely limited the government’s resources to buy votes.
9.3.4 Outlook
This dissertation has provided important insights into the logic of campaigning strategies in African
elections. The findings presented point to several avenues for future research. My findings suggest that
voters’ likelihood to participate in elections is an important determinant of which groups of voters parties
address. To further advance our understanding of the goals parties pursue during election campaigns,
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future studies should hence include voters’ likelihood to turn out, in addition to their political makeup.
My findings, further, suggest that studying only one campaigning tool in isolation might only reveal
part of the motivations of why parties target a particular group of voters. This should encourage future
research to analyze several campaign strategies simultaneously. Lastly, my findings suggest that parties
can pursue different goals with the benefits they offer voters during elections. They can use benefits
to groups of voters, such as club goods, to motivate voters living in areas with low turnout histories
to participate in the election, for example. At the same time, they can choose to channel individual
benefits to voters who are likely to turn out, because they might motivate others to follow suit. Parties
might thus target different profiles of voters, depending on the type of benefit they use to address them.
Future research interested in understanding parties’s rationale should hence study the use of campaigning
strategies at different levels of analysis.
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A.1 Questionnaire semi-structured interviews with campaign managers
1. What is the strategy you are using in the current campaign?
2. How does this year’s strategy compare to the election campaigns in 2008?
3. In what way do the campaign strategies differ between those for the presidential and those de-
signed for the parliamentary election?
4. What do you think the NDCs/NPPs strategy is?
5. What do you think voters expect from you during the campaigns?/ what has worked well for you?
• Big rallies
• Mini-rallies
• Door-to-door campaigns?
6. What is a stronghold for you?
• What is a competitive constituency for you?
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• Do you make the difference between strongholds and competitive electoral circumscriptions
only on the regional or also on the constituency-level?
7. Besides whether a constituency is competitive or a stronghold or a stronghold of the other party,
what are other characteristics you take into consideration when you design your campaign strategy?
• Ethnicity?
• Urban or rural areas?
• Poorer or wealthier voters?
• More educated or less educated voters?
8. What strategy do you use in an area where
• Majority is Ashanti?
• Majority is Akan?
• Majority is Ewe?
• Majority are Northerners?
• Urban areas
• Poorer areas?
• More educated?
9. Where do you think it is particularly important to translate the national program into promises
specific to the constituency?
10. In which way has your campaign strategy changed over time?
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A.2 Survey experiment
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A.3 Guide focus group interviews
A.3.1 Research questions
1. LOCAL VERSUS NATIONAL SCOPE
Upon hearing a local campaign promise at a rally in their constituency:
• Do participants understand that the candidate promises goods only to their constituency?
• Or do they think that he will also deliver the same goods to other constituencies?
Upon hearing a national campaign promise at a rally in their constituency:
• Do participants understand that the candidate promises goods to the whole of the country?
• Or do they think that he will only deliver the particular good to some constituencies?
• If so, what do they think determines where he will deliver these goods?
– Voting behavior?
– Ethnicity?
– Personal connections?
– Other conditions?
2. CONDITIONALITY
Upon hearing a local campaign promise at a rally in their constituency:
• Do participants actually think that the delivery of local promises is contingent on how they and
their constituency vote?
• How do they think parties find out how they vote?
• At what level of disaggregation do participants think their votes can be monitored?
• How many votes do participants think a candidate needs to win to deliver upon his promises?
Upon hearing a national campaign promise at a rally in their constituency:
• Do participants actually think that the delivery of national promises is independent and therefore
not conditional on how they and their constituency votes?
• Or do they think particular constituencies can and will be excluded even from public goods such
as the provision of free Junior High School, for example?
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A.3.2 Protocol
A) Introduction
• Explain the purpose of the exercise and lay out the rules
• All participants introduce themselves
• Mascha and Hartlyne begin and provide detailed background information on them, hoping that
participants will do the same
B) Warm-up
May I ask each of you to share with us what kind of promises you remember the two candidates of the
NDC and the NPP, John Mahama and Akufo-Addo made during their campaigns? I am sure each of you
can remember at least one.
C) Local versus national scope of promises
Let me also share some of the promises with you that I have heard of. Ask participants to read out their
promises aloud or read them for them.
If you hear this promise, what do you think? If the candidate who promised this wins, and he fulfills the
promise, who will benefit from it ?
Prompt answers with the following questions:
• Why do you think the candidate would only give X to some people?
• Whom do you think he would give X to?
• Would he be able to give X to everyone if he only wanted to?
• Why do you think the candidate would give X to everybody?
BREAK
Some politicians I have talked to, have told me that during the campaigns they tried to find out whether
people were one their side or not. How do you think they tried to find out on which side people in your
area were before the election?
Now, lets turn back to some other campaign promises. Look at this promise. If a candidate made this
promise in a constituency, say X [say name of some constituency, or show them a map with different
constituencies?], and he wins the election. Who do you think will get X?
• What if the candidate made this promise, but he lost the election. Would the candidate still give
the people X in this constituency?
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• What if this constituency (show on the map) votes massively for him, but he loses the election.
Would they get any of this X?
• What if the constituency disappoints him, but he wins the election. Would this constituency get
any of X?
• Ask about different candidates
• Encourage participantsto provide examples of the past
D) SUMMARY
We have discussed your views on many promises now. Please grant me some more patience to sum up
what we have talked about so that I am sure I have heard you well. Would this constituency get X or
not? Briefly go through all promises again.
E) Round-up
Thank everybody and explain to them what the information will be used for.
A.3.3 List of promises
National promises
“Most often, it is not the case that after school everyone will find jobs but we must also be
able to create jobs for ourselves and that is what we are intending to do in Ghana.”
“Firstly, I shall rekindle the private sector to help the youth find jobs to improve their living
conditions. This is the way to improve the economy of this country.”
“Again, since independence, there has not been any budget that makes reference to our
Zongo Muslim community in this country. But we have promised that in the first budget
of an Akuffo Addo government there shall be a provision for a Zongo Development Fund
which shall see to the development of the Zongo communities in Ghana.”
“The free education covers not only grammar education but also vocational and technical
education. Education is not going to be for the only the rich. Free secondary education shall
be a reality should I assume the high office of this country.”
“We are also coming out with the electricity for all policy which is going to provide electri-
city for any community that has a population of 500 or more.”
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Local promises
“The Headmaster has made some requests; I will appreciate it if you can put them in the
form of a letter and send it through the District Chief Executive to my office. I will advise
the GETFUND accordingly. One thing that I will personally do is to ensure that the Girls
dormitory is built for you.”
“This market does not merit Amasaman as a district capital. We shall assist the district
assembly to expand your market for you..”
“Secondly, it is sad that Kasoa with over 3000 inhabitants has no senior high school.
Someone has promised free SHS but here we, what will be the benefit if SHS is free and yet
the kids have no SHS in Kasoa to attend. I promise you, after winning the election we shall
build a modern SHS here in Kasoa. So please work had for the party. We need volunteers
to spend some few hours of their tie to work for the party and I believe Kasoa will provide
us the people to help the party successfully.”
Regional promise
“Currently we are negotiating with the Chinese Exim Bank for the money to close the gap
from Nakpanduri to Gulungungu through Garu. Once that road is done it is going to bust
economic activity here in Garu because it means Garu will become a major town on the
North-Eastern transit route as the shortest route from Bawku or Gulungungu to Accra. It
will therefore be easier to cart your agriculture produce from here to Accra.”
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B.1 Procedure to code constituencies in which campaign rallies took place
I checked the newspapers Daily Graphic and Daily Guide on a daily basis from August, 17 to Decem-
ber, 7, 2012 and made photocopies of every article containing information on any event in which NDC’s
or NPP’s running mates speak in public. I then extracted infor- mation into a dataset on the candidate
speaking (John Mahama of NDC or Akufo-Addo of NPP); the date of the event; the constituency in
which the event took place. If the date of the event was not given in the article, the general rule used
was to assume the event took place one day prior to the day when the article was published. This rule
was chosen because the most common pattern was that if the article gave precise information on the date
of the event, it referred to an event that took place on the day prior to the day on which the article was
published (61 out of 189 cases or 32.3 percent). If in the article an event in the future was announced
without information on a precise date, I assumed the event took place the day after the article was pub-
lished. If the article referred to a weekend and it was not clear whether the event took place Saturday or
Sunday, I always coded the later date, Sunday. In many cases, the constituency the event took place in
was not given in the article. In these cases I recorded all other information related to the location of the
event such as region, city, town, village, neighborhood or even the place itself if it was mentioned, such
as e.g. the city hall of Accra.
In the cases where the constituency was not mentioned in the article, I researched which constituency the
event was located in, based on the information available. I followed a standardized procedure in which
I first checked whether the name of the town mentioned in the article was a constituency headquarter,
based on a list of constituencies, constituency headquarters, districts and regions, obtained from CDD-
Ghana. If the town or city mentioned in the article did not correspond to the constituency headquarter,
I obtained longitude and latitude of the location using the website http://itouchmap.com/latlong.html. If
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the article only contained information on the city, but not on any location within the city and if the city
was divided in several constituencies, I assumed the event to have taken place in the central constituency.
E.g. Tamale Central, North, South.In such cases, I indicated the constituency as inferred and I conduct
robustness checks using a subsample containing events in which the constituency is not inferred. Using
the software QuantumGis I located the village, town or city mentioned in the article within the constitu-
ency, by matching the information on longitude and latitude with that of the constituency list. If the
information in the article was unclear because e.g. a politician inaugurated a road that goes from one
constituency to another, but is unclear where the event took place or the article only refers to an adminis-
trative unit that encompasses more than one constituency, supplementary in- formation on the event was
obtained from online media reporting on the same event. The unit of observation in the dataset is event
per day and constituency. Even if a candidate visited several places in one day within one constituency,
I coded this as only one event. This was done for reasons of reliability, since different lengths of articles
or differences in style between the two newspapers might account for the variation in how many places
per constituency the article mentions.
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Figure B.1: Effect of turnout on challenger rallies, conditional on past support
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Table C.1: Hypothesis testing, proportion of rallies with local promises, only full-length
speeches
Hypothesis Significant Type of test Test statistic p-value
Proportion of rallies with local Yes Chi2 14.5997 (1) 0.000
promises incumbent > challenger
Difference in number of rallies with local No Chi2 3.3099 (2) 0.191
promises by incumbent across past support
Rallies with local promises in NDC No Marascuilo .31 (dif), –
strongholds >swing constituencies .50 (cv)
Rallies with local promises in NDC No Marascuilo .36 (dif), –
strongholds >NPP strongholds .52 (cv)
Rallies with local promises in NDC strongholds No Chi2 0.2800 (1) 0.597
if past turnout low > turnout high
Notes: Except for the test of the effect of candidate identity, all tests are performed for campaign strategies by the incumbent.
Test values displayed in column 6 are Pearson Chi-values for Chi2 tests, degrees of freedom in brackets; difference (dif) and
critical value (cv) for Marascuilo tests and z-values for Mann-Whithney tests (WMW). All tests performed on the restricted
sample, including only speeches that are full in length.
Table C.2: Hypothesis testing, number of local promises per rally, only full-length speeches
Hypothesis IV Significant Type of test Test statistic p-value
Promises per rally incumbent > challenger Candidate yes WMW -3.923 0.0001
per rally than challenger
Local promises per rally if Northerners Northerners No WMW -1.616 0.1061
majority > Northerners minority
Local promises in NDC strongholds if past Turnout No WMW -0.736 0.4617
turnout low >past turnout high
Notes: Results of Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney and Dunn-tests of the difference in number of local promises per rally, across
different values of the independent variables. Test statisticts displayed in column 5 are z-values for the WMW-tests and ... for
the Dunn-tests. Except for the test of the effect of candidate identity, all tests are performed for campaign strategies by the
incumbent. All tests performed on the restricted sample, including only speeches that are full in length.
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Table D.1: Effect of incumbency status on the credibility of campaign promises, dep. variable
is binary
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Energy promise Water promise Energy promise Interaction
Incumbent 0.679+ 0.289 0.436 0.164
(1.82) (0.85) (1.25) (0.65)
News 0.0563 0.0830 0.112 0.0103
(0.81) (1.24) (1.21) (0.23)
Education 0.0526 −0.0212 −0.0989 0.0248
(0.84) (−0.32) (−1.24) (0.68)
NPP partisan 1.221∗∗ 0.480 0.457 0.775∗∗∗
(2.09) (1.00) (1.45) (2.90)
NDC partisan 0.566 0.237 −0.175 0.379
(1.41) (0.77) (−0.61) (1.28)
Incumbent*Local 0.442
(0.91)
Local −0.236
(−0.64)
Constant −1.121+ −0.272 0.801 −0.156
(−1.69) (−0.42) (1.29) (−0.38)
Wald χ2 7.81 3.31 6.41 17.81∗∗
Pseudo R2 0.06 0.02 0.03 0.02
Pseudo Log-Likelihood −117.46 −121.64 −98.99 −258.09
Number of clusters 15 15 15 16
Number of observations 188 189 191 396
Values are coefficients with t-statistics in parenthesis
Model 4 uses the energy promise as the dependent variable
+ p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table D.2: Effect of framing of the promises on their credibility, dep. variable is binary
(1) (2) (3)
Energy promise Water promise Street lights promise
Local −0.00872 0.0829 0.0704
(−0.03) (0.34) (0.28)
News 0.0205 0.0808+ 0.0989
(0.45) (1.95) (1.61)
Education 0.0128 −0.0500 −0.105∗∗
(0.34) (−1.14) (−2.06)
NPP partisan 0.708∗∗∗ 0.130 0.0219
(2.94) (0.45) (0.12)
NDC partisan 0.409 0.0510 −0.0431
(1.36) (0.20) (−0.34)
Constant −0.0667 0.144 1.139∗∗∗
(−0.17) (0.33) (3.11)
Wald χ2 10.14+ 5.37 5.66
Pseudo R2 0.02 0.01 0.01
Pseudo Log-Likelihood −260.15 −261.11 −213.66
Number of clusters 16 16 16
Number of observations 396 397 397
Values are coefficients with t-statistics in parenthesis
+ p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table D.3: Effect of co-identity with the candidates on the credibility of their promises, dep.
variable is binary
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Energy promise Water promise Street lights promise Interaction
Partisan 3.509∗∗∗ 2.267∗∗∗ 2.309∗∗∗ 1.545∗∗∗
(5.10) (4.20) (5.86) (2.93)
Ethnic partisan 0.0540 −0.338 −0.184 −0.293
(0.20) (−1.25) (−0.84) (−1.17)
Independent 0.744∗∗∗ 0.635∗∗∗ 0.802∗∗∗
(3.09) (2.69) (2.78)
News −0.0527 0.0219 0.0499 0.0279
(−0.88) (0.57) (0.75) (0.72)
Education 0.0600 −0.0189 −0.0674 −0.0203
(1.57) (−0.42) (−1.19) (−0.47)
Local −0.152
(−0.64)
Partisan*Local 0.924+
(1.67)
Constant −0.541 −0.0936 0.634∗∗ 0.226
(−1.45) (−0.23) (2.06) (0.51)
Wald χ2 35.12∗∗∗ 22.88∗∗∗ 54.31∗∗∗ 22.60∗∗∗
Pseudo R2 0.21 0.12 0.11 0.11
Pseudo Log-Likelihood −220.89 −241.93 −203.40 −244.43
Number of clusters 16 16 16 16
Number of observations 416 417 418 417
Values are coefficients with t-statistics in parenthesis
+ p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Model 4 is uses the energy promise as the dependent variable
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Table E.1: Descriptive statistics for the subsample used to fit the individual turnout model
Mean SD Min Max
Voted 0.821 0.383 0 1
Age 38.861 14.431 18 99
Member of dominant ethnic group 0.484 0.500 0 1
Contact local official 0.277 0.448 0 1
Contact party official 0.159 0.366 0 1
Attends community meetings 2.291 1.302 0 4
Attended campaign 0.476 0.500 0 1
Obervations 2913
Regions 115
Table E.2: Descriptive Statistics for the subsample used to fit models on clientelism and intim-
idation
Mean SD Min Max
Vote-buying 0.244 0.430 0 1
Intimidation 0.705 0.456 0 1
Poverty 0.045 0.998 -1.398 3.184
Age 38.202 13.707 18 100
Female 0.494 0.500 0 1
Urban 0.375 0.484 0 1
Education 3.392 1.938 0 9
Information 1.509 1.038 0 4
Vote propensity 0.808 0.136 0.176 0.978
Non-partisan 0.312 0.463 0 1
Id winning party 0.361 0.480 0 1
Id with other party 0.327 0.469 0 1
Turnout 0.633 0.137 0.378 0.924
Competitiveness 0.604 0.284 0.056 0.984
Observations 8992
Regions 91
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0.012
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0.095
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0.070
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